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    ABSTRACT 
 
This study seeks to understand and examine the role of public policy units with a specific 
focus on the South African National Parliament Policy Management Unit (PMU). The 
problem being investigated is that of a lack of constructive support and debate in 
understanding the role and functions of policy management units. Thus, the scope of the 
study is limited to policy management units with the South African Parliament PMU as a 
special reference.  
 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate the role of policy management units, 
with particular reference to the PMU in the South African Parliament. The secondary 
objectives will then be to provide a theoretical perspective of the role and functions of 
policy management units; and to develop a case of the PMU in Parliament for further 
analysis and examination. Examples of existing policy units and the support they have 
with parliaments will be produced, assessed, and explored. These will be illustrated by 
examining the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in the Congress of the United State 
of America as an exemplary policy unit. The secondary objectives will also seek to 
develop a framework that will suggest and recommend the role and functions that the 
PMU should play. Lastly, the objectives will conclude and recommend, based on the 
literature review and the fieldwork results, appropriate ways and means that will assist 
the South African Parliament to perform its duties efficiently and effectively, through 
technical interventions from a modified and politically realigned Policy Management 
Unit.     
 
The study will recommend and conclude that, by virtue of their expertise and skills, the 
PMU staff members are confined to administrative or internal policies. Therefore, they 
are under-utilised. Based on a rational desire to improve policy management capacity and 
quality in policy-making, deliberations and decision-making, it is therefore paramount to 
reconfigure the role of the Policy Management Unit in the South African National 
Parliament so to benefit parliamentarians.  
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Hogwood and Gunn (1984: 172) suggest that, ―The most suitable ways of improving 
creativity would seem to be to recruit persons capable of original thinking and to provide 
an organisational climate which supports rather than suppresses such thinking‖. Policy 
experts, the study advocates, should then, in the name of capacitating and empowering 
political elites, be placed as ― … islands of professional policy excellence near main 
decision-making parameters or boundaries, to provide holistic and innovative analysis as 
an aid to top-level decision-making‖ (Dror 1988: 281). The role of policy units is to 
provide policy advice, policy analysis, policy research, policy guidelines or alternatives, 
policy design, and monitoring and evaluation to policy decision-makers.   
 
Employing a qualitative approach as a methodological paradigm, did allow the researcher 
to analyse, investigate, interpret, as well as to participate in research activit ies for a better 
understanding of the workings of Parliament, research and independent policy units.  
 
The fieldwork findings suggest that, the existing Policy Management Unit in Parliament 
is not understood and sufficiently conceptualised. As a result, the Unit is limited to 
internal policies, instead of attending to macro-governmental or external policies as its 
primary objective. Findings reveal that the PMU is not providing a successful and 
effective policy support service to Parliament. Various recommendations have been made 
in this respect.   
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DEFINITIONS OF CONCEPTS 
 
Policy Units – The major function of such professional staff units it to contribute to 
better policymaking by considering alternatives more thoroughly and by imaginatively 
creating new policy alternatives (Dror, 1983: 266). 
 
Public Policy – Is whatever government choose to do or not to do … Thus, public 
policies may regulate behaviour, organise bureaucracies, distribute benefits, or extract 
taxes – or all these things at one (Dye, 1995, 2). 
  
Administrative Policy  - Administrative policy pertains to various aspects of a policy 
such as the income and expenditure of a particular government department, inclusive of 
stores, provision, development, utilisation and maintenance of personnel and other 
factors‖ (Cloete, De Coning and Wissink 2006: 19). 
 
Policy-making – Policy-making is the activity preceding the publication of a goal, while 
a policy statement is the making known, the formal articulation, the declaration of intent 
or the publication of a goal to be pursued (Hanekom, 1996: 7).  
 
Policy Analysis – Is any type of analysis that generates and presents information in such 
a way as to improve the basis for policy-makers to exercise their judgement … The 
activities involved may range from research to illuminate or provide insight into an 
anticipated issue or problem to evaluation of a complete programme (Dunn, 1994: 61).  
 
Policy Analysts – Are individuals with multidisciplinary character, concerned with what 
the decision-makers and policy-makers do or do not do. They are interested in the inputs 
and processes of a policy area (Parsons, 1995: 29-30). 
  
Policy Implementation – Policy implementation is the conversion of mainly physical 
and financial resources into concrete services delivery outputs in the form of facilities 
 
 
 
 
 xvi 
and services, or into other concrete outputs aimed at achieving policy objective (Cloete, 
et al. 2006: 183). 
 
Think-Tank – The term commonly used to describe organisations that perform research 
on policy. Their role is to role is to focus on policy and legal issues, free from partisan 
influence and ideological biases, and provide the research and creative thinking that 
legislative bodies do not have time or resources to produce (Carter,  2008: 41). 
 
Government – Government comprises those institutions and officials whose purpose it is 
to write and enact laws and to execute and enforce public policy. Government consists of 
legislators, the executive, the courts, appointed and elected officials (bureaucrats) in all 
branches of the state (Gitelson, Dudley & Dubnick, 2001: 12) 
 
Parliament – Is the most important branch of government; it lays down basic principles 
which the Executive has to apply in the implementation of laws … the power to legislate 
resides in Parliament, which alone represents the sovereign people (Inter-Parliamentary 
Union, 1976: 571).  
 
Executive – The executive branch of government is the extension of government which 
implements the policies that reflects the needs and desires of the public and which are 
directed at solving the ailments and problems in society (Fox & Wissink, 1990: 48). 
 
Policy Management Capacity – Refers to the establishment of a viable machinery that 
would be responsible for analysing and reviewing public policy on a permanent and 
continuous basis (Mutahaba & Balogun, 1992: 47).   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
It is argued that, where parliamentary democracy system exists, the constitution of the 
country mandates with authority, parliaments to design policies and fulfill their law-
making responsibilities and to follow appropriate processes and procedures when doing 
so (Murray & Nijzink, 2002:88). It is overwhelming and objectively argued that ― … 
legislators lack the expert knowledge required for the enactment of detailed laws‖ 
(Gildenhuys & Knipe, 2000:151). Thus, for parliament to perform its responsibilities 
efficiently and effectively, it certainly requires mechanisms that will ―… bridge the gap 
between knowledge and power‖ (McGann & Johnson, 2005:12), and also technical 
expertise and professionals who will capacitate, advise, and prepare elite politicians, 
specifically on public policy-making.  
 
It is said that public policy-making is a complex scientific exercise that demands 
competent governance, with intense acquisition of facts and knowledge about external 
problems, so to formulate better solutions (Parsons, 1995:17). Elaborating on the above 
statement, policy scholars are of the view that, for accurate and relevant public policies to 
exist, it is practically and scientifically imperative to have policy institutions or units 
within (in-house) and outside (think-tanks) the political system with dedicated ‗multi-
disciplinary capacity‘, assisting as technical support structures with the aim of 
augmenting intellectual ability and capacity for the benefit of official policy makers. In-
house policy units are defined as policy analysts, who are responsible for policy research 
and intelligence in parliaments, governmental agencies and public bodies (Parsons, 1995: 
30). Independent policy units or think-tanks are, according to McGann and Johnson 
(2005), autonomous policy institutions producing objective policy analysis, advocacy, 
education, and policy formulation. Hence, it is appropriate to associate or describe policy 
units as sources of intellectual information and capacity for adequate and quality policy 
input-output, and as providers of empirical policy research, analysis, and design.                                                
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The perceived gradual decline of technical capacity in parliaments is critically described 
as detrimental in policy-making, effective developmental strategies, and in reconciling 
political power with expert knowledge, particularly on the African continent (Olowu & 
Sako, 2002). In view of the fact that Africa is part of a global world, globalisation 
demands efficient and effective political institutions. Where political elites are 
empowered through the establishment of what Dror (1988:281) calls, ―… professional 
islands of policy excellence near main decision-making (legislators) parameters or 
boundaries‖, referring to in-house or ‗government affiliated‘ policy analysts. Whose main 
responsibility would be to provide evidence-based policy research, dynamic and 
innovative policy programmes and projects, relevant policy advice, monitoring and 
evaluation. The statements by Dror, explicitly advocate for the formation of across-
boundary policy unit that will operate within a political framework, and be staffed with 
professional policy analysts, policy researchers, monitoring and evaluating specialists, 
and legal experts. Who possess technical abilities to write and interpret complex policy 
documents. 
 
In examining the role of policy management units, the study will specifically focus on the 
functions of policy units working within the official political framework, as well as 
making significant references to policy units operating outside of the official political 
system. In Chapter Five, the role, the functions and the existence of the South African 
National Parliament and the Policy Management Unit are examined.  
 
It is imperative to mention that this is neither a policy analysis nor a policy-making study; 
however important aspects of these will be explored.   
 
Policy units in many democratic countries, particularly those from the developed world 
are playing a significant role as institutional support structures, providing empirical and 
qualified information to parliaments, and to government in general. The United States of 
America (USA) is the most experienced and advanced state in this regard. Countries like 
Brazil, through their open system approach have full acknowledgement when it comes to 
independent policy units, where government ―… has established an official mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 3 
for partnering with them in the delivery of social services‖ (McGann & Johnson, 2005: 
37). Employing the USA‘s institutional structural support system in this study is nothing 
more than a way of advancing and qualifying arguments in this study. Arguments 
disseminating from views or perceptions suggesting that, policy units and other policy 
stakeholders in Africa, that are expected to have an impact on policy processes have not 
played any significant role in the public policy scenario. Their magnitude of influence is 
relatively minimal. For that, ―External actors, most notably international financial 
institutions, bilateral and multilateral donor organizations, and northern NGOs – have 
dominated the policy process‖ (Olowu & Sako, 2002: 63) in Africa.  
 
It is argued that, public policies will always have negative or positive effects on societies. 
That policy affects all citizens in different ways, hence, the call to augment and perhaps 
equip intellectual abilities and capacity, especially of policy decision-makers (Anderson, 
1997: 6) is vital. The consensual view by most public policy experts and scholars, in 
relation to policy management capacity development, sees policy units as providers of 
technical knowledge to legislatures. Policy units are the basis for effective and efficient 
political institutions, for relevant policy and good governance. It is for this reason, that 
the study supports and advocates the creation of an in-house policy unit, to enable 
parliamentarians to directly access adequate policy advice, policy alternatives, policy 
research, policy analysis, monitoring and evaluating skills.  
 
1.2 MOTIVATON AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
The National Parliament of South Africa is the ultimate political decision-making body in 
the country. Its prerogative and responsibility is about delivery of goods and services to 
the voters (Venter, 1998: 23). Empowered by the Constitution, the role and responsibility 
of Parliament is to uphold democracy and preserve stability, to hold the Executive to 
account and deliver services, and most importantly to make and pass laws. Hopkinson 
(1995) indicates that the new democratic South African National Parliament is faced with 
socioeconomic and political challenges that require appropriate mission and vision with 
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quality inputs and outputs, and that the little experience that exists among the thousands 
of new Parliamentarians is seen as a set-back for a developmental state.  
 
It is argued that constitutional mandate alone does not transform or make parliaments 
effective and efficient political bodies, neither will they be innovative and creative when 
debating developmental public policies. The observation by Murray & Nijzink (2002: 4) 
suggests that, levels of expertise are not always present in the plenary sessions of 
legislatures. Hence, the division of labour through select committees within the mandate 
of Parliament seeks to address the above in a manner where efficiency and intellect is 
applied, particularly in policy deliberations and reviews. The argument is, for legislators 
to be able to engage in complex policy debates and also interpret documents with 
confidence. Technical capacity support is required, so they can analyse, communicate and 
perform independently, as policy decision-makers. ―Creativity in policy-making requires 
more synthesizing and integrative skills and the ability to look at the problems from a 
broader, more holistic perspective, visualizing the proverbial whole elephant, rather its 
trunk, ears, or tail alone‖ (Olowu and Sako, 2002: 116). 
 
This study, advocates that, the formula for a strong, effective and efficient Legislature is 
to draw the expertise of policy analysts, experts and policy researcher to provide 
empirical support in policy decision-making for Members of Parliament (MPs). 
Technical policy support can only be derived from policy units, whom by virtue of their 
existence, are professionally qualified to provide internal and external policy analysis, 
policy advice, policy research, monitoring and evaluation, and knowledge management. 
This study is motivated by arguments that say, it is important to allow policy researchers, 
analysts, and advisors working in policy management units within and outside the 
parliamentary framework, more space to exercise and provide a meaningful support to 
parliamentarians. In order for those units to have sufficient impact, it is necessary to 
expand the prescribed mandate; especially to allow those working within the 
parliamentary framework to focus more on national policies, specifically referring to the 
PMU. 
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The current South African National Parliament Policy Management Unit (PMU) has less 
impact in influencing the core business of Parliament, that is, to make laws and to 
monitor the Executive‘s programmes through its oversight role. The PMU only focuses 
on interpreting internal or administrative policies such as travel expenses, 
accommodation, cell phones, meals, sick leave, unpaid leave and annual leave, to name a 
few (see Policy Management Unit, 2006). The study advocates therefore that, instead of 
looking only at policies which are administrative and procedural by nature. The PMU 
should be adding value to the intellectual capacity of legislators, by assisting MPs to 
identify and analyse the demographic impacts of policies, their cost implications, and by 
providing MPs with skills so to enforce the intensions, goals and objectives of the new 
democratic Parliament. 
  
For efficient service delivery, there is a need for qualified individuals to assist on national 
strategic policy coordination. Individuals with professional expertise in policy advise, 
while empowering parliamentarians to unpack, deliberate, and communicate policies that 
are mainly initiated by the Executive. According to Griffith, Ryle and Wheeler-Booth 
(1989),  the executive possesses the required technical capacity and sufficient human 
resources, as a result, it carries an advantage over the legislature on public policy-making 
processes, thereof, demoting Parliament to a mere debating forum. 
     
Motivated by the role that policy analyst could and have been playing in developed 
parliamentary democratic states. This study will argue and recommend that, the current 
Policy Management Unit‘s role and functions should be realigned to fit the political 
context of Parliament. The study will further advocate for a clear mandate to be given to 
the PMU so that it can exist as an advisory and technical support Unit, responsible and 
accountable to Parliament. This study will also show that, politicians in general are 
failing to recognise the contributions and the inputs made by policy units, because of 
political allegiance. This unfortunate conduct and practice is as a result of negative 
attitudes, which are accompanied by political stereotypes and actions, where structural 
authority and status, plays a major role (Cloete et al., 2006: 298). This behaviour is a 
recipe for losing specialists and policy intellectuals, who possess the skills to contribute 
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and transmit valuable knowledge on research and policy to private and international 
institutions. More critically, this is a recipe that will gradually work against the objective 
of producing empirical and relevant laws by policy decision-makers. Laws that are 
suppose to address socioeconomic and political challenges in the country. 
Institutionalising policy analysis, for national strategic development and profound policy 
deliberations is perceived as a tool to improve policy review, decision-making, and policy 
coordination across institutional boundaries. Such, is informed by the understanding that, 
―Power has always used the clever, wise and experts‖ (Parsons, 1995: 386) to advance 
the effectiveness, efficiency and capacity of institutions, in this case, parliament.    
  
As a public policy management student, I am more interested in policy management 
capacity, particularly the need to technically empower policy decision-makers and actors. 
Evidence-based policy research is critical to me. I believe that to be a public policy 
scholar, one needs to understand first and foremost, how policies are formulated (policy 
process). Be able to identify who is responsible for what and how (policy management), 
and who has the authority to initiate, enact or reject policies (policy decision-making). 
However, as mentioned before, my focus is more on the technical support and capacity 
that exists in parliaments when dealing with complex policy-making processes. Policy 
units (within the political framework), I will argue, if given enough space could play a 
crucial role directly and indirectly in policy processes, policy management, and policy 
decision-making.  
 
The study will demonstrate that, due to its current mandate the PMU is losing its 
fundamental reputation as an organ that should be providing legislative and policy 
support to Parliament. The PMU has been downgraded to administrative, procedural and 
human resources, as its primary role. It is therefore imperative to revisit and re-examine 
the role and functions of the PMU within the structural composition and the core business 
of Parliament.     
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1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
It is argued that, the role of policy analysts has increased over the years because they are 
bringing and developing more information and more weight, as well as new analytical 
techniques to the public policy-making process (Cloete et al, 2006: 323).  
 
Policy management units in general bear the intellectual ability and the capacity to 
provide empirical policy proposals, to manage and facilitate technical policy challenges, 
and to profoundly analyse, advise, project, and monitor macro-governmental policies. 
Disappointingly so, these units are often faced with hostile working relations as a result 
of territorial boundaries, with lack of constructive support and debates in understanding 
the role and functions of the policy management units. 
 
Staffed with highly qualified, well informed, skilled and professional policy analysts, the 
PMU‘s mandate should be to support the Legislature, in identifying aspects of research, 
facilitating and coordinating policy initiatives and alternatives, and advising and 
analysing macro-governmental policies. Based on literature review, structural 
conceptualisation and alignment is critical to in-house policy units to be influential and 
effective when providing support on legislative and policy matters. To make Parliament 
more effective and efficient, at the same time improving its institutional ability to 
perform its role as an oversight and law-making body, one needs more that a political will 
to do such. But a creative and intellectually capacitated Parliament that will demonstrate 
confidence with authority when initiating, debating, and passing national policies and 
programmes.  
 
The research problem in this study is therefore that, the Policy Management Unit in the 
South Africa National Parliament is only subjected to administrative work which 
undermines and weakens the essence of its function. As a result, despite having highly 
qualified policy experts, analysts and researchers, the PMU remains isolated from being 
an influential unit to Parliament on macro-governmental public policies.   
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1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
Speaking to the problem statement, the primary and the secondary objectives highlighted 
in this section seek to profoundly address the role and the existence of policy units, and 
think-tanks in relation to official policy decision-makers (the legislature and executive).  
 
1.4.1 Primary objective 
 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate the role of policy management units, 
with particular reference to the PMU in the South African Parliament.  
  
1.4.2 Secondary objectives 
 
The secondary objectives of this study are to: 
 Provide a theoretical perspective on the role of policy management units; 
 Record and develop a case study of the PMU  in Parliament; 
 Provide an assessment on the working relationship between Parliament and the 
PMU;  
 Develop sound recommendations that will assist in identifying the role and 
functions that the PMU should play; 
 Conclude and recommend appropriate ways and means that will assist the 
institution in producing and retaining good quality advisors, and analysts who 
perform based on expectation and requirements;  
 
In reference to the above objectives, the guiding questions of this study are: 
 What is the extent of the role of the policy units in parliaments? 
 How effective and influential are policy units from the developed countries? 
 What is the role of the PMU in the South African Parliament? 
 How can policy management capacity in Parliament be improved?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
        
In a parliamentary democracy system, parliaments give politicians the right and authority 
to make policy decisions, to pass and reject laws. It present parliamentarians with a 
mandate to oversee the implementation of national programmes, and projects initiated the 
executive and other state agencies. As a result, presenting parliament as the highest 
decision-maker that upholds the constitution as the supreme law of the country. The 
literature in this study will focus on different factors that contribute to what is known as 
good governance and effective parliament.  Moharir (2002: 113) mentions six of those 
factors: 
 Effectiveness (achieving of goals and objectives of policy). Indicated by the 
contribution policy output makes to the realisation of policy objectives. 
 Efficiency (realisation of policy objectives in less time and with less cost). 
Indicated by the ratio outputs to inputs. 
 Innovation (creativity and innovation on policy design, mainly to realise the three 
criteria, in practise this is difficult in bureaucratic environments). 
 Political feasibility (degree of acceptance of policy by proximate policy makers, 
political executives, legislature, and interest groups).  
 Administrative feasibility (willingness, capacity, and ability of implementing 
agencies and target groups to realise policy objectives within stated time and cost 
parameters).    
 
In examining parliament further, it is argued that, the essence of its operation is mainly 
and primarily done through specific committees, which are identified as an integral part 
of parliament‘s workings. Parliamentary committee are defined as ― … mechanism to 
ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of government are 
accountable to it‖ (Van Niekerk, et al, 2001: 71). These longitudinally selected members 
of the legislature are to deal with specific issues. They hold the authority to investigate, 
deliberate and advise on matters before Parliament, and ― … they act as a vital contact 
point with the public‖ (Murray & Nijzink, 2002: 60). ―The most important role of 
committees, on the other hand, is to develop expertise, to gather information and to do the 
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detailed work that must underpin properly informed decisions about public policy‖ 
(Murray & Nijzink, 2002: 60). Committees are constitutionally designed to provide 
specific analytically knowledge and expertise for legislators ― … cutting across many 
policy areas‖ (Murray & Nijzink, 2002: 60). In the South African National Parliament 
context, the existence of committees through its support mechanisms contributes to the 
realisation of the six factors identified by Moharir (2002).   
 
According to Friedman (1995: 14), government does not know enough about the 
environment in which it operates. Legislators will always turn to researchers on issues of 
policy formulation and problem solving. This is in agreement with the argument by Sako 
(2002: 78) that, ―Many governments lack the capacity to design, implement, and monitor 
development policies and programmes‖. Thus, suggesting for an introduction of an 
adequate technical support structure comprising of qualified policy analysts and 
researchers, who will serve as technical capacity providers to parliamentarians. This is 
based on the understanding that, policy writing, research and policy analysis is a complex 
exercise that requires profound policy debates by official decision-makers (Anderson, 
1997: 134).  
 
Theoretically, ―Public policy is decided by the legislator and is, as such, the output of the 
political process. The implementation of the legislator‘s policy decisions is the task of the 
public institution‖ (Van Niekerk et. al., 2001: 93). However, practical terms reveal that 
public policies, at state level, are initiated and determined by the executive. This is 
perceived as a practice that might, or tends to alienate and underrate the intellectual 
capacity and ability of parliament in public policy-making processes.  Public policy is a 
contested and broad discipline. By its nature, it is a cross-cutting exercise that somehow, 
creates tensions, particularly between the legislatures, executive, think-tanks and civil 
societies. This is evidently so, if and when coordination and working relations are not 
properly designed and managed.  
 
With a general understanding of their role and expertise they possess, it is argued that, the 
― … most important participant in public policy analysis is the policy analyst, whose 
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primary function is to analyse and evaluate the policies referred to him with a view to 
advising the policy maker on the best course of action to resolve policy inadequacies‖ 
(Hanekom, 1996: 70). The argument by Hanekom, which depicts the role of policy units 
as providers of evidence-based policy research, and of creative thinking that legislators 
do not have time for, enjoys a broader consent from many policy scholars. Carter (2008: 
43) argues that, policy units and think-tanks in general, staffed with quality analysts and 
researchers serve as a necessary support for both the legislature and executive. In that, 
policy analysts, provides independent voice that is free of party influences and 
ideological biases. Carter (2008) further indicates that, policy units play a critical role in 
building institutional policy management capacity, by providing training, seminars, and 
workshops for legislatures and executives. The argument is, national and political 
policies require the support and expertise of policy units.  
 
In most of the developed countries, policy management units, outside or within the 
political framework, are integral parts of a comprehensive political system operating 
within a clearly defined framework. Appropriate conceptualisation and 
institutionalisation of policy units stimulates better inputs-outputs, and that the realisation 
of an effective policy support structure creates space for better policy facilitation and 
collaboration, which in turn, provides a forum for understanding disagreements, if not a 
resolution of them (White, 1999: 324). 
 
 By inviting different interest groups to participate in policy debates and submit proposals 
on a particular policy area, certainly promotes the importance of a working relationship 
between key policy players. As well as enhancing a more cooperative and functioning 
intergovernmental and cross-boundary communication approach, specifically on public 
policy development. White (1999: 326) explains the above as an exercise that 
encompasses a participatory experience, of sharing ideas that eventually produces 
powerful motivation factors for establishing a course of action. This is to enable and to 
address what Olowu (2002: 63) defines as a better processing of information, with the 
view of generating responsive fact-based policies, with all key policy actors participating.   
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Policy experts and analysts have a duty of making sure that what they develop meets the 
standards not only of their particular country but of the world, taking into cognisance the 
issue of the rule of law, globalisation, and ongoing environmental, socio-political, and 
economic changes.  Global politics requires that, national policies should be designed in 
order to address, promote and facilitate the adoption of good (corporate) governance, 
which is pertinent to service delivery, eradication of poverty, accuracy, transparency and 
efficiency. Hence organisations in modern democracies, to a certain extent, are required 
to function and think globally and be structured as such, so to allow high standards of 
intellectual activities to exist. The global notion advocates that good governance, viewed 
as outputs or outcomes of the governance system, depends on the state‘s ability to use 
available state and non-state institutional capacities to make and implement effective 
policies (Olowu & Sako, 2002: 67).  
 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
   
A research methodology should accurately reflect or rather speak to the research motive, 
research objectives, and to the research problem, so to assist in formulating relevant and 
precise findings and recommendation. Mouton (1996: 36) defines research methodology 
as ―… the means required to execute a certain stage in the research process‖. This is a 
social science research, employing qualitative methodology as its paradigm. Employing a 
qualitative approach as a methodological paradigm will assist the researcher to assess 
how people (in particular participants) think, what are their ideas, perceptions, and 
beliefs. How they act and respond to issues that affects their livelihoods. Further more, by 
deciding to apply a qualitative methodology means that, this research will explore, 
investigate, describe, interpret, and be participatory oriented. The study will examine and 
describe key variables; namely parliaments, policy units (within and outside the political 
framework) and capacity building, in relations to access to knowledge, skills and 
expertise. This study will try to address theoretical and practical problems related to the 
above variables. 
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It is essential to state that, ―… methodological paradigms are more than the mere 
collection of research methods and techniques – the term ‗methodological paradigm‘ is 
used to or include both the actual methods and techniques that to be used, as well as the 
underlying principle and the assumption regarding their use‖ (Babbie et. al., 2001: 49). 
Figure 1.1 explains the fundamental relationship between assumptions, relevant 
methodology and appropriate methods and techniques. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The main and fundamental goal of this approach is to demonstrate how relevant, 
significant, original, legitimate, reliable, valid, objective, and usable the research is, as 
explained by Cloete (2006: 259).  This should allow or rather ensure that, when the same 
exercise or study is performed again under the same conditions, the same findings will be 
obtained (Goddard & Melville, 2001: 41).  
Epistemological 
assumption 
Ontological 
assumption 
Methodological paradigms 
Research methods 
Research techniques 
Quantitative Participatory 
Qualitative 
Sampling, Data 
collection 
Data 
analysis 
                Research goal 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1.1 Levels in the methodological dimension 
Source: Mouton (1996: 37) 
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The study seeks to understand the role of Policy Management Unit in the South African 
National Parliament, to achieve that, it will be critically appropriate to maximise the 
theoretical validity, measurement validity, representativeness, reliability, and inferential 
validity as defined by Mouton (1996: 112). In providing answers to theory and problem 
statement, it was necessary for the researcher to employ a multi-method approach that 
will, whilst balancing methodological paradigms, continues to address issues arising from 
the research methods. For accurate verification, population sampling, data collection, and 
data analysis will facilitate the classification of information gathered through observation, 
questionnaires and interviews. The aim is to enable the researcher to translate and analyse 
raw knowledge using various techniques for authenticity and to confirm and disconfirm 
the given information. This approach is in line with what Kelly (2006) called a 
‗triangulation‘ approach. Kelly explains, ―Triangulation entails collecting material in as 
many different ways and from as many diverse sources as possible (Terre Blanche, 
Durreheim & Painter, 2006: 287). In accordance, the triangulation approach allows for 
both qualitative and quantitative data to be viewed equally, it gives room for adequate 
balancing of information from primary and secondary source, therefore overcoming 
inappropriate theoretical assumptions and biases. Interpreting and recording subjective 
experiences of participants (ontology) combined with direct participation and careful 
listening to what they say (epistemology), form the basis on how data will be analysed in 
this research. ―The key in doing a good interpretive analysis is to stay close to the data, to 
interpret it from a position of emphatic understanding‖ (Terre Blanche, Durreheim & 
Painter, 2006: 321).  
 
 In this study, research methods and techniques comprise both primary and secondary 
sources. The primary source of information in this context included interviews, 
questionnaires, and direct observations. The secondary sources of information included 
academic and relevant research-based books, journals and media articles, parliamentary 
and government annual reports and manuals, conference papers, and relevant available 
electronic resources. Theoretical framework and fieldwork results (analysis), will inform 
the recommendations and the conclusion of the study.   
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By ―Conducting an interview is a more natural form of interacting with people, …   
It gives us an opportunity to get to know the people quite intimately‖ (Terre Blanche, 
Durreheim & Painter, 2006: 297). Primary observation included two (2) parliamentary 
sessions to directly observe and understand how parliamentarians debate and conduct 
their business, and one (1) Parliament Research Unit seminar organised by the UWC Law 
Faculty. The researcher attended four (4) Portfolio Committee meetings where policy or 
content debates, presentations and submissions by different stakeholders, organisations, 
departments, experts and academics were undertaken. Interviews were scheduled and 
conducted; two (2) officials from the Policy Management Unit; four (4) experts from 
independent policy institutions (think-tanks); two (2) academics were interviewed; two 
(2) parliamentary officers from unions were interviewed; and fifteen (15) Members of 
Parliament and officials were interviewed. Most of the individuals interviewed in 
Parliament are long serving officials exposed to policy-making and policy decision-
making. Twenty five (25) questionnaires were emailed to Members of Parliament 
(randomly selected considering party representation) directly to their email addresses and 
through their political party parliamentary offices. Of those, ten (10) were returned 
completed. Questionnaires and interviews asked questions that seek to understand and 
examine the presence of capacity building in relations to policy design and management 
in Parliament, the role and the relationship between policy units and parliaments, and 
how effective policy units are, with particular reference to the PMU. 
   
Both interviews and questionnaires were unambiguous, not biased in terms of political 
affiliations. Party political affiliations and party ideological beliefs were not a determiner 
in selecting a sampling frame. Stratified random sampling as explained by Goddard and 
Melville (2001: 36-37) is used to identify and select participants. For the purpose of this 
research, the sample is confined to MPs, policy researchers, policy analysts from 
independent policy units and from parliaments, as well as academics involved in public 
policy management. For a fair and better representation, interviewees from all institutions 
and units who participated in this research were selected randomly, whilst carefully 
considering their contribution and relevance to the study. Participants in this research 
were informed of their right to stay anonymous, of refusal and of the degree of 
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confidentiality with which the material that they provided would be handled. The purpose 
of the study was clearly translated to them.  
 
1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
The nature of the study is confined to policy management units in relation to parliaments. 
To be able to manage the study and meet the research objectives of the study, the 
researcher confined the focus of research to the Policy Management Unit in the South 
African National Parliament. Thus, the findings in this study cannot generically substitute 
or be applicable to other countries and parliaments. However, it is suggested that it will 
be prudent and advisable for the South African National, Provincial, and Local 
Government Legislatures, to study and perhaps consider the findings and the 
recommendations of the research as it could be beneficial. Because of its nature and 
scope, the research could not provide more quantitative information as it is a qualitative 
study and limited to such. It should be mentioned that the PMU is a new establishment, 
and therefore no previous study has been done on this Unit.  
 
1.8 ETHICS STATEMENT 
 
Having read and understood the UWC ethics code of conduct, the study: 
 
 Obtained the consent of the participants from Parliament before research is 
undertaken. 
 Ensured that the well-being of the participants takes precedence over the expected 
benefits to knowledge. 
 Informed participants of their right of refusal and of the degree of confidentiality 
with which the material that they provide will be handled. 
 Ensured that participants have the right to remain anonymous and to have their 
right to privacy and confidentiality respected, permitting no release of information 
about individual persons that has been guaranteed as confidential, to any person 
inside and outside the Parliament. 
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 Approached the project with an unbiased attitude and strive to gather evidence 
fairly and accurately. 
 Documented the source of information and the process of analysis in each task in 
sufficient detail to enable a technically qualified colleague to understand what 
was done and to verify that the work meets all appropriate standards and 
expectations.  
 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Chapter One introduces and identifies research problems and questions. In this chapter 
the study will state the research objective, define important concepts, and provide a brief 
description on the theoretical framework. Research methodology and the limitations of 
the study are also explained in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Two broadly deals with the theoretical and literature review encompassing 
definitions, types of public policy, and key policy actors or stakeholders. This chapter 
will give a theoretical perspective on capacity building in relation to government, and 
parliament in particular.  
 
Chapter Three discusses parliament as a political institution; its mandate, role and 
functions, and the weakness of this supreme and rather unique organisation. This section 
will, as an example, discuss the Congress of the USA and its institutional support 
mechanisms in public policy-making.  
 
Chapter Four will begin by discussing the relationship between evidence and research 
on the subject of public policy-making. This chapter will define and examine the role and 
functions of policy analysts in relations to Parliament, and how influential they can be if 
appropriately utilised and acknowledged. Furthermore, weaknesses and disadvantages of 
policy analysts and units will also be outlined and discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter Five specifically deals with the South African Parliament. This Chapter will 
provide a brief historical background of the South African National Parliament, and 
subsequently identify the role and functions of Parliament as the highest political organ 
of the 1994 democracy. The chapter will highlight political concerns, leading to the 
formation of the PMU; at the same time the chapter will critically describe and discuss 
the current role and functions of the PMU.   
 
Chapter Six will capture and discuss the findings from the fieldwork.  
 
Chapter Seven will draw and propose recommendations and conclusions based on the 
theoretical review discussed in Chapter Two and Three, and the findings discussed in 
Chapter Six.  
 
1.10 CONCLUSION 
 
Technically, this is an introductory chapter. In serving its purpose the chapter describes 
the nature of the study, the paradigms, and the composition of the research. This chapter 
briefly identified a theoretically framework which will form the basis of the research 
analysis and interpretive examination. The problem statement which the study seeks to 
investigate and clarify is highlighted in this chapter, thus complementing the objectives, 
purpose, and the motivation of the study. Research methodologies have been clearly 
identified, distinguished and appropriately alluded to. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC POLICY AND 
POLICY-MAKING  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Drawing from the literature review, this chapter begins by providing definitions of public 
policy as a discipline and an exercise, as defined by public policy experts and scholars. 
The chapter will further present the types of public policies with subsequent discussions 
on the key actors in public policy-making, as described by Hanekom (1996: 21) as ―… 
official and unofficial policy-makers‖.  The relationship that exists between the official 
and unofficial policy-makers will also be alluded to. In an effort to address one of the 
main objectives in this study, the subsequent section will therefore focus on the pertinent 
issue of policy management capacity, with policy experts from both official and 
unofficial policy actors, arguably perceived to be at the centre of capacity building for the 
benefit of policy input and output.  
 
The focus area of this study and specifically of this chapter is to identify the essential key 
actors in policy-making, and how they intervene as analysts and experts in policy 
management capacity and in public policy-making processes as a whole. ―Governments 
need access to analytical capacity around the many issues they have to deal with‖ 
(Heymans, 1996: 35), given the types of policies that exists, and ―… other influences, 
perhaps the effects of other government activities, which were not taken into account in 
the development of policy ideas‖ (Hogwood, 1987: 8). Informed by the above, there is a 
view that promotes or suggests a correlation and synergy between public policy-making 
and capacity building.  
 
Based on the premises that recognises not only the existing correlation between public 
policy and intellect, by nature public policy is a complex subject and exercise, and is 
eminently inter-organisational oriented (Peters, 1993: 5).   
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2.2 WHAT IS PUBLIC POLICY?  
 
According to Dunn (1994), over the years the study of public policy has evolved and 
developed to such an extent that scholars have generated different but complementary 
definitions of what is public policy. It is worth noting for the purpose of this study that, 
when referring to policy the study merely refers to public policy as this is a public policy 
management research.  
 
De Coning (2006) defines the term policy ―… as a statement of intent‖, arguing that ― … 
policy specifies the basic principles to be pursued in attaining specific goals‖. In his 
definition, De Coning indicates that, ― … policy interprets the values of society and is 
usually embodied in the management of pertinent projects and programmes‖ (Cloete et. 
al., 2006: 3). Public policy is about national government plans, objectives, intentions, and 
coordinated guidelines for a programme of action by government in order to realise and 
execute set priorities and goals based on political desire and vision.  
 
In defining public policy, Guy Peters (1993: 4) is of the view that public policy consists 
of three levels, namely: policy choice – which involves policy decision-making by key 
policy actors (to be discussed in section 2.4); policy outputs – this is about putting theory 
into practice in the form of policy programmes and projects; and finally, policy impacts – 
which, according to Peters, reflects the successes or failures of the chosen policy (policy 
choice) and the implementation (policy outputs).  
 
In quoting a resource document from the Centre for Development and Enterprise, Tim 
Hart (ed). 1995. Building Policy Skills in South Africa. Johannesburg: CDE, Bardill 
(2006: 37) avow that policy is ―… a purposive course of action based on currently 
acceptable societal values, followed in dealing with a problem or matter of concern, and 
predicting the state of affairs which would prevail when that purpose has been achieved‖. 
In his exposition, Bardill mentioned that state affairs, society values, and the meaning of 
a policy cannot be separated from the needs and aspirations of citizens; which further 
suggest that policy belongs to both the state as the initiator and the society as the 
 
 
 
 
 21 
recipient. Bardill‘s definition embodies the notion that a sound policy should reflect and 
be designed based on the needs, challenges, and expectations of all citizens, regardless of 
race, class, and background. And that such a policy should be unequivocal and 
unambiguous. 
  
For Anderson (1997: 9), ―Public policies are those developed by government bodies and 
officials where non-governmental actors and factors may of course influence public 
policy development‖. In his definition Anderson proclaims that, public policy as an 
exercise involves not only the official policy makers, but citizens with civil societies as 
key actors in policy making. A definition by Hanekom (1987: 7) explains public policy as 
―… a formally articulated goal that the legislator intends pursuing with society or with a 
societal group‖. Hanekom further defines or describe public policy as a guide that 
delimits action; a mechanism employed to realise societal goals and to allocate resources 
(Hanekom, 1987: 7).  
 
Susan Booysen, in defining policy, argues that, ―… in general usage policy refers to the 
behaviours of some actors, such as officials, a government agency, or a legislature, in an 
area of activities (Venter et. al., 1998: 221).  
 
Public policy as a discipline differs according to the areas of interest of researchers, 
policy analysts, experts, and most importantly, the political elites. Identifying unifying or 
rather common aspects to the above definitions is that of an overall understanding that: 
first, public policy is a political exercise with political intensions; second, public policy is 
participatory in nature with intended beneficiaries; third, who is the ultimate policy 
decision maker. In essence, a common denominator when policy scientists define public 
policy is to say; public policy defines and transforms government‘s ideas to programmes 
of action that seeks to address political, social, cultural and economic needs and problems 
of citizens. With the intention of giving life to policy decisions, that is by achieving the 
desired political plans, goals, objectives, visions and missions that are designed and 
crafted by key policy actors. 
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2.3 TYPES OF PUBLIC POLICIES 
 
Public policy is said to be characterised by different stakeholders with different interests. 
Sometimes overwhelmed by conflicting political ideologies with intensions to influence 
and shape policy directions. It is therefore suggested that, to address such actions, 
legislatures as the representative of the people and the custodian of democracy and of the 
constitution should, and must, be proactive rather than reactive when it comes to policy-
making, and perhaps find ways of asserting itself as the ultimate law maker. Having a 
proactive parliament in policy development means, efficient policy input-output for better 
services and goods delivery, with much influence on how well legislatures are able to 
describe policy problems for future policy outcomes (Dunn, 1994: 68-69).  
 
According to De Coning (2006) there are three types of policies which determine 
organisational functions, their involvement and levels of influence on policy matters. The 
three types of policies are, De Coning (2006: 19) identified them as the ―… political 
policy (legislation or policies of political parties); executive policy (cabinet decisions or 
implementation policies as determined by political office-bearers, assisted by or working 
in conjunction with high-ranking public officials); administrative policy (pertaining to 
various aspects of a policy such as the income and expenditure of a particular government 
department, inclusive of stores, provision, development, utilisation and maintenance of 
personnel and other factors).  
 
Political policies are normally portrayed in political party manifestos, where they either 
unite or divide voters. Political policies are informed by beliefs and ideologies enshrined 
in that party. Eventually after elections, party political policies are relayed and 
transformed to legislative policies, depending on whether that party wins the elections. 
Political parties, in particular those in government, normally transfer their ideological 
beliefs to societal needs, which in turn translate to institutional goals, visions and 
missions, as a political strategy to assume, maintain, or regain political power.  
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De Coning (2006) describes the executive policies as policies that are designed and 
initiated by the executive. These are national programmes and projects for the 
government in power, with the sole purpose of influencing the lives of citizens. The third 
type, the administrative policy, merely ascribes to the internal aspects and activities 
within the organisation. Policies of this nature are confined to the overall performance of 
the organisation and the conduct of its people (personnel), as administrative policies are 
mainly human resource policies. ―Administrative policy pertains to various aspects of a 
policy such as the income and expenditure of a particular government department, 
inclusive of stores, provision, development, utilisation and maintenance of personnel and 
other factors…‖ (Hanekom, 1996: 10). Hanekom further explains that, administrative 
policies do not address the core business of government which is to make laws. They do 
not affect any government or executive policy as they are operational in nature, relating 
to routine office work (Hanekom, 1996: 10). According to Bernstein and O‘Hara (1979: 
253), administrative policy is a combination of procedural, interpretive, and legislative 
rules; it is procedural in the sense that it provides terms of regulation, behaviour, and 
protocol for each employee.  
 
In explaining administrative policies, Wissink states that administrative or internal 
policies in an institution such as parliament speak to inter-organisational coordination and 
other administrative processes or functioning of different structures. He further describes 
internal policies as a guide to the internal operation of government institutions (Fox, 
Schwella & Wissink, 1991: 36-37).  
 
Anderson (1997: 14-20) recommends that, policies be categorised in terms of the actual 
intentions of the government (substantive policy) and who is to do what, at the same time 
providing operational jurisdiction and mandate (procedural policies). He argues that, 
policies should clearly indicate as to who are the intended beneficiaries with much 
consideration to cost implications (distributive policies), emphasising the notion that 
policies should provide tangible services and goods, and political stability with carefully 
designed regulations.  
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Adding to the list of policy types as suggested by De Coning (2006), Hanekom presents 
an additional type as shown in Figure 2.1, which he calls a ‘government policy or 
national policy”. In describing this type of policy, Hanekom argues that, government or 
national policy derives its existence from national programmes or rather ―…policy of the 
political party in power. It is a translation into practical objectives of the ideas of the 
party on how to govern the country and in which direction society is to be steered‖ 
(Hanekom, 1996: 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: Hanekom (1996:11) 
  Figure 2.1: Policy types 
Government policy 
(somewhat more specific than 
political policy) 
Executive policy 
(more specific than 
government policy) 
 
Political policy (political party policy) 
(general and idealistic) 
 
Administr
ative 
policy 
(detailed) 
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It is argued that policies are political, social and economical in nature, hence they ―…tend 
to exist in a certain descending order, and each level has to have a specific institution that 
serves as the clearing house and/or lead agency with respect to each policy or group of 
policy‖ (Mutahaba & Balogun, 1992: 64). Sam Agere‘s (1999: 11) view is that, policies 
speak to different organisational and societal aspects and factors. Therefore, they are 
classified and viewed as ideological and social constructs, representing the attempt by the 
ruling class to mask the reality of class relations and disguise the dominant role of the 
state.  
 
The types of policies described by Hanekom (1996) and De Coning (2006), with the 
exception of the administrative policies, are macro-governmental policies. For that, they 
are subjected to expert knowledge and insight provided by technocrats, policy analysts 
and researchers, for more constructive and profound thinking and deliberations. The 
above argument illustrate a view that says, behind an effective, feasible public policy 
there is a mind or intellect of a qualified, professional analyst who continuously provides 
policy alternatives, analysis and research, with clear developmental objectives, to policy 
decision-makers for consideration. Dror (1971) argues that, there is a high demand and 
need for public policies that are more precise, clearly designed, managed and technically 
profound.  
 
Thus, policy decision-makers do need the services of professional policy experts with 
analytical skills and knowledge to provide general and specific policy alternatives and to 
―…produce information about the likelihood that future courses of action will result in 
consequences that are valuable to some individual, group, or society as a whole‖ (Dunn, 
1994: 266-267). 
 
2.4 KEY ACTORS IN PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING 
 
Burstein (1991: 346) contends that ―Public policy is influenced primarily by formal 
organisations and the relations among them, both informal and as structured by formal 
rules governing interorganisational relationships‖.  
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Hogwood (1984: 21) explains that, ― … though there are identifiable recurring 
relationships which cross formal organisational boundaries and even the boundary 
between government and non-governmental bodies. The concept of policy community 
may imply a degree of containment of issues within limited communities which is greater 
than what actually exists‖. Literature reveals the existence of critical and sometimes tense 
relationships and interactions amongst policy communities, as a result posing a challenge 
for a compatible synergy or correlation, with desirable aspirations for better and 
appropriate policy deliberations, alternatives, and decision-making. The relationship 
between policy actors, structures, cultural and community groupings and power, is a 
dialectical one. However, to tackle the existing societal dynamics depends on those actors 
working together with a common principle and focus (Kooiman, 2003: 17-18). 
  
With government being a compound business, where different stakeholders are involved 
in the process of advocating and making of policies, politicians in government as official 
policy-makers, would ― … turn first to their advisers both from the permanent public 
service and from their party machines‖ for policy advise (Jenkins, 2008: 6). With an 
understanding that public policy-making and development as a process ― … is typically a 
complex and protracted‖ (Fox, Bayat & Ferreira, 2006:48) discipline. Thereafter, Jenkins 
explains, because ― ... policy solutions have to fit with the complexity of their 
management task, they (politicians) will turn to organisational theories, business models 
and academic advice‖ (Jenkins, 2008: 6) for more appropriate and profound policy 
knowledge.  
 
When examining public policy, it is always appropriate and thoughtful to identify and 
discuss policy communities, and the extent of their involvement in public policy making 
processes. The argument by Jenkins objectively suggests that, policy communities 
represent macro-policy ideas and exert broad-based specialised policy knowledge. These 
communities contain individuals with adequate skills to communicate, translate, develop, 
forecast, advise, monitor, and evaluate external policies  
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Hanekom (1996: 21), describes key actors in policy-making as ‗official‘ and ‗unofficial‘ 
policy-makers. When he speaks of official policy-makers, he refers to the legislative and 
executive authorities in government with constitutional mandate. Hanekom refers to 
unofficial policy-makers as interest groups and influential individuals, with the 
intellectual capacity and thinking to develop policies based on their subject of interest. 
Viewed as the secondary source in policy-making, unofficial policy-makers‘ duties are  
to actively lobby and strategically influence policy content and directions with intentions 
to persuade, or rather win the hearts and minds of the official policy-makers. Policy 
analysts, civil rights and political party organisations, non-profit and non-governmental 
institutions, and labour unions are categorised as unofficial policy-makers.  
 
It is generally argued that unofficial policy-makers are in a better position to forge close 
relations and contacts with citizens because they work with them on a daily basis through 
policy research, thus legitimising their policy input, findings, and recommendations.  
 
The United State of America is one country that is acknowledged as prospering in terms 
of promoting the existence of unofficial policy-makers or think-tanks for broader policy 
alternatives and advice. Dunn‘s (1994: 20-21) contribution is that, unofficial key actors in 
public policy-making operate from different levels, from various stages and basis, with 
limited and indirect influence to policy decision-making. Interest, lobbyist and advocacy 
groups as they are commonly known in the USA, present themselves as a force to be 
reckoned with in official policy decision-making. Whenever Congress is in session, 
unofficial policy makers or interest groups seek access to elected officials in an attempt to 
influence national or federal policy decision-making (Gitelso et. al., 2001: 211). 
Unofficial interest groups do preserve the ability to exist and act autonomously and 
somehow semi-autonomously with government and with other groups, and in the process 
they accumulate the expertise of specialists, analysts ―… lawyers and former members of 
the executive branch‖ (Gitelso et. al. 2001: 216).  
 
Hanekom (1987: 20) notes that, ―… political office bearers (ministers) and the appointed 
officials are the most important participants in the policy-making, however vested with 
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the constitutional authority the legislature with the different committees are the ultimate 
decision-makers on policy-making‖. This statement unambiguously promulgates the view 
that, the executive as policy executor remains central to policy formulation and 
implementation. That the executive, have had an upper hand (when compared to the 
legislature) when it comes to policy-making in many modern developed democratic states 
for many years. Critically so, the bone of contention has been on the issue of ownership – 
who preserves the authority and the right to initiate, legislate, execute and to monitor 
public policies, between the executive and the legislature.  
 
In a parliamentary democracy system, Murray and Nijzink (2002: 73) indicate that, ―… 
making law is often considered to be the major task of a legislature – after all, the term 
legislature itself suggests a body that makes law‖. The legislature is referred to as the 
political body with constitutional authority to approve and reject policies. It is the 
‗ultimate‘ policy decision-making body. In practical terms, even in the modern 
parliamentary systems, legislatures have limited responsibility in realising their mandate 
as law-makers. Mintzberg (1983: 461) explains that, even within a parliamentary 
democratic system viewed by some as effective and efficient, the pitfall is that, the 
system ―… concentrates a great deal more power in the executive branch of government‖, 
leaving the debating activities to parliament. Sebastian (2008) argues that ― … at the 
more proactive and constructive end of the spectrum, legislatures such as in the U.S. 
Congress are able to develop their own legislative proposals and thus participate along 
with the executive in directing the policy agenda. Given their policy capabilities, such 
legislatures are also likely to be active and effective in overseeing policy 
implementation‖. 
 
The argument put forward by Nagel (1984: 7) is that, ―There is an increasing trend 
toward giving more power to the national government and the executive branch to cope 
with policy problems‖, perhaps for specific reasons. According to Wissink (1991: 37), 
the executive has proven (with public officials as its vanguard) to be a vital role player in 
initiating, executing and monitoring both internal and external policies, this is as a result 
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of qualified (academically and otherwise) analytical skills and knowledge, embraced by 
the capacity that exists within the executive .  
 
Across the world, the executive is considered to have a technical advantage in policy-
making, with all the necessary support available. For instance, after much consideration, 
the UK government with the Conservative Party in power, introduced the ―… Central 
Policy Review Staff (CPRS) designed primarily to advise the Cabinet on policy issues. 
Small groups of mainly younger people, civil service and from outside government 
advise the Cabinet collectively on major policy and financial issues‖ (Jenkins, 2008: 30), 
intensifying the notion that the executive is the major, and the key, policy player. 
Anderson (1997: 63) notes, ―We continue to live in an ‗executive-centred era‘, in which 
the effectiveness of government substantially depends upon executive leadership and 
action in both the formation and the execution of policy‖. 
 
This section briefly identified and discussed key actors in public policy-making, those 
being the legislature and the executive (official policy-makers), civil societies, and 
independent policy units or think-tanks (unofficial policy-makers). The in-depth analysis 
of their roles in policy-making and policy decision-making will be discussed in the next 
chapters respectively.  
 
With an understanding that official actors – legitimately so – control the official process 
in policy-making, Dror (1988: 281) therefore suggests that ― … for the success of its 
empirical policy-making processes, the establishment of islands of professional 
excellence near main decision-making parameters or boundaries, to provide holistic and 
innovative analysis as an aid to top-level decision-making is necessary as a starting 
point‖. The context of Dror‘s argument is that, policy analysis and decision-making 
requires intellectual and technical capacity to critically assess knowledge which is 
relevant to policy problems for policy action with intentions to produce sufficient policy 
actions. 
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2.5 CAPACITATING POLICY DECISION-MAKERS 
 
Shellukindo argues, ―It is useful to remember that the purpose of analysing policies 
sufficiently before decisions are taken, by enlarge, is to provoke high-level inquiry and 
debate, the rest of which is certainly high-quality rational choice amongst better-known 
options‖ (Mutahaba & Balogun, 1992: 43). Political will or legitimacy does not 
automatically transform to, or rather make, good policies. It is a qualified individual who 
designs good, relevant or irrelevant policies. Based on arguments that depict policy-
making process as a complicated exercise, this section will theoretically reveal the need 
for an adequately resourced, trained, empowered and capacitated official policy actor, 
specifically referring to legislators. In keeping with the executive that continues to be 
generally perceived as sufficiently resourced and technically empowered. Scholars like 
Nsibambi argue that, public policy as a course of action do not fail because they are poor, 
or there is no will to manifest a specific policy, they fail due to lack of intellectual 
capacity by decision makers to analyse, assess, scrutinise, and project implications and 
strategies for implementing relevant and feasible policies (Mutahaba & Balogun, 1992: 
30).  
 
Literature review reveals that, capacity development is the basic architecture for adequate 
policy-making as a process, when it is strategically promoted, appropriately 
conceptualised, and directly integrated within the overall political framework of policy 
decision-making institutions.  
 
There is a demand for key policy actors to realise national policy objectives. It therefore 
becomes apparent, especially for official actors, legislatures in particular, to acquire 
necessary human and other resources for substantive analysis on macro-governmental 
policies, thus, referring to the need to draw from both tangible and intangible resources, 
as both factors communicate and compliment each other. Both tangible and intangible 
resources require practical skills, competent policy decision-makers, and capacitated and 
well informed leadership. Tangible and intangible resources are factors indentified by 
Brynard and De Coning (2006) in determining effective capacity development. Tangible 
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resources explain the ―… human, financial, material, technological and logistical‖. The 
intangible resources refer to ―… leadership, motivation, commitment, willingness, 
courage and endurance‖ (Cloete et. al., 2006: 199). Both these factors are seen as vital in 
shaping and elevating the quality of an organisation, especially, in this case, the executive 
and the legislature, without excluding the unofficial policy actors.  
 
Heymans (1996) identifies three crucial components of capacity building, one being what 
he describes as ‗analytical accuracy‘. He argues that because of insufficient skills and 
expertise to provide accurate analysis ―… inaccurate demographic data make it 
impossible even to establish where people actually live, undermining government‘s 
overall ability to develop an understanding of people‘s need‖ (Heymans, 1996: 38). 
Public policy seeks to address multiple and diverse issues that affect the country and 
people who share different background in ideologies. In that, accuracy and details are an 
integral part of analysis, thus requiring capacity.  
 
The second component mentioned by Heymans is ―… developing a multi-disciplinary 
capacity‖. Given the consensual understanding that policies are a product of political 
ideologies, to put those political intents into action the quest will be to have 
comprehensive and diverse policy experts, specialising in different but necessary 
disciplines. To substantiate, Heymans argues that, for a country like South Africa where 
there are institutional and technical constrains, a broader range of qualified multi-
disciplinary skills are required to achieve policy goals and objectives (Heymans, 1996: 
38) in addressing the legacy of the past, and the current vision for a better future.  
 
In describing the third component Heymans indicates that, capacity building involves 
activities that include and determine policy ―… planning and implementation and thus the 
context against which implementation can be monitored and evaluated‖ (Heymans, 1996: 
38). The importance of capacity building as a tool for effective and discreet policy 
debates, sensible policy decision-making, improved and efficient policy implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation requires a ―… close relationship between the policy, 
information and evaluation functions‖ (Heymans, 1996: 39). In essence, Heymans avow 
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that, capacity building as a tool that seeks to improve intellectual abilities, should enable 
political leadership to accurately analyse and select priority information. At the same 
time creating and promoting an environment that allows the existence of multi-
disciplinary expertise and skills for the creation of relevant macro-governmental policies. 
Consequently, promoting possible and positive interlinks between policy processes, 
human capacity and competency with broad policy outcome, produce sound evidence-
based policy research.   
 
To design solutions for policy theory is one exercise that involves accurate problem 
identification followed by scientific solutions or insights. In unpacking the concept, 
authors like Plummer and Slater, speak of ―Capacity to analyse needs and develop a 
strategic response; capacity to implement the strategy; capacity to maintain effective 
partnerships; capacity to engage with stakeholders; understanding of capacity building 
needs and ability to improve capacity‖ (Plummer et. al., 2002: 273-274). Capacitating 
decision-makers is to instil a sense of knowledge and learning to elite politicians, where 
new information influences the pre-existing governing perception (Kooiman, 2003: 30).  
 
Policy-making is about weighing and interpreting technical arguments, evaluating 
financial resources, projecting future shortfalls, and the ability and capacity to assess 
political situation for sound policy solutions (Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 148). To 
develop capacity means, providing skills development mechanisms in order to address 
and empower the existing lack of analytical and technical abilities. It means augmenting 
both socio-political and economic knowledge, and enhancing the ability for effective 
communication, evaluation and data analysis. It is therefore suggested that, capacity 
building as the proponent of efficiency, bears the deeds of good governance, constructive 
policy deliberations, and organisational development.  
 
Brynard and De Coning (2006: 199), citing Savitch (1998), ―… regards capacity building 
as a total (structural, functional and cultural) transformation of the government in order to 
mobilise all available resources to achieve policy objective‖. Based on this analogy, 
capacity building can be viewed as a tool that enables public policy decision-makers to be 
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able to maximise quality input when debating content and technical issues on policy 
formulation, research and recommendation, and policy reviews. By capacitating policy 
decision-makers, as mentioned by various policy scholars (see Grindle & Thomas, 1991; 
Heymans, 1996; Brynard & De Coning, 2006), the strategic intention and factor is then to 
improve the current ways of doing business in government, particularly in parliament.  
 
The rationale behind the concept of capacitating decision-makers is about encouraging 
policy innovation. It is about what Wissink (1991) calls ‗analycentric perspective‘, where 
policy makers can, with confidence, efficiently analyse, deliberate and decide on relevant 
policies. Capacitating parliamentarians on policy and law making is about empowering 
politicians so they can pass laws with clear empirical understanding of ―… the principles 
of the proposed legislation and the policy that the law seeks to implement‖ (Murray & 
Nijzink, 2002: 60). The basis for capacity building is the notion that, policy-making 
exercise requires analytical skills and intellectual creativity as instruments to respond 
efficiently to those diverse and complex socio-political and economic policy issues. 
Hence, a need for an in-house policy advice mechanism is suggested. The call by policy 
scholars is for ―… the institutionalisation of policy analysis (PA) as a ‗professional‘ 
activity in government‖, that will mainly focus on developing intellectual capacity for 
legislators, in the context of arguments suggesting that ― … legislators lack the expert 
knowledge required for the enactment of detailed laws‖ (Gildenhuys & Knipe, 2000: 
151).   Different and critical questions then arise, as to who should capacitate parliament, 
who has the knowledge of providing adequate and necessary training on public policy-
making processes, and who is able or qualified to provide policy analysis support to the 
legislature?  
 
It is the role of policy units (both inside and outside Parliament) to provide policy 
training, to ―… assist in policy issue identification and on possible course of action, 
including current programmes and their performance‖ (Fox et. al., 1991: 211). Policy 
units, it is argued, possess the required qualifications, knowledge, skills, and expertise 
with empirical abilities to assist and provide a systematic support to parliament as an 
organisation and to elite policy decision-making in general. Literature reveals that, policy 
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units are eminent support mechanisms that carry the appropriate credibility, intellect and 
ability in providing capacity building to government in public policy-making exercises, 
which is consciously perceived as technically, politically and academically challenging. 
Lending critical analytical support in order to strengthen the position and capacity of 
policy-makers, to equip them with new tools in relation to speech and action, and to 
improve the premise for policy formulation, either as an internal process or in a regional 
and international context, demands a properly capacitated unit, steered by analysts and 
policy professionals. This proves to be a reliable and necessary approach or effort for 
long-term success in policy-making (Grindle & Thomas, 1991; Odora Hoppers, 1997). 
However, when capacitating decision-makers, international standards in public policy 
management capacity are to be observed, and policy units with the potential and expertise 
to capacitate legislators should have the confidence and the ability to think globally 
because of the need and the demand for a sub-specialisation of global policy 
professionals, in order to improve the cognitive capacities of global governance with 
intergovernmental relations. The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) 
is a relevant example of a policy and research institute that provides policy advice, 
research findings, and recommendations to government and parliament on international 
affairs, whilst observing international standards and professionalism.  
 
Qualities, such as the ability to critically and constructively analyse policy matters, to 
strategically project matters of national and international importance and challenges, to 
fundamentally understand the impact of external environment on policy formulation, are 
central to the concept and intentions of capacity building. Parsons (1995: 266) 
emphasises that, no matter how powerful politicians are, there is only one rule that 
applies as a matter of reference in policy decision-making, and that is, if a policy decision 
requires the specialised knowledge of a group of people, it will similarly be subject to 
safe review only by the similar knowledge of a similar group that is comprised of experts, 
policy advisors and policy researchers.  
 
It is broadly argued and observed that parliamentarians are not experts, qualified policy 
analysts, neither are they policy professionals. For better performance and feasible 
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governmental reforms it is necessary and possible to equip and capacitate government 
branches, particularly the legislature, with what Brynard and De Coning (2006: 200) 
describes as ‗necessary resources‘ for better informed policy decision-making. Weiss 
reaffirms this notion that, by capacitating policy decision-makers ― … you are arming 
public representatives in government to be able to access resources and be analytical at 
the same breath, you are facilitating the capacity to respond to public policy challenges‖ 
(Weiss, 1992: 192).  
  
In Africa to be precise, Shellukindo suggests that, if policy management capacity could 
be taken seriously, Africa could witness prosper and constructive development. He 
suggests that, ―… we should not be too proud to ask for assistance or advice from those 
who have necessary skills and experience‖ (Mutahaba & Balogun, 1992: 47). This 
argument illustrate that, policy management capacity is the only hope for reviving 
Africa‘s dying analytical skills, which are necessary for viable and adequate policy 
formulation, research, monitoring and evaluation, provided that it is done properly with 
policy experts, analysts, researchers and professionals alongside official policy decision-
makers.  
 
In short, De Coning et al (2002: 31-32) indicates that, policy management capacity 
underpins what is call ‗macro-institutional environment‘, which speaks to governance, 
intergovernmental relations, the relationship between organisations and the legal 
framework; human capital with capacity to do the actual analysis, research, advice, 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E). It is about ‗institutionalisation of policy capacity‘ 
with multi-skilled policy specialists facilitating and steering policy activities.  
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter different definitions of public policy were discussed, where policy was 
explained as a politically guided and motivated framework or statement of intent, that 
seeks to address the desired ambitions, goals, values and visions of those in power. The 
chapter further discussed different types of public policies as suggested by De Coning 
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(2006) and Hanekom (1996) namely; political policies; government policies; executive or 
cabinet policies; and administrative policies. In examining the above types of policies this 
chapter categorically classified and identified key actors involved in the making of such 
policies; the key actors being the executive (cabinet); parliament (legislature); policy 
units; civil societies; and other relevant advocacy groups.  
 
The chapter then discussed components of capacity building as efforts to capacitate 
official policy-makers, in a sense augmenting their intellectual, analytical and technical 
abilities as a prerequisite in public policy-making. Dror emphasises that, the word 
‗capacity‘ cannot only or literally be limited to academic qualifications. There are various 
factors that directly or indirectly affect capacity, notably: professionalism, individual 
knowledge and skills to identify socio-political and economic issues, the ability to assess 
internal and external environments, encompassed with the ability to communicate and to 
deliberate policy matters. Capacity building underlies quality policy debates and effective 
and efficient governance for better service delivery, hence a need to capacitate policy 
decision-makers is identified. Informed by the literature review, the chapter also alluded 
to arguments suggesting that policy units should steer and lead policy management 
capacity development. This is due to notions perceiving policy units as appropriately 
suitable and academically qualified to train, to facilitate seminars and workshops, to 
provide policy advice, research policy and policy guidelines, and assist with monitoring 
and evaluation.   
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CHAPTER 3: PARLAMENT AS A POLICY DECISION-MAKER  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Labuschagne (2006: 19) in the Journal for Political Science and Public Administration, 
comments that the disappearance of absolute central power vested in one person who is 
the King, where ordinary people ―… entrusted their will and gave the King the absolute 
powers‖ to rule the country, is as a result of long fought struggles that persisted 
throughout the world for many years. Hence, ―… the role of parliamentary privilege may 
seem very different today from what it was when parliament was under physical threats 
from absolute monarchs and their forces‖ (Murray & Nijzink, 2002: 24).  
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the efficiency and the extent to which parliaments 
hold their constitutional authority, particularly on the issue of public policy-making. As a 
product of political evolution and transformation, from a one-man ruler to a constitutional 
democracy, parliament has in many countries proved to be the arc of the state, especially 
in a parliamentary democratic system. Subsequent continuation of Chapter Three will 
discuss, in-depth, the role and responsibilities of key actors in relation to public policy-
making, and amongst each other.  
 
This chapter will generally define and discuss parliament as a political organisation. It 
also will include a section that will specifically examine the role and functions of 
parliaments. Furthermore, acknowledging the executive as an eminent policy actor, the 
chapter will describe the strength of the executive in conjunction with weaknesses and 
challenges faced by parliament as a policy actor. An example of a policy unit will be 
investigated and discussed, namely the Congressional Research Service. The chapter 
concludes with a comprehensive theoretical analysis on the role that each key actor plays 
in public policy- making processes. 
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3.2 PARLIAMENT AS AN ORGANISATION  
 
Rainey‘s (1997: 7) concern is that, when studying organisational behaviour, public 
administration scholars tend to limit their focus on individual and group behaviour, on 
attitudes and work dynamics, and on how to improve production by citing  motivation 
and incentives. For this reason, this section will take a different approach, which is to 
understand and study the existence of the organisation in its entirety:  the role of the 
organisation, in this case parliament, and the factors that affect its functioning.  
 
It is argued that no organisation, including parliament, exists or operates in isolation. As a 
formal organisation, parliament is inevitably directly or indirectly affected and influenced 
by internal and external environmental factors. Parliament as an organisation operates 
from different, rather distinct, premises when compared to private organisations. 
Parliament is a political entity elected by the people, representing the people, and 
accounting to the people, so as to prolong the term of those in office or political power. 
External factors affecting parliaments relate to socioeconomic and political elements, 
whereas the internal factors are derived from within the institution, the functioning of the 
organisation. As an organisation, parliament adheres to sets of rules and procedures, with 
a clear mandate stipulated in the constitution of the country. It is theoretically argued that, 
parliaments are legislative bodies with ultimate but inclusive power, and the authority to 
make, debate, approve or rejects laws. Parliaments are structurally arranged and designed 
to accommodate the framework of political activities, which include – among others – 
debates on strategic and policy decision-making.  
  
In describing parliaments, ―The legislative assembly at the central government level is 
usually referred to as the Parliament although other names are used, like Bundestag in 
Germany, Bundesrat in Austria, the Natianalrat (National Council) in Switzerland and 
Assemblee National (National Assembly) in France. Some of these legislatures, consist 
of one or two so-called ―chambers‖, establishing what are called bicameral and 
unicameral systems‖ (Gildenhuys & Knipe, 2000: 136). In South Africa, the Legislature 
or Parliament consists of the National Assembly (NA) and the National Council of 
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Provinces (NCOP), where they participate in the legislative process in the manner set out 
in the Constitution (Van Niekerk et. al., 2001: 70). 
 
Taljaard points out that ―… parliament is a key institution in a democratic state: it is a 
place where important public issues are debated openly and freely; it elects the president 
and can remove the cabinet from office‖ (Venter, 1998: 23). Exercising authority as 
political powers, parliaments world-wide (weak or strong) design rules and procedures on 
how they will conduct their day-to-day businesses, and how they should relate to other 
institutions of state, namely the executive, and the judiciary. Parliament‘s organisational 
structure evolves from a point that a group of those elected to political power and 
decision-making positions will perform based on the principle of realising the vision with 
a mission to achieve national policy priorities as a collective. Hence, the structure of 
parliament is a formal system that controls how people coordinate their actions and use 
resources to achieve organisational goals. Organisational structures define and 
differentiate organisations, ―… the purpose of the set organisational structure is to 
determine how operational functions or duties must be allocated, who reports to whom, 
and the formal coordinating mechanisms and interaction patterns that will be followed‖ 
(Robbins, 1990: 5).  
 
Mutahaba et. al. (1993) argues that, organisational articulation, authority relationship, and 
capacity disposition are indeed intertwined therefore affecting policy outputs. A 
structurally arranged institution with a clear definition of roles and responsibilities 
promotes smooth and efficient operations, where policy management highly depends 
upon the interrelationship between functions, organisation and capacity. A coherent 
organisational structure undermines discord relationship. Taking the British legislature as 
an example, where the House of Lords and the House of Commons bear a historically 
uneasy and tense working relationship (see Pye & Yates, 1990) on issues relating to 
authority and policy decision-making.  
 
The legislature, as mentioned before, holds a distinct position in society as compared to 
other organisations, making it a complex institution with respect to its existence in 
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relation to other branches of state, the role of individuals within, internal and external 
factors, and the manner in which it derives its mandate. For that, ―Parliament is a 
significant institution, an organisation that acts across social, economic and political 
boundaries with coherent but distinct formal organisational features deliberately designed 
to achieve a common goal or set of goals‖ (Robbins, 1990: 4) as defined or determined 
by the constitution and by the political party in power. Blondel (1995) describes 
parliament as a state institution operating under the auspices of the constitution, which is 
a product of political engineering. The complexity and the size of parliament, as an 
organization, portrays the fact that parliament in a broader perspective represents 
different but particular interests, and that it generally speaks to the socioeconomic and 
political policies of the country and the well-being of citizens. As a product of political 
engineering, parliament depicts direct and indirect participation, and it is the embodiment 
of a representative government, where people are expected to look for policy leadership 
(Patterson, 1993: 468).  
 
It is argued that organisations, if not feasibly and viably structured, may come and go and 
perhaps lose their effectiveness and relevancy, and even taking into account its unique 
identity. This predicament can apply to parliament as well. Elaborating on the above 
statement, Hopkinson (1995: 2) indicates that there is a growing debate about the 
perceived authority and relevance of parliament as an institution that is suppose to be 
effectively influential, whilst exercising its political power and upholding constitutional 
authority and mandate. Identifiable threats to the authority and the viability of this 
political institution relate to policy management capacity and to ―… parliament‘s ability 
to control the executive‖ (Pye & Yates, 1990: 220).  
 
3.3 THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF PARLIAMENT  
 
As the symbol and catalyst of a constitutional democracy, parliament is argued to be the 
mouth-piece and the eyes of all citizens. By ensuring that the executive prioritises 
national programmes and implements macro-governmental policies as a means to address 
problems and challenges faced by communities. It is appropriate and relevant to indicate 
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that citizens, especially in a parliamentary democracy state, will always have high 
expectations of what parliament as a political institution representing them (citizens) will 
provide. This is to say that, in a modern democratic state, parliament‘s role is politically 
and strategically modelled to ensure that goods and quality services are delivered to the 
people accordingly and effectively, and that the rule of law is observed. It is therefore the 
role of parliament to represent the people, to create and dismiss governments, to pass 
laws and scrutinise the executive, and to recruit and socialise political leaders (Hague et. 
al., 1993: 292).  
 
The constitution, which is the supreme law of the country, allows parliament to monitor 
agencies that are tasked with specific responsibilities in performing their duties 
accordingly and as prescribed. This is what Bicker (2001: 186) would like to call as a 
practice of ‗command-and-control‘ within the bureaucratic system. For Blondel (1995: 
261-263), the role of legislatures is normally assessed at the level of broader policy 
influence, which is complex to measure due to procedural and technical aspects and the 
readiness of the government to allow policy debates to take place and support institutions 
to develop.  
 
In describing the function of parliaments, Pye and Yates (1990: 218) state that, ―The 
legislature is responsible, under the Constitution, for making policy: it is sovereign‖. 
Section 1 of the Constitution of the USA clearly stipulates that ―All legislative powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United State…‖ (see Burns et. al, 
1995), consequently providing the legislator with the ultimate mandate to pass, amend 
and return bills. Gildenhuys and Knipe (2000: 150) emphasise that, it is within 
parliament‘s prerogative to ―… decide on the national objectives, strategies, functions 
and services and to convert them into legislation for execution by the executive 
authority‖. It is worth outlining that, in theory, the deliberation and adoption of laws may 
rest with parliament, but in practice, the executive proves to be thé actual policy-maker, 
making in-roads into parliament‘s legislative powers (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1976: 
571). Such a statement rather suggests that, the role of parliament as thé ultimate, 
supreme law-making body is only theoretically based; with the UK parliament for an 
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example, voluntarily delegating legislative powers (which include public policy-making) 
to the executive due to different reasons which include lack of capacity to make law, and 
to justifiable conveniences (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1976; Pye & Yates, 1990). 
 
It is the role of parliaments to hold the executive accountable. This is an oversight role of 
parliament where they exercise their mandate to scrutinise the performance of the 
executive and other government agencies on issues related to national programmes and 
projects. Parliaments role is to monitor, review, and investigate departmental and 
agencies‘ activities (in most occasions through committees), it is to ensure good service 
delivery, transparency, efficiency, and consistency with the mission and vision of 
parliament. National parliaments as custodians of the constitution and of democracy, 
carries the authority and the power to ― … decide what shall be done, how it shall be 
done, who shall do it and by what means it shall be financed. In short, the legislature is 
the highest decision-making and policy-making institution in a democratic state‖ 
(Gildenhuys & Knipe, 2000: 136). Chapter Six of the Constitution of Uganda clearly 
upholds the parliament of the country as the primary law-making body, indicating, 
according to Articles 79 and 92, Section (2) that ―… no person or body other than 
Parliament shall have power to make laws except with permission of Parliament‖ (The 
Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, 2006). 
 
Griffitth et al (1989: 5) referring to the Westminster system argues that, ―It is a central 
feature of parliament, however, that it performs a responsive rather than an initiating 
function within the constitution‖. Table 1.1 provides an explanation of the types, nature 
and examples of parliaments considered to be active, reactive and otherwise, on the 
subject of public policy-making as a constitutional mandate and function of legislatures. 
Table 1.1 also indicates the level of challenges faced by these elite political bodies as 
policy decision-makers, as well as the extent of their participation in the entire process of 
law-making when compared to the executive.  
 
In Botswana, where the Westminster type of parliamentary system is practised, Edge and 
Lekorwe (1998: 209) note that, the role and responsibility of the legislature in that 
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country, apart from passing laws and overseeing government‘s activities, is to promote 
governance and democracy by conducting the affairs of government in an accountable 
and transparent manner, free of corruption and illicit, with the formulation of public 
policy as one of its principal functions.  
 
In his argument, Blondel emphasises the view that, ―The function of legislatures was to 
make laws i.e. to pass the most general rules under which countries were to be governed. 
The argument is as follows: if the people are to be sovereign, or at least as powerful as 
possible, their representative should be concerned primarily with most general rules. The 
executives are needed to keep the country going, but the legislatures could and should 
decide on the general rules‖ (Blondel, 1973: 4). The general functions of parliament is to 
oversee the operations of state institutions or agencies, to monitor the programmes of the 
executive in that it becomes the voice of the citizens, it is to determine the functioning of 
parliament procedurally, politically and as a law-making body.  
 
 
 
 
Type Nature Example 
Active Assembly makes policy 
actively and autonomously 
US Congress 
Reactive Assembly reacts to and 
influences government 
policy 
Westminster-style 
parliament 
Marginal Assembly is a minor partner 
in executive policy-making 
Polish Sejun (pre-1989) 
Minimal Assembly is a rubber stamp 
under executive domination 
Malawi 
 
Source: Hague et al, 1993: 298 
 
   Table 1.1 Policy classification of assemblies 
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To a large extent, the argument has been that parliament‘s role and functions are first and 
foremost to represent the voice of the people in government, and to defend and promote 
the constitution which is the supreme law of the country. Parliament‘s role is to preserve 
democracy and good governance. It is the watchdog of government activities through 
monitoring, investigating, scrutinising budgets (for example), recommending, and 
deciding on public policy matters. However, in order for parliaments to realise and 
achieve their constitutional duties and to perform their role and functions in terms of 
assessing policy and legislation matters amicably. It is advised that the relationship 
between parliaments and committees with other branches of government needs efficient 
consideration (Hague et al, 1993; Taljaard & Venter, 2006).  
 
A functioning and efficient parliament determines and; 
 
 ―… sets up its own internal support institutions (we usually think in terms of standing 
committees) to evaluate policy choices, give power to external actors (here we think in terms of 
an executive, bureaucracy or quasi-governmental organisation), or employs some combination of 
the two. If the legislative body decides to delegate authority to an external body, it can either 
provide detailed instructions in the implementation legislation or give wide latitude in interpreting 
the law‖ (Braun & Gilardi, 2006: 77).  
 
This is to suggest that, there can be no democracy if there is no functioning parliament. 
Literature supports the view that parliament has the autonomy and the power to make and 
influence public policies, however, it is also recorded that in many countries parliaments 
as public representative institutions are ―… vulnerable to executive domination or 
outright suppression‖ (Hague et. al., 1993: 299), particularly when dealing with public 
policy-making. Two factors are attributed to the above. The first one is called, ―Cabinet 
dominated version‖ (Hague et. al., 1993: 323), which depicts or portrays the executive as 
the sole responsible entity in policy-making and implementation, where they (the 
executive) monopolise the policy-making processes. Secondly, it is a lack of policy 
management capacity associated with insufficient or poor structural support for 
legislators when compared to their counterparts, in this case the executive.  
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Like most organisations, parliaments are faced with challenges; among those is that of 
having, even in a democracy system, the biggest political party controlling the ― … 
majority in parliament and often reducing the role of parliament to a simple rubber-
stamping of the government‘s policy‖ (Braun & Gilardi, 2006: 190). This therefore, it is 
argued, instigates a sense that describes parliaments as ineffective and powerless, at the 
same breath confirming critics that view today‘s parliaments as institutions with 
minimum input, and less value in public policy than they were thirty years ago. 
Furthermore, politicians (legislators) are perceived to be more concerned about image 
making (Wells & Hamilton, 1996: 97), thereby contributing to the apparent failures, 
inefficiencies and inadequacies associated with legislatures.  
 
Another challenge that is objectively recorded by various authors as being detrimental to 
parliament‘s feasibility is that of having legislatures that only react, but fail to proactively 
initiate policy programmes, actions and documents. As a result, such behaviour is viewed 
as hampering the image and the ability of these political institutions (Blondel, 1973: 115). 
Such challenges boil down or rather perpetuate arguments that generally promulgate and 
depict legislatures as only the ―… organisers and planners of forums that seat to debate 
policies initiated not by them but rather by the executive‖ (Murray & Nijzink, 2002: 5).  
 
3.4 THE STRENGTH OF THE EXECUTIVE AND WEAKNESSES OF 
PARLIAMENTS 
 
The emphasis in this section will be to examine arguments promulgating and sharing the 
view that ―… legislatures or parliaments, representative assemblies have two main formal 
powers: making laws and voting the budget. But these are not always given in full even 
in theory, let alone in fact‖ (Blondel, 1995: 256). Saalfeld‘s view is that, ―In Britain‘s 
parliamentary system of government, the cabinet depends on the confidence of 
Parliament, although under normal circumstances the cabinet clearly dominates 
Parliament‖ (Strom et. al., 2003: 622). Parliaments, including those from the advanced 
democracies, still ―… have insufficient control over the executive‖ (Taljaard & Venter, 
2006: 37), thus losing or portraying a weak political will and mandate – particularly in 
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policy-making, which in turn affects their ability and authority when performing their 
oversight duties, decision-making in terms of policy analysis, scrutiny, and assessment of  
available policy submissions.  
 
It is argued that, when the executive begins to show signs of being dominant over 
parliaments, hypothetically speaking this reflects and affirms that:  
(i) Parliament is weak;  
(ii) Parliament is only a debating forum with minimal or lack of adequate inputs in the 
actual policy-making processes; 
(iii) Parliament relies on the executive to introduce, research, formulate, interpret, and 
evaluate public policies (see Griffith et. al., 1989; Sebastian, 2008).  
 
Critical arguments and observations emphasise and continue to promulgate notions 
suggesting that, even in a parliamentary representative democracy system, parliament 
remains ―… a debating forum not a government body‖ (Griffith et. al., 1989: 6). 
 
The following authors: Edge and Lekorwe (1998: 210), Murray and Nijzink (2002), 
Saalfed (2003), and Taljaard and Venter (2006) attribute the weaknesses of parliaments 
to insufficient capacity, lack of formative knowledge, inadequate qualifications and poor 
technical skills, particularly on the subject of public policy-making processes, leaving 
them (parliamentarians) with no choice but to rely on the executive, and to depend on 
outside and perhaps foreign expertise. According to Patterson (1993), in a parliamentary 
democracy system, the executive and even the president are given express powers, thus 
making the executive provisionally and efficiently above parliament, although in 
principle and theoretically (constitutionally) the ultimate elite political and policy 
decision-making falls under the jurisdiction of parliament. Patterson argues that, because 
parliaments position themselves in a substantially disadvantaging position, in addressing 
and responding to policy complexity, they will allow the president and the executive to 
have additional policy staff and authority (Patterson, 1993: 462), therefore allowing 
themselves to be outclassed by well-resourced, staffed and skilled executives.  
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Wang (2005: 2) stipulates that, the most important aspect in policy decision-making is 
that of parliament‘s impact on the entire public policy-making process. However, raising 
his dissatisfaction, he describes the situation, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where the 
issue of political oversight by parliament on the executive as one that is totally 
overlooked and poor, citing the lack of resources (capital and human), insufficient 
intellectual capacity to debate policy models, and the inability to assert its authority as the 
legislative body, as factors. In agreement with Wang, Strom (2003: 72)  states that, even 
with the Westminster parliamentary system model, the impact and the role played by 
parliament is detrimentally weak and ineffectual, because of ineffective institutional 
support mechanisms, lack of motivation, lack of capacity and party partisan tendencies.  
Strom et al  (2006: 27-37) argue that, in South Africa, the weaknesses of Parliament and 
its support mechanisms (committees) can be attributed to a lack of resources, staff, and 
skills, the consequences being that ― … its work in the public eye quite often seems a 
ridiculous mud-slinging match between political parties‖ with insufficient input-output 
and insignificant impact on national policies.     
 
When compared to the well-resourced executive, Patterson (1993: 468) describes the 
weaknesses of parliament as a threat to the development of comprehensive national 
policies, attributing such empirical perceptions and observations to a lack of intellectual 
and technical direction, and to poor organisational vision and political understanding 
within parliament. This perspective conveniently gives rise to systematic arguments that 
consider parliaments as political institutions with no capacity, lacking the ability and skill 
to rationally identify external and internal factors, affecting and influencing the dynamics 
of national politics and programmes. Patterson believes that, the weaknesses of 
parliaments are as a result of organisational inability in terms of human proficiency, poor 
institutional conceptualisation, and lack of competency to function as fundamental policy 
decision-makers, therefore presenting parliaments as less than a co-equal branch of the 
national government (Patterson, 1993: 480). In essence, these alarming arguments 
systematically and detrimentally depict parliaments as political institutions that are 
becoming irrelevant and unpersuasive.  
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In countries like the UK where;  
 
―… there is evidence to show that the influence of Parliament is in decline, particularly due to the 
growth in power of the executive, the doctrine of parliamentary government (where government 
is drawn from, located in and accountable to Parliament) remains fundamental, since it is the way 
in which the system is made democratic and legitimates the government‘s rule of the country by 
holding it accountable. Although it is no longer influential in terms of legislating, and even in 
scrutinising the actions of the executive, Parliament is still an important body despite its 
weakness‖ (http://www.coursework.info/GCSE/Politics).  
 
This situation will continue until and unless parliaments prioritise ― … a need for internal 
sectorally focused policy capacity‖ (Heymans, 1996: 44). Thus, suggesting the 
establishment of a functioning, professional and quality in-house policy unit. That will 
compliment and correlate with external policy units (think-tanks) in advancing policy-
making, decision-making, analytical skills and providing evidence-based policy research 
for the benefit of legislators. In that, making the role of parliaments, which is to legislate 
or make laws, a reality and symbolic function that will be exercised with full and 
effective knowledge and technical skills. It is said that parliament will need more than 
political legitimacy or will in making policies, and in asserting itself as an influential and 
relevant key actor. The US Congress, which is portrayed as one political institution which 
commands the respect in terms of law making in particular, arguably, because of the 
technical support structures that exist within its political framework, it therefore 
resembles a strong model of a strong parliamentary democracy from which other 
legislatures can draw lessons.  
 
3.5 US CONGRESS AND ITS POLICY SUPPORT UNIT 
 
The standard of policy discussions and making, of conducting policy research and 
implementation, of policy advisory and advocacy, differs from one country to another 
due to factors of human and capital resources, organisational support mechanisms, and 
political environments. Heymans (1996: 45) argues that, developing countries are faced 
with challenges where experts, specialised capacities and analytical skills are minimal or 
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do not exist, and are therefore threatened with dysfunctional or instable political 
institutions. Understanding the comprehensive nature of political institutions in relation 
to policy analysis, it is then generally argued that the size of government determines the 
complexity of policy and law-making activities in a particular country. And, that because 
of globalisation, the subject of policy-making has become more complex and complicated 
as modernisation takes its course. For the purpose of the study, this section, based on the 
relevancy and the strong establishment and functioning system that exists, will 
conveniently discuss the US Congress public policy support unit as an exemplary model. 
The discussion will concentrate specifically on the support offered by the unit to 
Congress, in relation to the constituency or staff in the unit. It will highlight the working 
relationship and the structural arrangement between the unit and Congress as a way of 
addressing arguments of previous sections and chapters, particularly arguments in 
Section 3.4.  
 
With a clear understanding and knowledge of the existence of ‗similar‘ in-house policy 
units in developed and developing countries, and in Africa, the researcher consciously 
chose the US Congress, so as to illustrate the purpose of the study. In Uganda for 
example, the Department of Library and Research Service and the Department of Legal 
and Legislative Services respectively, provide research and technical advice to members 
of Parliament and committees, with the aim of enhancing capacity building in terms of 
interpreting and analysis of bills, drafting Private Members‘ Bills, and proposed 
amendments (The Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, 2006). Nonetheless, the US 
Congress is a preferred example, due to its advanced parliamentary democracy system 
and the perception that this unit has been in existence for a number years, therefore 
making it suitable for the study.       
  
The structural arrangement of the US Congress is uniquely designed to suite its electoral 
system as it consists of two houses: the House of Representative and the Senate, divided 
along party lines; the Speaker is the leader of the House (Patterson, 1993: 449-450) and  
plays an active role in terms of  ―… formulating policy positions and coordinating party 
strategies‖ (Patterson, 1993: 465). Patterson argues that with the American system, the 
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Speaker is the second most powerful official in Washington, after the President. As the 
central principle of the American culture, Patterson argues that, the ―Congress has the 
responsibility to see that the executive carries out the laws faithfully and spends the 
money properly, a supervisory activity‖ (Patterson, 1993: 488-492). Acknowledging the 
importance of capacity and the ability to debate and make laws, Patterson depicts the US 
Congress as body that is intellectually capable of taking a constitutional lead and a final 
say in policy and law making. In foreseeing the above, there has been a realisation of a 
need for institutional support in terms of lawmaking, technical policy analysis, and 
research capacity, the formation of the Congressional Research Unit was as a result.  
 
The Congressional Research Service (CRS), which provides policy and research support 
to the Congress, has been functioning since 1914. It is one of the oldest policy and 
research units in existence worldwide, and was established through a needs analysis and 
as a result of honest rational acknowledgement by the Congress. Who rather sensed that, 
it was being outweighed in the ongoing struggle to maintain the balance of power 
between the two branches of government (legislature and executive). Constitutionally 
enacted in 1946 (see Weiss, 1992: 182-183). The Congressional Research Service has 
placed greater emphasis on legislative consultation (consulting with both members from 
the majority and minority parties), policy analysis, the use of simulation models and 
interdisciplinary analyses, and anticipation work.   
 
The 1970 Amendment on the Legislative Reorganisation Act (LRA) gave the CRS more 
authority to provide support to the Congress on policy analysis. Legislators initiated this 
move as a method of reclaiming their authority as political decision-makers and as 
elected representatives of the public; the CRS was therefore seen as a support technical 
tool in empowering the Congress to a point where it could confidently apply its 
intellectual knowledge in public policy deliberations and decision-making. The CRS was 
formed on the basis that it efficiently informs policy decision makers on policy matters. It 
works under the principle that  ―… this unit should not offer policy recommendations but 
policy alternatives, and that it exists solely to help Congress to maintain its role as the 
world‘s best-informed, most independent legislature‖ (Weiss, 1992: 189). The mandate 
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and the role of the CRS was carefully conceptualised and designed so as to ensure that 
political leadership maintains its power and mandate as the ultimate law-makers. Since 
the establishment of the CRS, it has been argued and observed that Congress has 
managed to perform its law-making role efficiently, debating policy matters with 
confidence and on the same level of quality standard, when compared to the executive.  
 
The functional principle of the CRS, as explained by Patterson (1993), has been that of a 
policy unit that is non-partisan and neutral when consulting with a politically elected 
representative, a unit that will be serving not just one political representative or party but 
the entire Congress. The growing ability of the Congress to lead on policy-making, with 
legislative ability and capacity is as a result of the CRS being staffed with specialised 
individuals, who provide an in-house expertise for the benefit of Congress. As an 
institutional support unit, structurally designed to interact directly with Members of the 
Congress, when it comes to authenticity, scientifically proven analogy, and for better 
trusted and more efficient input-output. Analysts in the CRS are predominantly holders of 
graduate degrees in law, master‘s degrees in a variety of subjects, and many PhDs 
(Weiss, 1992: 186).   
Congressional Research Service is divided into five interdisciplinary research divisions: 
 American Law  
 Domestic Social Policy  
 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade  
 Government and Finance  
 Resources, Science and Industry  
The Knowledge Services Group provides research support services to the policy experts 
in each of the five divisions. 
Six infrastructure offices oversee long-term goals, management, and administrative duties 
of CRS: 
 Office of the Director, including the Office of Communications  
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 Congressional Information and Publishing  
 Counsellor to the Director  
 Finance and Administration  
 Information Management and Technology  
 Workforce Management and Development (The Congressional Research Service, 
2010). 
The CRS, as indicated above, is a unit that mainly focuses on external or macro-
governmental policies as its essential and primary role and functions. Acknowledging the 
importance of a viable institution, the CRS therefore includes, among its roles, internal 
organisation development which encompasses internal or administrative policy research, 
analysis, monitoring, and review, given the broad expertise employed in the Unit. 
Adequate and necessary conceptualising and support given to the CRS by the Congress 
has been noted to be significant. As it has strengthened the Unit and the professional 
analysts within it, so they can execute their duties independently, efficiently, and 
objectively. This move connotes the importance of institutionalisation of policy 
management capacity.   
Viewed as a unit born out of thorough, precise conceptualisation, and established under 
the act of the legislature, the work of the CRS is monitored by the congressional 
leadership, which meets twice a year to ensure its consistency with Congress‘s own 
agenda. By such, the intention is to curtail any possible work duplication and out-of-line 
studies. The Amendment on the Legislative Reorganisation Act (LRA) of 1970 made it a 
point that the CRS as a congressional agency does not operate in a vacuum (Weiss, 
1992). ―While the need to keep technocrats in check is often politically acknowledged, it 
is of course often difficult to achieve‖ (Heymans, 1996: 32); the purpose is not to confine 
the CRS, but to ensure that policy analysts in the unit compliment political direction and 
programmes, thereby enhancing politicians to realise their socioeconomic 
responsibilities, and ―… keep them on an agenda of management and governance issues‖ 
(Heymans, 1996: 32). The fundamental principle of the unit is that, the CRS accounts and 
―… works only for Congress‖ (Weiss, 1992: 189). 
 
 
 
 
 
 53 
The enactment of the CRS as a policy unit functioning within the parameters of Congress 
is viewed and appreciated as a working mechanism that will spearhead, shape and 
enhance the involvement of legislators in policy debates, and will ensure that the 
Congress is effectively proactive when conducting its business. Alluding further to the 
above statement, Weiss points out that ―Once Congress understands the problem and the 
family of choices available, members are good at fine-tuning the policy options and 
making the political judgements‖ (Weiss, 1992: 196). Whilst enjoying and maintaining 
its non-partisan objectivity and legitimacy in providing policy alternatives and advice, 
analysts in the CRS, as part of their mandate and responsibilities, preserve the right and 
the authority to present, explain and justify any critical assumptions; investigate and 
recheck data anomalies; use primary resources whenever available; double-check all 
statements of fact; and document and vet all sources. This, Weiss (1992) explained, 
assures members, as they engage in debate, that the analysis they rely on is as accurate as 
it is current. The presence of the CSR, it is argued, has managed (though with challenges) 
to entrench the role of the Congress as a leading sphere in policy and law making, in 
budget deliberations, and in overseeing the programmes of the executive, with 
confidence. The Congress is arguably noted as enjoying efficient technical support from 
qualified researchers, policy advisors, analysts, and professional policy experts situated 
within the political parameters of the Congress for national policy undertakings.  
 
3.6 CONCLUSION  
 
The discussion in this chapter illustrates a theoretical perspective on the role and 
responsibilities of parliaments, firstly as organisations (politically oriented), and 
secondly, as law-makers. The indication has been that of acknowledging the uniqueness 
of parliaments when compared to other formal or informal organisations. What underpins 
this unique institution is the relationship that it has with the people, as it relates to 
national issues and international issues, to other external factors and to key societal 
players. As custodians of the constitution, especially in a parliamentary democracy 
system, parliaments preserve and uphold the authority to initiate, pass, amend, and reject 
laws, and to monitor government‘s national programmes. The chapter identified 
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detrimental challenges and weaknesses faced by parliaments in general, in conjunction 
with the effective strength of the executive on the subject of public policy-making. The 
debate raised was that, weaknesses and challenges faced by parliaments empirically 
instigate growing arguments that questions their relevancy and efficiency as policy 
decision-makers. The argument is, parliaments, both in developed and developing 
countries only exist as rubber-stampers of policies initiated by the executive, thus 
portraying parliaments as merely powerless debating forums (Griffith et. al., 1989; Hague 
et. al., 1993; Heymans, 1996; Olowu & Sako, 2002; Sebastian, 2008). The above is being 
attributed to poor or lack of technical skills available for legislators in providing policy 
analysis, policy research and policy guideline or alternative for the better decision-
makers. It for this reason that policy scholars advocates for an in-house policy 
management capacity mechanism, steered by policy experts, policy researchers and 
analysts that will provide quality and evidence-based policy. Stating that ―It is advisable 
to create relatively small but competent units whose size may be expanded in accordance 
with the demands of the work‖ (Mutahaba & Balogun, 1992: 47) of parliaments.       
 
The CRS in the US Congress has been an appropriate example of an in-house policy 
support unit established specifically to provide the requisite technical support, with 
skilled policy analysts, policy advisors, policy researchers, and monitoring and evaluating 
experts. The reason for establishing such an institutional support mechanism is rooted in 
recognition and introspection made by the Congress on the various subjects, with public 
policy-making as the primary course. Coming in to terms with the fact that they 
(legislators) were academically and intellectually outclassed by the well-resourced 
executive, thus creating a technical gap in terms of policy deliberations and making 
between the executive and the legislature became an essence in the formation of the CRS. 
The primary objective and role of the CRS as a policy unit is to provide policy advice on 
internal and macro-governmental policies: it provides policy analysis, interpretation and 
research support, and it consults with politicians on what Weiss (1992) called, ‗a 
legislation consultation‘. Therefore, the CRS is an in-house policy unit that assist with 
policy monitoring and evaluation; provides policy alternatives; and informs policy 
decision-makers on relevant policy issues including policy development.  
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CHAPTER 4: POLICY UNITS: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, public policy-making is a complex political exercise, 
with its own successes and failures. The focal point in this chapter will evolve around 
views arguing that, policy initiatives and debates should be informed by national 
priorities and needs, and supported by empirical investigation or research and proper 
analysis, which requires knowledge, ability and proficiency. ―Establishing specialising 
staff positions for policy analysis and decision analysis is essential for better policy-
making … such teams should be attached to heads of the main policy-making structures 
as professional staff units‖ (Dror, 1983: 266-267).  
 
This chapter will discuss the relationship between public policy-making and research. It 
will eminently discuss a theoretical view on the role and responsibilities of policy 
analysts, policy units and independent policy institutions or think-tanks, in relation to 
policy advocacy. The chapter will also outline crucial weaknesses faced by policy 
analysts and units, and how these weaknesses relate and affect the ideal existence and 
functioning of policy units in general.  
 
Dror (1983: 266) perceives the role and functions of policy units as ―(1) Continuous 
education of the policy makers on the uses and limitations of the different disciplines, and 
of policy knowledge in general; (2) Contributing, on a current basis, relevant knowledge 
to policymaking and (3) Liaison with universities, special policy-analysis and research 
organisations, and central systems-management, metapolicymaking, and comprehensive-
policymaking units‖.  
 
4.2 EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY-MAKING  
 
Steven Friedman argues that ―Policy research is the practice of using the skills of social 
researchers and analysts to inform social decision-making‖; he further points out by 
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suggesting that, ―Policy makers need researchers because, while they may know what it 
is they wish to achieve, they may also lack sufficient knowledge of how to achieve it‖ 
(Friedman, 1995: 1). In employing Friedman‘s argument, relevant policies should always 
be informed by evidence and research based knowledge, with skilled and trained policy 
researchers and analysts in the centre stage as the source of technical and timely 
information for official policy-makers. 
 
Fox et al (2006: 37) note that, ―… research has an inevitable influence on policy matters‖ 
directly or indirectly, positively or negatively. Hence it is argued that, policy 
development will never be complete if those involved omit evidence-based research, as 
this is thé critical exercise in determining positive policy input and output. The rational 
behind this argument is that, evidence-based research guarantees policies that are suppose 
to be objective, empirically proven and goal-oriented. Masilela (2008), view the 
relationship between public policy and research as an essential one, adding that, 
‗brainstorming‘ in policy-making processes should be utilised as a research technique to 
improve sufficient input-output, and for priority-setting. In explaining that, he notes, 
―The adoption of this framework for the priority-setting exercise and the specification of 
sustainable development, social justice, democracy and peace as strategic goals, 
underlines the relative importance of the policy-demand side of the supply-and-demand 
framework used to characterise the research policy relationship‖ (Masilela, 2008: 31). 
Burton (2006) describe the role of evidence-based policy research as an approach that 
responds to, and ―… enters at every stage, from problem framing, through solution 
generation and alternative testing, to retrospective evaluation‖ (Burton, 2006: 184). 
Burton believes that a ―Scientific quality of evidence is crucial, and that stronger truth 
claims are more likely to be used by policy makers‖ (Burton, 2006: 184).  
 
Argued by some scholars as an exercise based on knowledge and trust, evidence-based 
research policy-making requires and demands a healthy working relationship to be 
cemented between policy scientists (within and outside the political system) and the 
government. This reason being, Heymans (1996: 29) explains, an inclusive public 
―Policy-making entails issues being identified, researched and analysed, information 
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processed and interpreted, positions formulated, articulated and debated, and lessons of 
experience utilised to improve the quality of government‘. Therefore, a much needed 
correlation between key policy actors might assist the decision-makers with the necessary 
technical abilities required. This relationship can also be classified as perhaps a creation 
of an essential synergy between knowledge (policy experts) and action (policy decision- 
makers), where policy analysts and researchers are allowed to promote evidence-based 
policy findings and recommendations. Appropriated utilised, the relationship between 
research and policy can therefore be viewed as a model that seeks to strengthen the 
understanding, judgement and intuition of both politicians and other officials involved in 
policy-making. According to Burton (2006: 174-175), the rise of evidence-based policy-
making has prompted a burgeoning sub-field, concerned specifically with the relationship 
between research and policy. 
 
For an accurate and positive policy, one has to prioritise research as a tool to identify key 
challenges. Literature indicates that ―… anyone who has worked in the field of solving 
public policy problems knows that before a person can really solve a problem he or she 
must interact with the problem, become immersed in its very nature, and come to know 
the problem intimately‖ (Bertsch, 1991: 613). This is to say, with the ability to identify, 
and prioritise evidence-based researched policies, will diligently promote and 
commission official policy-makers to appropriately apply their minds with confidence 
when deliberating on public policies. Evidence-based research allows and provides 
policy-makers with the ability to strategically consider the evidence given, in conjunction 
with policy implications in achieve the anticipated and desired input-output.  In context, 
evidence-based policy research seeks to adequately empower and ―… to provide policy 
makers, practitioners and other stakeholders with knowledge about how best to improve 
service delivery and service outcome‖ (Masilela, 2008: 35).  
 
A research-policy relationship is conceptualised as a mediated and contingent process 
influenced by the interaction of three factors:  
 Context: determined by institutional structures, interests, roles, power relations, 
and organisational cultures 
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 Evidence: determined by pre-existing knowledge, values and experiences; the 
quality and packaging of research; the credibility and communication of research 
etc 
 Linkages: determined by the closeness of the personal links between researchers 
and policy makers (Masilela, 2008: 36) 
 
The argument advocates the notion that presume the importance of a working relationship 
between key policy actors, and for the existence of a conducive environment for 
knowledge of the subject matter, that will subsequently lead to positive and objective 
practical solutions. Frederickson and Wise (1977: 180) observe that, whenever there is a 
study or deliberation on policy proposals by government officials. There are always 
professional staffs trained in policy research, able to interpret data, with access to 
professional evaluation, trained to analyse data collected on public policy proposals, and 
with the capacity to contextualise and unpack research-policy problems. With good 
governance as the motivator, it is argued that good policy research equals to accurate 
findings, which are appropriate to be utilised to influence policy decision-makers, or 
rather advise them when a need to identify policy challenges, shortcomings, and 
implications arises.  
 
Complications associated with policy-making demands a fair political consideration, 
where policy decision-makers with policy experts and researchers as providers of 
technical support and policy directions, together with trust and respect share scientific 
content knowledge. The problems and challenges faced by official policy-makers in 
making a distinct choice between a good and an improper policy is caused by the 
inability to simplify, analyse, classify and process data provided by policy analysts and 
researchers. The existence of the perceived relationship between policy researchers and 
policy decision-makers will therefore address the above for better policy deliberations 
and analysis. 
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Presenting his paper to the Australian Public Service Commission (APS Commission) 
Gary Banks (2009: 1) asserts that; 
 
―It is as important that we have a rigorous, evidence-based approach to public policy in 
Australia today as at any time in our history. This country faces major long-term challenges; 
challenges that have only been exacerbated by the economic turbulence that we are struggling 
to deal with right now. When the present crisis is over, we will still have the ongoing 
challenges of greenhouse, the ageing of our population and continuing international 
competitive pressures‖.  
 
The argument is therefore that, it is advisably eminent and relevant for policy decision- 
makers to know the significant features and benefits that accompany the evidence-based 
research approach to public policy-making. ―Ideally, we need systems that are informed 
by evidence at each stage of policy development, from when an issue is first identified, to 
the development of the most appropriate response, and subsequent evaluation of its 
effectiveness‘ (Banks, 2009: iii). As outlined in Figure 3.1, the relationship between 
public policy-making and evidence-based research constitutes a complex but positive 
output. It is about identifying and analysing a policy problem. It is an exercise that 
enables or informs policy research debates based on ―Socially constructed realities‖ 
(Burton, 2006: 186), and it allows primary policy actors an opportunity to test, measure, 
and openly scrutinise (monitor and evaluate) the process with credibility and the 
confidence to produce better policy outcomes. One thing that should not be ignored is 
that the political world is changing, therefore there is a high ‗demand and supply‘ (as 
explained by Masilela, 2008) for relevant, representative and reliable policy information 
which is consistently supported by evidence and research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Banks (2009:6) 
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WHAT constitutes real evidence? 
Methodology 
Analytical approach allows for 
proper consideration of the 
problems 
Capacity 
Research skills are sufficient to 
undertake the analysis 
Time 
To harvest data, gather new data 
and test the analysis 
 Good data 
High-quality data bases, 
support, timely analysis 
Independence 
Incentives to deliver advice in 
the public interest 
Transparency 
Open debates and discussion to 
test and educate the public 
HOW can credible evidence be ensured? 
WHEN is adequate evidence available to inform decisions? 
A receptive policy environment 
Willingness to test policy options and the 
structures and resources to do so 
 
Evidence-based policy 
Figure 3.1: Evidence-based policy-making 
Source: Banks (2009:6) 
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The need for evidence-based policy research is primarily intended to improve national 
agenda for adequate policy priorities. It is about preparing the political environment for 
scientific data collected, that will influence and advance the entire process of public 
policy decision-making.  
 
It is also argued that, the efficiency of policy-makers to formulate and make formidable 
policy decision depends, unconditionally, on the type of technical support they receive in 
terms of information or data collected, policy advice presented, and the analytical 
capabilities available to them. According to Burton (2006: 178), ―… if policy research 
becomes more rigorous and the evidence it generates becomes more robust then policy 
makers will have no good reason for not using it‖. Basing this on the notion that, ―… 
good evidence can ameliorate or ‗neutralise‘ political obstacles, thereby making reforms 
more feasible‖ (Banks, 2009: 6). Figure 3.1 illustrates a framework that provides for a 
scientifically oriented, policy-based research and evidence that is tested and contested. 
The indication is that, when appropriately applied, evidence-based policy research, also 
described as an ‗essential ingredient‘ by Banks, is a transparent approach that is 
consultative in principle. It is an approach that promotes and seeks to ― … educate the 
community about what is at stake in a policy issue‖ (Banks,  2009: 12). Freidman (1995), 
Burton (2006), and other scholars concur with the notion that, ―You can‘t have good 
evidence, you can‘t have good research, without good people‖ (Banks, 2009: 13). The 
underlying principle in evidence-based policy research is that, people are the source and 
the intended receivers or targets of national programmes and projects.   
 
The view of Dror (2002: 147) is that, in modern democratic systems, public policy 
practices exist to engage key actors in quality policy deliberations, policy direction, 
evidence-based policy research, radical but moderate policy alternatives, value for money 
policy outputs, informed social critique and pure policy theories, all of which are steered 
by individual policy thinkers and free-floating intellectuals, academics and professionals, 
ideologues, grassroots activities, prophets, social dreamers, entrepreneurs, special interest 
groups, universities and think-tanks.  
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4.3 THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF POLICY ANALYSTS 
  
Hanekom‘s (1996: 13) view is that, ―Policy decision-making and policy-making are not 
synonymous, describing the latter as the action taken after a thorough intellectual process 
aiming to achieve policy goals or the policy intentions, whereas decision-making is about 
selecting a preferred alternative or advice after ‗proper‘ consideration of other 
alternatives‖. Policy decision-making outlines a systematic exercise involving political 
elites as the ultimate decision-makers, and policy analysts as providers of policy options 
or alternatives for consideration. Thereafter, reaching a favourable and appropriate policy 
choice that speaks to political goals, governmental visions and missions, and the desirable 
national programmes. Though they are prominently involved in policy-making and 
influential in policy decision-making, policy analysts are not policy decision-makers, 
they are ―… creators and products of policy systems‖ (Dunn, 1994: 71). This section will 
examine the role and responsibilities of policy analysts, who are regarded as the brains 
behind policy formulation, policy advice, policy analysis, guidance, monitoring and 
evaluation. In conjunction to that, this section will explore and discuss policy units as key 
players in public policy-making, and thus describing the types of these units.  
 
The purpose and the role of policy analysts is to provide objective policy advice, interpret 
or analyse complex and comprehensive policy alternatives. Policy analysts possess the 
skills to intellectually brainstorm, conceptualise and produce evidence-based policy 
research, and facilitate policy management capacity. Acknowledged by many, 
responsibilities of policy analysts includes among others, designing of macro-
governmental policies, and shape policy directions. It is to provide quality policy 
personnel and expertise, and be actively involved in policy advocacy and lobbying with 
intentions of influencing policy agendas. As providers of non-partisan or independent 
voices, policy analysts generally procure empirically and scholarly-based policy 
knowledge and capacity to benefit legislatures, the executive, and ultimately the people. 
The motive behind a non-partisan policy unit is to try and avoid what the Central Policy 
Review Staff (CPRS) in the UK suffered, as it was closely associated with political 
figures and parties (see Mutahaba & Balogun, 1992) in conducting its duties.  
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It is widely argued that, policy analysts ―… should bear in mind that his primary client is 
the political office-bearer or policy-maker. The relationship between policy-makers and 
policy analysts should be of a very high order, especially because of the possibility that 
the analyst may have to try to ‗sell‘ his personal views to the policy-maker‖ (Hanekom, 
1996: 70). Putting the above into perspective, Carter (2008: 41) emphasises that, public 
policy analysts roles include among others ― … focusing on policy and legal issues, free 
from partisan influences and ideological biases, and thus providing research and creative 
thinking that legislative bodies do not have time or resources to produce‖ (Carter, 2008: 
41). Generally staffed with quality analysts and researchers, policy unit‘s purpose is to 
assume a role of providing, what Carter (2008: 43) called ‗conventional wisdom‘, 
technical and timely policy analysis, research findings and recommendations. As policy 
advocates and advises; policy analysts play a crucial role in building state policy 
management capacity and are very much interested in policy formulation, 
implementation or evaluation (Parsons, 1995: 31).    
 
Commonly known as technocrats, policy analysts provide what is viewed by some 
authors as critically qualified analysis on matters regarding economic, social and political 
importance. They mediate between the government and the public, by providing an 
informed environmental examination, at the same breath identifying problems for further 
assessment, as well as creating possible interaction and communication for quality policy 
dialogue (Carter, 2008: 43). By possessing qualities to identify and translate social, 
economic and political problems into policy cases, policy analysts‘ roles also involves the 
ability to scientifically ― … design implementation strategies to give effect to the 
legislative framework and participate in policy implementation, monitoring and revision‖ 
(Fox et. al., 2006: 42). This explains the diverse skills entailed by policy analyst, if 
employed adequately by political elites, literature reveals, could benefit legislatures, 
citizens, as well as policy units.    
 
Policy analysts exist in government agencies, in non-governmental institutions, and 
within political party parameters. Identifying types of independent policy institutions 
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(think-tanks), Carter (2008: 42), in making a reference to McGann (2005), classifies 
policy analysts as:  
 ―Academic (specialised and diversified) think-tanks are theory based, produce 
research for the academic community; and for long-term research  
 Contract research organisations have a narrow policy orientation, focus on specific 
sectors, and can serve as policy or programme consultants  
 Advocacy think-tanks push an ideology, and their work is defined by partisan causes. 
They generally reject academic orientation to policy analysis 
 Policy enterprise think-tanks invest in their brand to produce research outputs only to 
meet the needs of busy policy makers and politicians. They place a premium on 
marketing their ideas rather than validating them‖  
 
In explaining the four types of think-tank organisations as identified by Carter:  
 
Academic think-tanks are theory based, producing policy research for academic 
purposes, long term scientific research, and training. It is argued that, within this category 
one can receive enormous quality knowledge and skills in public policy-making and 
awareness. Dror (2002: 143) describes the academic think-tanks as ―More innovative and 
creative, free floating intellectuals‘. Noted in the World Social Science Report (2010: 17), 
the work done by academic think-tanks elevates their standards. Hence, they enjoy 
recognition with a strong presence among official policy-makers, especially in developed 
countries. The report further describe this type of think-tank and its institutions as a ― … 
driver of economic growth‖ (International Social Science Council, 2010: 15). However, 
the limitations or challenges faced by academic think-tanks are that, the material they 
produce is mainly for academic communities, with intellectual or academic jargon which 
is difficult for civil societies, ordinary citizens and sometimes government, to understand. 
Thus portraying the work of academics on policy-making loses support, as they are 
perceived to be less accommodating.  
 
Having a narrow policy perspective, contract research institutions, as explained by 
Carter, are considered to be limited to a particular field, and are said to find it difficult 
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when analysing or researching policy that does not interest them. This is to say, their 
policy research knowledge and expertise is limited. As independent policy institutions, 
contract policy analysts operate on a consultative basis with specific groups of 
individuals possessing specific interest, e.g. an education policy unit that mainly focuses 
on education related matters and nothing else. These are, as Parsons (1995: 30) informs 
us, institutions that contribute and are involved in public policy-making processes based 
on them attaining government contracts determined by fees. Contract research institutions 
are ‗freelance consultants‘ perceived by others as career opportunists.  
 
The advocacy think-tanks are ideologically oriented. Their work is easily defined by 
partisan causes. Advocacy think-tanks/units concentrate, or are rather, structurally 
designed to formulate, articulate and market policy ideas as a result of a particular 
organisational interest. Their partisan alignment and causes, in a way, restrain their 
understanding of broader components and factors affecting societies, therefore in a sense, 
closing or becoming sceptical of influences of other think-tanks, especially the academic 
influence and orientation to policy analysis.   
 
The policy enterprise think-tank’s role is to advocate a specific policy agenda, and 
interest ahead of national policy programmes that exist as a result of manipulating a weak 
or ill-defined role by parliament (legislature), regarding policy analysts, policy 
management and advocacy. Policy enterprise think-tanks generally exploit the situation, 
where the executive and the legislature lack the capacity and the ability to develop and 
advance policy proposals for a particular period. The danger imposed by this type of 
think-tank is that they produce unqualified, unsubstantiated policy research proposals 
which might lead to chaotic and problematic policy implications, especially on 
implementation.  
 
Political party think-tanks, identified by Parsons (1995) and Burstein (1991), are mostly 
aligned to political ideologies and parties, where they design, advocate, analyse, and 
redefine policies in support of the party‘s vision and goals in pursuit of political 
objectives. How authentic, substantive and representative their policy advice and analysis 
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is, is another matter, as policy domains are supposedly objective and substantive in 
content, rooted from an organised but complex political system (Burstein 1991: 328). 
Taking into cognisance the view that, policy experts construct their policy research based, 
on social or environmental needs. With political party think-tanks, however, their policy 
inputs are arguably considered to be biased as they are subjected to political ideologies 
and open to party political control and manipulations which sometimes favour political 
careerism. In South Africa, the ruling party has its own fundamental and influential 
policy unit headed by Mr Jeffrey Radebe, who is also a Minister in the Cabinet (ANC 
Parliamentary Caucus). The ANC‘s policy unit is a typical example of a political party 
think-tank as described by Parsons (1995) and Burstein (1991). 
 
Although differing in their ‗professional setting‘, these different types of think-tanks 
contain both specific and multiple capacities and the abilities to effectively influence and 
contribute on the subject matter, that being public policy-making in its entirety. The view 
therefore is that policy analysts ―… have a number of common and overlapping concerns: 
they are concerned with what the decision-makers and policy makers do or do not do‖ 
(Parsons, 1995: 29). With visible intellectual growth and opportunities, South Africa has 
seen a number of competent and credible think-tanks developing and nurturing quality 
researchers, policy analysts, and specialists. Among those are the South African Institute 
for International Affairs (SAIIA), Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), Institute for 
Democracy in Africa (IDASA), Democracy Development Programme/Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung in South Africa (DDP/KAS), Centre for Education Policy Development (CEPD), 
Human Science Research Council (HSRC), and the South African Institute of Race 
Relations (SAIRR), to name a few. These are vibrant public policy research institutes, 
which mostly initiate policy research with intentions to shape national policy agendas and 
programmes. They advocate, lobby and educate by sharing their findings and 
recommendations the policy decision-makers. In most instances, these units conduct 
specific policy research independently and sometimes in collaboration with government.      
 
The argument in this chapter is that, making governments and legislatures in particular, 
more effective and efficient, requires an in-depth technical investment in multi-
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disciplinary and policy management science. Policy analysts, with their acquired policy 
research, policy design and analytical skills positioned in the central mind of government, 
could add essential and necessary intelligence to official policy-makers, as catalysts and 
proponents of policy management capacity development.  
 
Various scholars, including Dror (1988), Burstein (1991), Heymans (1996), and Carter 
(2008), share a common belief that says, policy analysts are an important segment of a 
strong efficient democratic society. Policy analyst‘s role is described by these scholars as 
imperative in public policy management. However, it is also recorded that policy analysts 
face a challenge in advancing their policy suggestions, alternatives, findings and 
recommendations for consideration by official policy-makers. Friedman (1995: 18) points 
out that, public policies and policy research should be relevant and exciting, hence policy 
proposals, findings, and recommendations can not just be ―… accepted at face value 
simply because they are produced by someone with a university degree‖.  Policy experts 
need to meet the requirements which include environmental knowledge, authenticity, and 
capacity.  
 
4.4 WEAKNESSES AND CHALLENGES OF POLICY ANALYSTS 
 
Policy analysts and experts have their own individual and organisational weaknesses and 
limitations, which affects their performance, credibility, and objective analysis in public 
policy making. Dror (1971: 3-4) contends that;  
 
―Policy recommendations presented by scientists, presuming to rely on science, suffer from a 
number of serious weaknesses, including in particular; the following: 
 A tendency to formulate problems narrowly ―tunnel vision‖ taken from specialised 
disciplines, for example an economist tends to view all problems as economic ones, with 
a little attention to borders of validity. 
 These weaknesses can be summed up as narrow, mono-disciplinary perspectives, which 
produce single-dimensional images of multispace issues; a distorted perception of 
problems; careless transgressions beyond one‘s area of scientific competence; and zero-
effective, if not counter-productive, recommendations which are accompanied by lack of 
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knowledge by most scientists of even rudimentary elements of policy prescriptive 
approaches. 
 By lack of knowledge, Dror‘s argument clearly means; lack of knowledge permitting 
control and direction of the environment, direction of society and individual. [is this part 
of the direct quote? 
 The absence of meta-direction and meta-control not only constitutes a serious lacuna in 
scientific inputs into policymaking, but also hinders transformation of available scientific 
knowledge into policy recommendation, because policy recommendations must be based 
on some fusion between prescriptive methodologists and knowledge of the environment, 
society and individuals‖. 
 
Wissink in Cloete et. al. (2006: 323) explains that, a prominent policy analyst should be 
able to identify and project conflicting policy options. Policy analysts should, as a pre-
requisite, possess skills to develop appropriate policy alternatives, develop and provide 
policy outcome measures for evaluation with relevant information. They should contain 
the ability to facilitate an environment for political adoption. Wissink further notes that, 
―The standard that usually disqualifies most social scientists is the inability to present all 
this information clearly, concisely and convincingly … policy analyst fails if his advice is 
not taken, his advice fails to produce the intended consequences‖ (Cloete et. al. 2006: 
323). By disregarding the above fundamental segments and guidelines in understanding 
the processes of public policy-making, policy analysts, in most cases directly or 
indirectly, expose themselves to rejections, being ignored or being vulnerable to 
manipulation and political influences.    
 
In order to succeed, Burton critically notes, policy analysts, researchers, and experts 
should acquaint themselves with political skills, noting that academic qualifications alone 
are not enough to advocate and accurately provide policy advice, and to research and 
analyse. He emphasises that policy analysts should ―… become more politically savvy as 
well as technically skilful if they want their work to be influential; even if they cannot 
envisage themselves as fully-fledged deliberative practitioners‖ (Burton, 2006: 189-191).  
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The notion that policy experts are obvious technical and analytical support providers for 
legislatures because of their academic qualifications is, according to Dror (2002: 142), a 
misconception. Elaborating, he points out that an individual may carry many 
qualifications while lacking the fundamental abilities and qualities to influence 
trajectories into the future within given or mutated evolutionary potentials. Which 
requires the ability to identify high quality critical choices and to strategise based on the 
information gathered; and those choices are likely to have a significant impact on the 
future policy decisions taken that eventually affects the lives of ordinary citizens. The 
emphasis is that, policy analysts, with their academic knowledge, are still required as a 
prerequisite to public policy-making, to logically and strategically acquaint themselves 
and adjust to complications related to the political environment, and to complexities 
associated with the workings of government in general and parliaments in particular as 
elite political bodies. The argument suggest that analysts should be aware that, ― … 
government does not need to accept the proposed policy‖  (Braun & Girladi, 2006: 192). 
It (government) enjoys the right and liberty to decide whether to accept what has been 
proposed to them if and when it feels ‗appropriate‘. Hence, it is crucial for analysts to 
rationally understand and follow political agendas, goals, vision and mission as stipulated 
by the state. Mintzberg (1983: 26) describe this as the ability to acquire ‗political skill‘ 
while maintaining non-partisan. It is, he argues, ―… the ability to use the bases of power 
effectively – to convince those whom one has access, to use one‘s resources, information, 
and technical skills to their fullest, … to sense what is possible and to organise necessary 
alliances‖. Lacking the above, leads to frustration, thereafter, forcing policy analysts and 
units to choose unethical means in influencing policy-making processes, in that they 
become insignificant unendorsed allies of the government, who legitimise political party 
policies (Friedman, 1995, Braun & Gilardi, 2006), by such facing the risk of losing their 
integrity as providers of independent, objective and non-partisan policy voice.  For these 
reasons, Hogwood and Dunn (1984: 30) suggest that ―… analysts have to be trained in 
the political skills as well as in planning techniques and approaches. The trained (whether 
undergraduate or post experience) should emerge with a heightened awareness and 
understanding of, and sympathy for, the essential political nature of the policy process‖.   
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4.5 PUBLIC POLICY UNITS AND POLICY ADVOCACY 
 
Boundaries between policy domains are more permeable than party-political boundaries. 
This is because policymakers and experts, in one domain borrow ideas from other 
domains close to their own, supposedly when and if they share similar policy content and 
perspectives (Burstein, 1991: 335-336). Policy units, especially academic, contract 
researchers and policy enterprise think-tanks, understand that policy advocacy involves 
activities that demand capacity, networks, and sufficient or popular recognition. The rule 
therefore is to advocate while at the same time drawing the attention of official policy- 
makers for acknowledgement. Public policy units should, it is argued, as a critical starting 
point, ensure that what they are lobbying and selling is political relevant and significantly 
progressive.  
 
It is strategically imperative for policy units or centres to ―… remember that policy 
makers are often confronted with a multiplicity of policy issues; some of which are 
complex and messy, and others that are more routine and simple‖ (Cloete et. al., 2006: 
361). The point is, there will always be a political need for accurate, effective policy 
advice from technically skilled policy experts and professionals, with the ability to 
channel, communicate, and sell feasible and progressive knowledge. Carter (2008) 
believes that the idea of having an influential policy research on national agenda depends 
on the interplay of networks and relationships between the producers (policy 
units/analysts) and users (parliament and executive), between evidence and the political 
context. For Parsons (1995: 185-197), this represents what he calls ‗policy subsystem‘, a 
policy-making process, which is composed of all key policy actors involved in a number 
of policy advocacy coalitions, based on a context of relationships and dependencies. The 
argument advocates for an appropriately conceptualised and conducive operational 
environment that will define sensitive boundaries in policy domains for actual growth of 
think-tanks (see Burstein, 1991; Parsons, 1995; Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Carter, 2008; 
Jenkins, 2008).  
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Gumede (2008: 16) indicates that a ―Policy Unit oversees and partakes in meta policy 
development and management through the cluster system in ensuring that the goal of 
mitigating poverty and building a cohesive society, and other complementary objectives 
are achieved‖. The empirical perception thereafter, relates to policy management units as 
providers of comprehensive and professional perspective for evaluating major current 
decision issues, with special attention to the more critical ones (Dror, 1988: 281).  
 
Heymans (1996: 31-32) and Shellukindo (1992: 48) stipulate the view that, official policy 
decision-makers or political leaderships, on a continuous basis require, and base their 
policy stance partly upon the perspective derived from technical advisors. They argue 
that, a tactically clever government will most likely engage with various interests and 
sources of expertise in order to make its pursuit of policy goals more streamlined. This 
creates and confirms, theoretically, the general demand by official policy-makers for 
more technical and empirical solutions to complex policy processes, therefore allowing 
for ultimate policy advocacy to prevail in a consensual manner.  
 
In clarifying environmental contentions and boundary confusions, Parsons (1995: 267) 
note that, in line with the perception that policy units (within or outside the political 
framework) exist only to offer policy alternative and advice, assist with monitoring and 
evaluation, conduct and produce research findings and recommendations. They are not 
policy decision-makers, and therefore can not recommend a policy. Their role is to 
facilitate, advocate, provide, and suggest a more coordinated, semi-academic research-
based analysis. They provide intense high level thinking, with moderate but relevant 
radical ideas (Jenkins, 2008: 30).  
 
The environment and boundaries for the possible viability of policy units should be 
explicitly identified and be conducive, so that the units can play an active and efficient 
role in facilitating and sharing information for informative policy dialogue, policy 
guidelines, and proposals. Christiansen and Nørgaard (in Braun & Gilardi, 2006: 192) 
observe that, in European parliamentary democracies, especially the Scandinavian 
countries, the general practice is that independent think-tanks with strong working 
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relationships to political parties in parliament have traditionally been closely, and 
effectively involved in public policy-making and implementation, through well 
coordinated relationship that allow progressive advocacy, networking, lobbying, and 
other  participatory arrangements to exist.  
 
With the USA having a large number of policy analysts and units, their contribution in 
public policy-making and decision-making through lobbying and advocacy is regarded as 
the most advanced and efficient. As a result, policy units in the US are acknowledged as 
crucial and eminent policy communities in national agendas, in policy-making processes, 
as they are considered as providers of intellectual capacity to official decision-makers. 
This argument in this section advocates for institutionalisation of policy management 
capacity in parliaments, with ―… professional (analytical) support functions, such policy 
and research analysis, information management, planning as well as monitoring and 
evaluation as a core‖ (De Coning et. al., 2002: 32).  
 
Policy advocacy is a delicate exercise. What hinders the ‗success‘ of think-tanks in this 
regard is the willingness by elite politicians to make use of data produced and presented 
by think-tanks, as they operate outside of the official political framework. For policy 
management units to be effectively influential in public policy advocacy, they should, 
Dror (1988: 285) suggests, position themselves in a manner that will give them ―… direct 
channels to top-level decision-makers, the cabinet and senior advisors in ministries. The 
purpose in Dror‘s suggestion is, for policy units to obtain the opportunity to present their 
policy findings and recommendations directly to political office bearers. To build up 
islands of professional excellence near main decision- making structures, as suggested by 
Dror (1988) and Heymans (1996) is not sufficient in policy advocacy. Considering that, 
policy advocacy combines lobbying, advancing and channelling what is presumed to be 
accurately designed policy alternative. What should be emphasised as crucial in policy 
advocacy is, ―The ability to ―sell‖ research findings, to identify the research problem and 
the actual need to conduct a research. What is viewed as crucial is the skill and the 
technical competency of an analyst and the researcher, to influence the political 
environment wishing to operate under. 
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―Policy advocacy requires the skills of rhetoric, persuasion, organisation, and activism‖ 
(Dye, 1995: 6), hence, it is argued that, to generally view policy units as credible expert 
with influential structures which automatically provide policy research, advice, policy 
alternative and advocacy is to be short-sighted. 
 
When it comes to Africa, authors like Mutahaba et. al. (1993); Olowu and Sako (2002), 
are not entirely convinced that Africa‘s policy units are even on the verge of adequately 
propagating policy ideas based on profound evidence-based policy research. The reason 
for this is that, official policy decision-makers (politicians) in Africa do not totally 
subject themselves to technically profound policy input, promulgations, analysis, and 
advice. That is why ― … policy analysis tended to be weak in many African countries‖ 
(Mutahaba et. al., 1993: 50). The argument by these authors shows that, state priorities or 
national agendas in Africa have always been of different nature, when compared to 
developed countries. Good governance and service delivery, as mentioned before, 
promote and compel policy decision-makers to augment their capacity and technical 
skills for relevant policy making. In Africa, ― … the absence of policy analysis units 
presented decision-making as an optionless exercise, since the capacities for defining 
different policy choices were lacking‖ (Mutahaba et. al., 1993:  50).  
 
The existence of policy units in the USA, arguably, the leading parliamentary democratic 
system in the world with the largest government, is rooted in ongoing official ties and 
working relations between the scientific experts and the legislature, leading to gradual 
policy innovation and efficiency (Burstein, 1991: 333). As a source of valuable 
knowledge, the purpose of a cross-cutting multi-disciplinary, policy unit reflects efforts 
that seek to improve and instil good quality policy dialogues, alternatives, analysis. 
   
Table 2.1 categorically highlights specific roles and responsibilities of policy units as 
determined by the nature of the organisation concerned, and the relationship it has with 
official policy makers and the citizens. Furthermore, it indicates that, policy units in 
general present the ability and human capacity to ultimately influence public policy 
management and policy decision-making, given the multitude of expertise possessed.    
 
 
 
 
 74 
Table 2.1: Roles and responsibilities of policy units 
 
Policy design Dunn (1994)  
Dye (1995) 
Cloete, De Coning and Wissink (2006) 
Policy analysis Mutahaba & Balogun (1992) 
Dunn (1994) 
Heymans (1996) 
Cloete, De Coning & Wissink (2006) 
Policy research Friedman (1995) 
Parsons (1995) 
Burton (2006) 
Banks (2009) 
Policy advice and alternatives  Dror (1983, 1988, 2002) 
Weiss (1992)  
Heymans (1996) 
Hanekom (1996) 
Internal or administrative 
policies 
Fox et al (1991) 
Hanekom (1996)  
Cloete, De Coning & Wissink (2006) 
Policy advocacy Vining & Weimer (2002) 
Braun & Gilardi (2006)  
Carter (2008) 
Monitoring and evaluation Parsons (1995) 
Heymans (1996) 
Cloete, De Coning & Wissink (2006) 
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4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, the focus has been to combine evidence-based policy research, public 
policy-making, and policy management capacity. The chapter highlighted the view that 
policy-making as a process is not complete if it lacks knowledge or omits quality 
evidence-based research, steered by qualified policy units. Theoretical aspects of the role 
and responsibilities of policy analysts were examined. Policy analysts are essential 
technical providers, who produce policy analysis, offer policy advice, assist with 
monitoring and evaluation, and conduct and communicate policy research findings and 
recommendations to official policy-makers. Types of policy units or think tanks as 
identified by Carter (2008) were discussed, namely: academic think-tanks; contract 
research organisations; advocacy think-tanks; and policy enterprise think-tanks.  
 
Vining and Weimer (2002: 699) emphasise the notion that, ―… good policy analysis has 
substantive depth. It is important that analysts take time to learn about the legal, political, 
economic, social, and, where relevant, scientific aspects of the issues they are attempting 
to address‖. In discussing weaknesses and challenges faced by policy analysts, the 
chapter argued that, it is paramount for policy analysts to understand the political context 
that they are working under, the external factors that affect and determine their perception 
of what their role is, and who their clients are. The idea emanates from what Dror (1971) 
perceived as a lack of meta-direction and meta-control for productive influential 
scientific policy input-output. The inability to identify and adapt to socioeconomic and 
political realities, affects the functioning of policy units as policy advocates and analyst. 
Who by virtue of their work, should be relating, selling and communicating evidence-
based policy research.  As Vining and Weimer (2002: 701) indicate, ―Public officials, 
interest groups, non-governmental and international organisations, operate in different 
policy arenas and bring different interests, responsibilities, authorities, and political 
resources to the policy process. It is important therefore to provide novices with 
experience in recommending the particular sorts of actions that can be taken by their 
clients‖. Policy units who lack the expertise, rhetoric skills and capacity, to influence 
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while advocating their policy interest, will be marginalized not only by government 
departments, but by other policy institutions. 
 
Policy units or think-tanks duty is to systematically and strategically influence policy 
decision-making through advocacy and lobbying. As providers of profound and 
independent voices for policy debates and policy solutions (Carter, 2008: 43), it is crucial 
for policy units (especially those outside the political frameworks) to strategically 
position themselves so to have direct access to policy officials and makers. To ‗succeed‘ 
in doing so, policy units eminently require the services of professionals who possess the 
ability to efficiently sell research findings and recommendations, analysts with not only 
academic qualifications but who understand the political environment, who has the 
qualities of channelling policy information accordingly.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL PARLIAMENT AND THE 
PMU  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter the focus will be on the South African National Parliament. The 
examination of Parliament will deliberately begin in 1994, during the birth of the new 
dispensation. The discussion will highlight, in context, the challenges that the new regime 
encountered and had to address and deal with, as a result of the previous apartheid 
regime. The aim and the objective of this chapter is to illustrate the role and functions of 
Parliament as prescribed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 
1996, which categorically defines Parliament as an important political institution in a 
parliamentary democracy system, and as the law-maker. To facilitate this exercise, key 
functions of Parliament or the National Assembly are discussed. The study will assess the 
technical capacity of Parliament in policy-making. It will further and specifically present 
policy-making as a political exercise, and thus examining the role of the Policy 
Management Unit in Parliament.  
 
5.2 A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARLIAMENT OF 
1994 
 
Internationally pronounced as a crime against humanity, apartheid, as advocated and 
spearheaded by the National Party of Prime Minister Verwoerd, Vorster, Botha and De 
Klerk, deliberately chose to suppress the rights of Black people. As a result Parliament 
and government in general felt less responsible in terms of accountability and equal 
service delivery, and in designing comprehensive developmental and representative 
public policies. In its dying days, it is argued,  the apartheid regime tirelessly and covertly 
strived to destroy South Africa‘s efforts for change, mostly targeting the ― … institutional 
mechanisms‖ (Gumede, 2008: 10) of the state. This action was seen as a political ploy 
aimed to destabilise the new incoming administration, so they could lead the country to 
failure. Detrimental and destructive measures were made, especially during the period 
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between 1990 and 1994, to make South Africa a haven of ‗political‘ and ‗ethnic‘ 
violence, where the country was masked with chaos and bloody incidents (Ross, 1999: 
185), so to promote disunity, distrust, and a sense of incompetency.  
 
Sparks (2003: 16) makes an important observation when he notes that, the new regime, 
unfortunately, inherited an economic and political mess. Not only that, it also inherited a 
rather peculiar segregationist and less representative parliament in the form of the 
Tricameral Parliamentary system. Where Coloured and Indian voters had their ‗own‘ 
legislatures separate to the White Parliament, and where ― … black parliament set up 
besides the Tricameral Parliament, would consist of the governments of the black states, 
representatives of black local authorities‖ (De Klerk, 1991: 58) with less or no human 
rights.  
 
The new democratic government of 1994 was unavoidably faced with numerous complex 
challenges which, among others, ―… involved redrawing the geo-political map of South 
Africa‖ (Sparks, 2003: 18), concurrently followed by ― … rebuilding the institutional 
mechanisms, initiating and implementing legislation and policies that are in line with the 
Constitution‖ (Gumede, 2008: 10). This exercise, overwhelmingly called for inputs from 
all stakeholders on how to craft a functioning unitary state under one supreme law, which 
is the Constitution, which would be people-oriented in principle. A new country with new 
visions entering the ranks of global parliamentary democracy principles, which are based 
on the rule of law with an emphasis on human rights and dignity, good governance and 
accountability.  
 
The new democratic regime, in no time, had to set its priorities and address issues of 
socio-political and economic inequalities, at the same time, it had to reconfigure and 
reconstruct a previously malfunctioning Parliament as a result of separationalist 
philosophy, so to transform it into an institution that would respond effectively to the 
needs of the people. Tireless efforts and planning by former freedom fighters and  
activists in political leadership, in collaboration with those of the previous regime who 
were ready and willing to accept change, were based on the desired ―… need to develop a 
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common understanding of the constitutional design of South Africa‘s legislative 
institutions‖ (Murray & Nijzink, 2002: 15). Hence today, the new South African National 
Parliament is arguably thé dynamic political body representing transformation and unity, 
an institution that ― … gives expression to one of the most liberal constitutions in the 
world. With an entrenched Bill of Rights guaranteeing all the fundamental human rights, 
including the right to life, liberty, and freedom of expression‖ (Sparks, 2003: 7). 
 
Committed to the rule of law, the new democratic system subjected itself to the idea of 
separation of powers or ‗trias politica‘ to guarantee the existence of accountability and 
good governance. Making a reference to Van der Weyver (1993: 178), de Vries avow that 
‗trias politica‘ illustrates separate functions of government branches. It is about 
identifying and defining official boundaries, monitoring and evaluation, checks and 
balances, clarifying mandates and codes of operation in the three components of 
government, which are the Executive (cabinet), Judiciary (courts), and the Legislature 
(parliament). The aim of checks and balance in a trias politica system, is for each branch 
of the state entrusted with special powers to monitor other two so that an equilibrium in 
the separation and distribution of the powers may be upheld ( de Vries 2006: 43). 
 
The first outline of the Constitution was drafted in 1993 as Act 200, leading to the final 
creation which was adopted in 1996 as the supreme law of the country, and became 
officially known as The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.  
The existence of this supreme law empowered and gave direction to the government and 
Parliament in particular, so as to unambiguously identify and define institutional 
responsibilities, core business of Parliament, work ethics, communication boundaries, 
mission and visions, processes and procedures to be adhered to by all within and outside 
the institution. With the ANC as the majority and a ruling party, the new democratic 
Parliament of 1994 operates from a clear mandate enshrined in the Constitution, and 
constitutes two Houses:  the National Assembly (NA) with 400 Members of Parliament 
(MPs), where MPs as party representatives are elected into power by the people through 
party affiliations or lists, and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) representing 
nine provincial legislatures with ten delegates from each, which provides a national 
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forum for provinces to express their interests (Murray & Nijzink, 2002: 16). Both these 
Houses are Parliamentary institutions, operating parallel but interdependently especially 
when it comes to policy and law-making, where public policy-making has to reflect the 
aspirations and visions of a new democratic country, and be transferred from national to 
provincial to local government for implementation.    
 
According to the Strategic Plan for Third Parliament 2004-2009 (2007: 39), Parliament 
has shown signs of political maturity, hence in 2005 it adopted a new vision for a 
democratic South Africa, that outlines the desire ―To build an effective people‘s 
Parliament that is responsive to the needs of the people and that is driven by the ideal of 
realising a better quality of life for all the people of South Africa‖. The focal point was 
echoed in the launch of the Parliament‘s new Vision by Mr Zingile Dingani, the 
Secretary to Parliament; 
 
―Explained that the time had come for Parliament to focus on how legislation is affecting 
people‘s lives and how Parliament can play a role in improving the quality of life for all South 
Africans‖, indicating that ―Our Vision, which was based on the Constitution of this country, 
indicates a new direction for Parliament. From 1994 to this point, the emphasis was on getting rid 
of apartheid laws and replacing them with progressive legislation. Now we are moving away 
from that and we require a more vigorous and vibrant Parliament, one that oversees government 
programmes to ensure they impact positively on the people of our country‖ (Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa, INsession, 2005: 04).  
 
Since 1994, Parliament has therefore rigorously embarked on activities and exercises 
with intentions to transform, reshape, and redirect this institution so that it can heal the 
divisions of the past and advance the aspiration for a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist 
South Africa through effective public policy-making.    
 
5.3 KEY FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
  
Contrary to Ghana, where the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) is the 
highest ruling and policy-making body, vested with legislative and executive powers 
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(Mutahaba & Balogun, 1992: 64). In South Africa, the Constitution mandates Parliament, 
as the highest political institution; to make, amend, debate, pass or reject laws, with 
checks and balances in place for adequate separation and distribution of power.  
 
Fox and Bayat (2006) present a different perspective on the role of Parliament in South 
Africa as law-makers. Making a reference to the Constitution, their argument is that, 
―Section 85 (2) provides that the President shall exercise the executive  authority, 
together with other members of the Cabinet by, inter alia, developing and implementing 
national policy. Therefore, policy-making and law making in the national interest are 
vested in the President and the Cabinet of the South Africa Parliament‖ (Fox et. al., 2006: 
17). Revealing an interesting observation, the authors portray the Parliament as a political 
institution with limited or no legislative powers, when compared to Executive that 
contains the ultimate legitimacy to make laws.  
     
However, de Vries (2006: 44-45) objectively views the Constitution as the guiding 
doctrine and the highest law of the country, with Parliament as its author. To confirm 
that, Section 44 of the Constitution of South Africa notes that, law-making authority is 
constitutionally vested in Parliament as the elite political body. With Section 42 (3) of the 
Constitution mandating and compelling Parliament to represent the people, to ensure that 
government by the people under the Constitution is in existence, more importantly to pass 
legislation, and to scrutinise and oversee executive actions (Parliament of the Republic of 
South Africa, 2006: 26). ―Thus the Constitution suggests that the representative role of 
legislatures is to be realised both in institutional arrangements (such as the participation 
of minority parties and the facilitation of public participation in legislative work) and in 
representativeness of their members‖ (Murray & Nijzink, 2002:4-5). Section 57(b) of the 
South African Constitution Act 108 of 1996, clearly stipulates that the National 
Assembly may make rules and orders concerning its business with due regard to 
representative and participatory democracy, accountability, transparency and public 
involvement. As a representative body, Parliament therefore ―… provides a link between 
government and the people‖ (Murray & Nijzink, 2002: 6).  
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The Constitution of the country permits the National Assembly to develop effective 
institutional entities and supporting mechanisms that will assist it to realise its 
responsibility as an oversight body. The ―… fundamental role of the legislature is to 
provide ongoing scrutiny or oversight of government‖ (Murray & Nijzink, 2002:  6), and 
to hold all executive departments accountable including relevant stakeholders and 
agencies. The most pivotal supporting system in this regard would be Parliament‘s 
committees, which play a critical role in terms of oversight, public hearings, and debating 
in-depth policy matters. Taljaard and Venter (2002: 26) avow that, ― … before May 2004 
the committees existed primary to rubber-stamp the laws put forward by the apartheid 
regime. Now they are the engine room of the new parliamentary democracy‖. In 
executing their responsibilities, parliamentary ― … committees must monitor, investigate, 
inquire into and make recommendations relating to any aspect of the legislative 
programme, budget, rationalisation, restructuring, functioning, organisation, structure, 
personnel, policy formulation or any other matter considered relevant‖ (Taljaard & 
Venter, 2002: 26). For this reason, it is argued and acknowledged that Legislative 
institutional support mechanisms have the ability to empower and embrace Parliament in 
efficiently exercising its role as a law-making, policy decision-maker.  
 
With the legitimate political authority, it is the responsibility and function of Parliament 
to elect the Speaker, Deputy Speaker and the President of South Africa, at the same 
breath bearing the right to dismiss, through a vote of no-confidence, the executive 
members and the presiding President of the country (Constitution of South Africa, 1996: 
Chapters 4 & 5). Again, the ANC-led Parliament nominates and appoints individuals to 
perform constitutionally designed positions, most importantly positions and institutions 
which aide Parliament with its oversight role; these are called Chapter 9 institutions, with 
Chapter 10 Public Service Commission (Murray & Nijzink, 2002: 5-6). Parliament is also 
constitutionally mandated and obliged (see section 165(4) of the Constitution) to ―… 
assist and protect the courts and state institutions, to ensure their independence, 
impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness‖. In addition, it is compelled to 
educate, inform, and consult the electorate on any government or policy matter.  
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Taking into consideration the eminent constitutional role and function of Parliament, 
which is to make laws, it is however argued with empirical knowledge by many, 
including Venter and Landsberg (2006), Murray and Nijzink (2002) that, in practical 
terms, most of the law-making work of South African Legislatures takes place within the 
walls of the Executive. Meaning policy papers or Bills are initiated, promulgated and 
executed by the Executive, thus portraying Parliament as a reactor and legitimiser of the 
Executive‘s policies. 
 
In a nutshell, the role and functions of Parliament as clearly stipulated in the Strategic 
Plan for 3
rd
 Parliament 2004-2009 is to: 
Function 1: Pass legislation 
Function 2: Scrutinise and oversee executive action (keep oversight of the Executive and  
        organs of state) 
Function 3: Facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative and other  
        processes 
Function 4: Participate in, promote and oversee cooperative government 
Function 5: Engage in, participate in, and oversee international relations (Parliament, 
2008: 31). 
  
5.4 PARLIAMENT’S TECHNICAL CAPACITY IN POLICY-MAKING  
 
With the end of Apartheid in South Africa, and the arrival of multi-party system 
throughout the continent, new parliamentarians emerged, most of whom with no 
experience of operating within a parliamentary framework (Hopkinson, 1995: 40). Thus 
raising concerns about the urgently needed capacity to deliberate and produce sound 
developmental policies.  
 
In South Africa the immediate challenge was how to do away with old separationalist 
policies and introducing new representative policies. Chelechele (2009: 45) explains, 
―Apartheid policies in respect of human resource development have left a legacy of a low 
skills base and gross inequalities in terms of skills development in South Africa‖. 
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Chelechele‘s argument relates to views suggesting that, it is not only because of their 
involvement in the struggle or political activities that caused politicians (who are now 
MPs) and people in general not to have ―Necessary abilities, capacity, skills, and 
knowledge‖ in policy-making (which is a complex exercise), it is as a result of a 
systematic strategic plan by the apartheid regime to depress and deprive the oppressed 
fundamental skills, education, and confidence in preparation for a future developmental 
state. ―The development and education policies of the apartheid regime were purposely 
designed to confine Black South Africans to menial labour‖ (Chelechele, 2009: 48). 
 
Nevertheless, taking the bull by the horns, in 1994 the ANC-led government adopted the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as the basic strategic policy 
framework that will guide the ruling party towards an ideal transitional and 
developmental stage. The RDP emphasises and encourages the development of human 
resources or capital, and of building capacity as a driving force for success (RDP White 
Paper, 1995). Complimenting or rather supplementing the RDP, in 1996 the government 
developed a macro-economic strategic policy, called the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution, or GEAR (Venter et. al., 1998: 237). These developments reflect that, 
within a short period of time in power, the ANC-led Parliament had to take full 
consideration of the fact that policy-making in South Africa had to redress the acute 
socio-political and economic programmess of the past. For Parliament to perform such 
with efficiency, Ahmed Mohamed (2008) in his article in the Cape Times, emphasises the 
importance of strengthening the technical capacity of the legislature with the objective of 
attaining and promoting a vibrant policy debate with substantive policy outcome.  
 
It is the view of Booysen and Erasmus, in Venter et. al. (1998: 231), that the commitment 
and determination by the new government to address the issue of technical capacity has 
to be undertaken with an understanding of the complexities involved in turning around 
government‘s attitude, practices, or business as usual, in line with relevant policy 
decision-making as a political exercise. 
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Considering and acknowledging the crucial role to be played by Parliament as a 
representative institution in public policy-making, calls supporting suggestions by 
Booysen and Erasmus in Venter et. al. (1998: 232), that is, to capacitate and empower the 
Legislature so to advance their understanding of ― … discussion documents, government 
directives, white papers, legislation and regulations for policy implementation‖ were 
advanced and promulgated. In support of such calls, the former Chairperson of the 
NCOP, Naledi Pandor explains the need of a technically capacitated Parliament, saying 
that the only thing they have done as Parliament is to ― ... debate oversight‖, therefore 
suggesting that ―… Parliament can do more if and when tools to ensure effective policy 
analysis, evaluation and implementation are in place, when they are provided with 
knowledge and scientific evidence to perform as decision makers‖ (Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa, 2006: 102). 
  
The reason and concern raised by Mrs Naledi Pandor emanate from perceptions that, 
there is a detrimental lack of technical support and institutional capacity provided to 
assist Parliament (NA and NCOP), so it can perform its duties effectively and efficiently. 
According to Dr Corné Mulder, Freedom Front representative in Parliament, poor or lack 
of technical capacity in Parliament when it comes to policy-making processes elevates 
and justifies impression that the Legislature is there to rubber-stamp bills that are already 
finalised by the Executive. In order for Parliament to be visible and respected, Mulder 
motivates, ―More is needed in terms of support, staff and research capacity to really make 
a decisive input‖. Citing the above to the fact that, ―… in a committee, members will be 
up against the department, with all their expertise, consultants and huge budget‖ 
(Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2006: 103-105); thereof exposing the ill-
capacitated Legislature as inefficient and no technical ability.  
 
A study done by Murray and Nijzink (2002: 26) reveals that, ―… in the provinces many 
MPLs were unprepared for the type of job in which they found themselves. In particular, 
they had not anticipated the amount of paper work and detailed analysis of laws that are 
involved and often found it difficult to adapt to the intense reading culture required of 
them‖. This revelation captures a negative bearing with detrimental effects in the 
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functioning of Legislatures as oversight bodies mandated to make laws. Thus, calling for 
interventions on technical empowerment for the benefit of Parliament, to logically 
generate and reflect positive and comprehensive results particularly on the subject of 
public policy management. Introducing and augmenting capacity for policy analysis, 
research and advise are seen as efforts seeking empower Parliament to be competent, and 
to create an environment where appropriate transfer of quality knowledge from skilled 
policy analysts to elite politicians exist. This argument reveals the need for efficient 
training in public policy-making accompanied by legislative procedures, for both old and 
new members, in order to achieve a better approach in sustainable development and good 
governance (see Booysen, 1998; Wissink, 2006; Carter, 2008). 
 
Considering the fact that policy is not only an intellectual exercise, it is also about outputs 
and outcomes, Theunissen contends that, for a better policy-making input-output exercise 
there is a need to identify specialised analysts with required technical capacity and skills 
to produce, influence, and project outcomes. However he cautioned that, with the support 
and the availability of quality and adequate capacity from policy experts and 
professionals, ―A legislature cannot choose a political impossible option, whether or not 
it is within its legal competence‖ (Venter et. al., 1998: 124-127). Emphasising the above 
with a contextual understanding of the role of Parliament, that is to: represent a diverse 
constituency, make laws, do oversight duties on the well-capacitated Executive, educate 
the public, and interact with other stakeholders. Parliamentarians are politicians who 
abide not only to the rule of Parliament, but also to party political rule. The argument is 
that, while advocating for the need of appropriate and systematic capacity building to 
exist in Parliament, political will and knowledge should be the basis for policy 
management capacity.  
 
In the study done by Christo de Coning, Masingita Zwane, Sonnyboy Maphanga, Kim 
Olbrich, and Catherine Churchill, in Nelspruit, October 1999, on the Maputo Corridor 
Tracking System, in the section of institutional arrangements and capacity building, they 
identified and revealed the importance of having a professional full-time capacity support 
system to address issues of research and policy work in an informed, focused and 
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systematic manner, therefore making the environment conducive to policy options and 
adequate policy debates. Furthermore, they suggest that, by having a dedicated in-house 
technical capacity working closely with organisations outside government, referring to 
think-tanks and research units is fundamental, in terms of improving and promoting 
strategic and evidence-based policy research, and eventually advancing the process of 
public policy-making in its entirety. The notion therefore is that, the supply-and-demand 
regarding policy advice, monitoring and evaluation, and policy design and policy analysis 
is critical, taking into cognisance profound arguments that ― … political leaderships 
based their stances partly upon perspectives derived from technical advisors‖ (Heymans, 
1996: 31). To realise technical and analytical capacity in the Legislature, and to empower 
legislators as policy decision-makers, requires specialised knowledge, experience and 
expertise to provide policy options, and the ability to write appropriate policy papers and 
explanatory papers supported by evidence-based research (Hanekom, 1996: 26).   
 
In explaining the structure of Parliament, in line with the institutional supportive 
mechanisms available for consolidating and realigning operational objectives for efficient 
institutional governance, Appendix B portrays the PMU as an administrative division, 
accountable to the Office of the Secretary to Parliament, where Parliament‘s support 
system is designed for specific services aimed at empowering, and at the same time 
maintaining, a professionally administered Parliament. The National Assembly Table 
Division was established to give procedural advice, support and guidance on House rules, 
whilst the Legislative and Oversight Division, and the Parliamentary Legal and 
Constitutional Services provide brief and content research, oversight instruments, 
administrative support to committees, and legal advice respectively. The Human 
Resource Division is an administrative and organisational wellness division which aims 
at ensuring that institutional policies and labour relations matters are adhered to by all. 
The Corporate Service Division is to improve and update ICT in and around Parliament, 
and the Office of the Secretary facilitates the access to information and provides legal and 
procedural advice to Parliament. The Parliamentary Research Unit‘s role is to provide 
MPs sitting in committees with specific policy research knowledge and specialised 
information.  
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5.5 BACKGROUND AND THE ROLE OF THE PMU IN PARLIAMENT 
 
Section 73(2) of the Constitution explicitly indicates that, any MP has the right to 
propose or introduce a Bill to Parliament with the exception of the money Bill. With an 
understanding that policies are political by nature (Heymans, 1996), the view is that Bills 
are driven by political ambitions, where politicians take full responsibility for identifying, 
designing, deliberating and analysing political policies, which in turn become Bills and 
later Acts of Parliament. Whoever defines or designs boundaries and rules of engagement 
in the National Assembly determines the socio-politics of the day, policy directions, as 
well as national intentions in relation to challenges and policy problems as perceived by 
the public (Parsons, 1995: 207).  
 
Rapoo (1997: 15) convincingly argues that, ― … in order for political leaders, 
administrators and planners to face the enormous tasks of dealing with complex policy 
problems in modern societies, their demands for policy information and researched 
options have grown substantially‖. For a more capacitated National Assembly with 
credible technical support from policy analysts and policy researchers, who, according to 
Rapoo ― … have thus come to fulfil the role of gathering data, analysing it and presenting 
it to policy-makers in a form relevant for resolving policy problems‖, could prove to be 
as effective and efficient as their counter-part, that is the Executive, if appropriately and 
politically conceptualise.  
 
Ann Bernstein (2009: 19), in her presentation in the Report of the Tswalu Dialogue 
indicates, ― … it became apparent that the role of Parliament was diminishing as a centre 
for effective policy debate and serious exchange, and so much more attention was paid to 
the Executive in Pretoria rather than the Legislature in Cape Town‖. Thus, echoing 
arguments suggesting that, ―Cabinet is a core agency in public policy-making and 
implementation‖ (Booysen and Eramus, 1998: 234). Within the community of official 
and non-official policy-makers, the Executive is argued to be the ultimate policy initiator, 
designer and implementer, with the capacity to monitor and evaluate its own programme. 
Table 3.1 illustrates policy communities and the extent to which they influence macro-
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governmental policies and the national agenda, as well as the extent of their relationship 
with other key policy actors when viewing or deliberating on policy matters. Critically 
so, the Table below highlights the basis for or rather what informs (directly and 
indirectly) such influence. In this case, the African National Congress as the ruling party 
determines macro-governmental policy outcome as it constitute the majority in policy 
decision-making structures. In South Africa, according to Booysen (2006: 739-741), the 
core and the primary clusters in policy-making and implementation are aligned with the 
Presidency, where the Executive remains the core and the centre for strategic and 
effective policy-making. Parliament in this regard is considered less influential and 
effective in the process, in a way sharing similar status with civil societies in a secondary 
cluster, as shown in the table below. This illustrates how policy is being channelled and 
the ‗balance of power‘ in relations to law-making and policy decision-making. This 
arrangement has been identified by many policy scholars and elite politicians (from the 
ruling and opposition parties) in South Africa as a demeaning arrangement which 
elevates a sense of superiority and authority to the Executive. Hence, it is argued and 
perceived that an arrangement of this sort, directly contributes to a deteriorating 
behaviour of active engagement in policy-making, leaving Parliament technically 
ineffective, especially when considering complex documentary stages, with the Executive 
gaining an upper-hand, whilst it continues to enhance its human capital behind public 
policy-making. These are enough reasons for cause of concern by politicians, thinks-
tanks, and some civil societies, who call for a revitalised Parliament and a commendable 
voice of the people, especially when addressing public policies. 
   
 
Institution actor Levels of policy influence 
                                      PRIMARY CLUSTER 
Presidency  - generally Powerhouse, clearing house of ideas, generator of initiatives to fill 
gaps, consider and recommend policy action in crises, design 
system of governance and policy-making. 
President The president (Mbeki) (now Zuma) is policy – in cooperation with 
Treasury, but power of Treasury is being scaled down. 
Table 3.1: Public policy communities 
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Cabinet Collective influences, with recognition that some individuals 
operate without fear of being challenged, occasionally bypassing 
ANC structures. 
Cabinet 
office/Secretariat 
Supportive influence – Cabinet committees, clusters and PCAS, 
ensures integration of government action, coordination of 
implementation of Government‘s programme of action. 
Department of 
Finance/Treasury  
Crucial gate-keeping through medium term expenditure 
framework, later moderated by medium term strategic framework. 
FOSAD Processes ministerial initiatives and Policy Unit guidance, 
undertakes research for Makgotla. 
Luthuli House Directly linked to Presidency via President, weekly liaison and 
coordination – multi-faceted interface (not structurally regulated). 
Presidential working 
groups 
Ideas and coordination of initiatives often originate here. 
                                SECONDARY CLUSTERS 
 
Alliance and labour in 
general 
Privileged, despite on second tier, often overruled even if 
considered. 
Business and 
international finance 
organisations 
Strong influence, often direct, throughout process; also 
manifested in primarily cluster via special working groups 
(especially with regard to BEE action).  
Parliament Channel for indirect policy influence, often via ANC structures. 
Institution/actor Levels of policy influence 
ANC study group in 
Parliament 
Influence for enhanced implementation. Tendency to become 
more technical, e.g. in preparing for committee meetings. 
ANC Caucus Sounding board, affirmation mechanism – receptive, not 
 in initiator 
Provincial and Local 
Government 
Crucial in implementing spheres, often as a restraining influence 
rather that cumulative progressive influence. Increasingly 
watched.   
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Spontaneous civil 
society  
High levels of influence that is issues-specific. Influence mostly 
not directly acknowledge 
 
Opposition political 
party 
Influence not well acknowledged (thus indirect); mostly are too 
small or insignificant to make a difference 
Organised NGO civil 
society 
Hope for reinvigoration, but low-key consensual-white state 
progression 
 
(Source: Booysen, 2006: 742)   
 
Long standing concerns from MPs like Corne Mulder, in Parliament since 1994 – 
Achievements and Challenges, who, in his capacity as a Member of Parliament, advised 
that, ―More is needed in terms of support, staff and research capacity to really make a 
decisive input‖ (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2006: 105), when referring 
to insufficient policy support that Parliament receives. This is because of the perception 
that, Parliament operates in an overwhelming environment that is often hostile to honest 
and incisive technical analysis of policies. For Parliament to assert itself with visible 
contributions on policy deliberations – with profound policy knowledge and constructive 
inputs whilst depicting creativity and innovation –  the way to go is, according to 
Heymans (1996) and Friedman (1995), for Parliament to augment its technical abilities, 
where policy analysts and researchers will not merely play a legitimising role, but a 
critical role where they will provide entrusted independent policy research and 
alternative, policy advice, analysis, and assist in shaping of national policy directions.  
 
Therefore, it is for these reasons and concerns that Parliament decided to establish the 
Policy Management Unit, a parliamentary policy project envisaged to be among the core 
and a critical player in policy decision-making processes. An appropriate vehicle that will 
perhaps improve and enhance institutional governance and capacity building, a Unit 
ideally designed to realign policies of Parliament with the visions and goals of the entire 
political organisation. The formation of PMU by Parliament in April 2005 was intended 
to create a Unit whose role would be to intervene in macro-governmental policies. To 
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provide policy management capacity, to coordinate and facilitate the re-writing and 
refining of existing policies as contained in the Policy Directives and Implementation 
Procedures, and perhaps develop new internal policies (Parliament of the Republic of 
South Africa, 2008:19).  
 
At the time of this research, the PMU had only five staff members, structured as follows: 
 
Head of the PMU 
Manages the Unit and gives strategic direction to the Unit 
Manages financial and human resources of the PMU 
Develops and writes policies 
 
Analyst: Monitoring and Evaluation 
Monitors the implementation of policy and evaluates its impact  
Conducts advanced research and analysis 
Develops monitoring and evaluation instruments  
Provides analytical support on any other matters 
 
Policy analyst  
Provides policy research, advice and analysis to the PMU 
Facilitates the development of policy  
Provides advanced research and analytical support on any other matters 
 
Assistant: Policy development  
Conducts preliminary research and investigation on policy issues 
Facilitates the development of policy  
Assists the Head with budget monitoring and resource management 
 
Secretary  
Manages, facilitates and coordinates the affairs of the Unit on a daily basis. 
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The envisaged role of the PMU and the basis for its formation was to enhance the desired 
vision of reinforcing and building an efficient and effective Parliament that commands 
respect. The rooted foundation of the PMU was for it to be a tool that will augment 
cooperative policy management capacity, to improve institutional feasibility and 
governance, and to be a mechanism for adequate policy input and output. The PMU‘s 
formation was for it to provide; 
 
 ―… research support and policy advice and analysis to the Secretary to Parliament on all aspects 
of policy development, coordination, implementation, and monitoring in line with the vision and 
strategic objectives of Parliament. As such the PMU has specific responsibilities which include; 
monitoring, assessing and evaluation that ideally would influence policy-making in the external 
environment. In particular, the PMU is responsible for the development and formulation of 
internal policies‖ (Policy Management Unit, 2008: 12).  
 
The PMU‘s current role and function is to write or rather facilitate the writing of new 
institutional or internal policies. For example, the Policy on Leave of Absence, Policy on 
Cell Phones, Policy on Smoking, and Policy on Employee Conduct to name just a few; 
and to revisit existing internal policies to ensure that they are in line with Parliament‘s 
vision and mission. Theoretically, the role and responsibility of the Unit (PMU) is to 
conduct policy research, to provide and suggest policy alternatives, and to assist with key 
indicators in monitoring and evaluating macro-governmental policies. However, noted in 
the Policy Draft Manual of 2008, dealing with or assessing macro-governmental policies 
to gauge their effectiveness in achieving the aims and objectives of the government of the 
day will rather be a long-term focus of the PMU (Policy Management Unit, 2008: 14).  
 
Supporting the formation of the PMU, academic institutions like UWC noted, ―The 
School of Government, University of the Western Cape understands and appreciates that 
the immediate focus of the Policy Management Unit is to refine existing policies and 
develop new institutional policies where gaps exits‖ (University of the Western Cape, 
2006: 6). The acknowledgement was driven by what was perceived to be an intellectual 
source of knowledge, skills and expertise for parliamentarians specifically on macro-
governmental policies.   
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
In giving a brief historical overview in line with difficulties that were/still faced by the 
new democratic government of 1994 in terms of institutional development, the chapter 
discussed functions and responsibilities of the South African Parliament as mandated by 
the Constitution of the country and electorates. The chapter noted that the structural 
conceptualisation of the apartheid regime made contributed to enormously in what is 
(after 1994 elections) perceived by many as ill-capacitated decision-makers. Initially, 
government in general was staffed by inadequately skilled managers and political 
officials. However, by setting and identifying its priorities, the Executive managed to 
address challenges and shortfalls in policy making processes.  
 
Section 73(2) of the Constitution notes, a National Assembly member within his/her 
prerogative carries a mandate to propose or introduce a Bill to Parliament with the 
exception of the money Bill. This implies that Parliament‘s role is not only to decide on 
policy matters but also to make laws, in complimenting its oversight role. Under the 
auspices of the RDP, the new administration had to by all means, eradicate the legacy of 
deprivation through policy programmes (Rapoo, 1997: 16). The RDP with other 
subsequent policy programmes of the ANC government unavoidably posed challenges 
and obstacle to the new government. The fundamentals of those challenges relates to lack 
of technical skills, analytical capacity, and intellectual knowledge on public policy-
making, particularly by legislators.   
 
In elaborating and identifying existing institutional support mechanisms, the chapter 
mentions the support given by committees, who are described as the engine room of 
Parliament, noticeably enhancing the workings of Parliament in many ways, namely on 
its oversight role, by conducting research and providing content advice to 
parliamentarians. However, a fair practical assessment from various scholars indicates 
that the Executive is well resourced and capacitated sphere, and that it has been effective 
and efficient in public policy-making, thus perceived as having an upper hand in this 
regard, as a result creating a technical gap between the Parliament and the Executive.   
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The chapter discusses concerns from key actors including Members of Parliament that 
perhaps lead to the introduction of the PMU. The formation of this Unit was rather seen 
as a tool to address and advance policy management capacity; to enable legislators to 
intellectually and profoundly analyse and debate public policies. Nevertheless, the current 
PMU has, since its inception, become an administrative structure for internal policy 
analysis.  
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CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The South African democratic Parliament of 1994 underwent a very critical and complex 
period, where it dramatically transformed from a separationalist to a unitary Parliament. 
In the process it repealed old and enacted new policies that are people-centred and 
developmentally based. This chapter presents findings that emanate from the information 
gathered in the literature review, from direct observations, interviews, analysing 
questionnaires, and data gathered from both primary and secondary sources, including 
articles and other government documents.  
 
The existence of policy units is fundamentally necessary in advancing good governance, 
relevant and profound policies, policy management capacity, and national development. 
The study has discussed challenges faced by parliaments globally, with specific 
comparison or reference to Africa. The findings in this chapter will allude to 
responsibilities and abilities of the South African National Parliament as a politically 
designed body, with a constitutional mandate to represent the people, to make laws. 
These will be examined in relation to the Executive‘s capacity, which has been generally 
perceived as superior and technically efficient. Findings will reveal that, capacity 
building is a necessary exercise that seeks to improve institutional governance and 
effective input-output. Institutional and policy capacity building, it argued, has the ability 
to redress the legacy of the past, instilled by the apartheid regime.   
 
Literature review promulgate what is argued as a consensual analysis, a common 
understanding, in describing public policy-making as a technically complex exercise that 
requires adequate inputs from qualified individuals, such as policy experts, policy 
researchers and analysts. Findings on the role and functions of the PMU are also 
discussed in this chapter. 
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6.2 FINDINGS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
PARLIAMENT AS LAW MAKERS 
 
Parliaments, particularly in Africa, have a long way to go. Lessons learned from the 
literature review and from seminars attended by the researcher organised by the Human 
Sciences Research Council (HSRC) overwhelmingly indicated that, parliaments in Africa 
still lack a great deal of competency, and that there is less or no evidence of the existence 
of technical expertise, especially in public policy-making. Lack of capacity building, pose 
as a challenge to the entire continent, in realising good governance and more critically to 
the ability available in formulating relevant policies. This situation leaves the continent 
with little choice but to rely on expatriated skills, with external or foreign policy actors 
(see Edge and Lekorwe, 1998) as alternative policy professionals.  
 
The drafting and adoption of the South African Constitution in 1996 was seen by many as 
a major step and a breakthrough for a better life for all, and perhaps, a progressive move 
towards a better state with appropriate capacity in place. Chapter Five explicitly reveals 
that, Parliament as a political institution, carries the mandate and the authority vested in it 
by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, to ―Consider, pass 
amend or reject any legislation before the Assembly … and initiate or prepare legislation, 
except money Bills‖ (see Section 55(1)(a-b) of the Constitution). Theoretically and 
constitutionally, Parliament has and shares the right to introduce bills, despite the 
foreseen domination by the Executive to carry such. The study maintains that, it is 
Parliament‘s constitutional prerogative through the Private Members‘ Bill to introduce or 
initiate Bills, to deliberate upon, and to lobby for any policy proposal in advancing its 
political cause. 
  
Contrary to its constitutional responsibility, the study reveals that, the National Assembly 
systematically relies heavily on the Executive, to initiate and introduce Bills, to research 
as well as draft policies, as a matter of problem solving. The study reveals that, it is the 
Executive that shape legislative debates and agendas. Thus, confirming arguments that 
seem to suggest that, legislatures are reactive instead of being proactive in their approach 
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to policy-making, in that depicting Parliament as an ineffective institute that rubber 
stamps Bills that are initiated by the Executive (see Hague et. al., 1993; Sebastian, 2008). 
 
Nonetheless, it is appropriate to note that, the National Assembly has done relatively well 
in its oversight responsibilities over the Executive and other relevant stakeholders and by 
taking Parliament to the people (though there still some serious challenges on the latter). 
One of those challenges referred to, is the issue of opposition MPs complaining that, 
party allegiance affects Legislature‘s policy and oversight role, especially when it 
involves ruling party Members. In an interview with a presiding officer, who is also a 
senior Member of Parliament (ANC), the issue of party allegiance was examined. In that, 
the Member explained that the relationship between committee members and government 
departments needs more consideration. The Member also notes that, the existence of this 
obscure relationship between the two spheres of government is a case of concern, as it is 
rooted from a party political loyalty, therefore becomes a liability, especially during 
policy deliberations and examinations. This relationship according to the Member, leads 
to leniency especially when committees are suppose to execute their unbiased oversight 
duties over ANC officials from departments, thus defeating Parliament‘s role as an 
independent oversight body.      
 
The shortfall though, has been that, so far Parliament has not been convincingly able to 
carry out its mandate, that is, to initiate and introduce Bills. Instead it reacts to Bills and 
policy proposals that are initiated and drafted by the Executive (see Report of the 
Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament, 2009). Interviews and questionnaires 
reveal the same sentiments, thus attributing the perceived leniency and re-activeness not 
only to political allegiance, but also to the issue of policy complexity and insufficient 
technical capacity within Parliament to equally engage and meeting the standard of the 
Executive on matters of policy policy-making. What was revealed in the interviews is 
that, some MPs claimed not to have sufficient time to generate, initiate and consider 
public policies, due to political duties and other activities of Parliament. The question 
emerging from the above is, does the latter justify the ineffective Legislature in becoming 
active instead of reactive in policy matters?  
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In the time of this research, a matter before Parliament was that of the Member in the 
Committee on Private Members‘ Legislative Proposals and Special Petitions, Mr M. 
Oriani-Ambrosini - an IFP MP - who had lodged an application with the Cape High 
Court, to challenge the decision of the Speaker of the National Assembly not to allow 
him to introduce the National Credit Bill, on the basis that it was unconstitutional. Mr 
Oriani-Ambrosini viewed the matter as urgent because it hampered his constitutional 
responsibility to initiate legislation (www.pmg.org.za/report/20100810) as an MP.  
Although some MPs (especially from the ruling party) are not moved with this action, it 
is a constitutional matter that requires policy and legal expert interpretation of the law. 
The matter is still sub-judice, therefore, the researcher can not elaborate much on the 
matter. 
 
The Parliamentary Committees through their specific units, namely, the Parliamentary 
Research Unit, Legislation and Oversight Division, though with challenges, proved to be 
beneficial to Parliament‘s political mandate. One identified challenge relate to the fact 
that, the support provided by these support structures, is limited and specific to a 
particular matter as per Member‘s request. Hence, one would argue that, these structures 
do not provide broad technical policy knowledge, analytical skills and expertise needed 
to augment policy capabilities of parliamentarians.   
 
In the course of attending parliamentary and committee sessions, the researcher observed 
that, deliberations on policies are sometimes a matter of Members scoring political 
points, where inputs are tedious and inefficient. This is self-demeaning, because it 
perpetuates carelessness and intellectual incompetence. Interviewees from civil societies 
and think-tanks also share the same perception, citing the root of the problem as 
insufficient training, lack of confidence, the growth in political careerism within 
Parliament. To poor academic credibility (which is fundamental for policy document 
analysis and interpretation), and inadequate support or improper use of capacity in 
relation to national policy priorities, and of course political party allegiance.  
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6.3 FINDINGS ON THE STRENGTH OF THE EXECUTIVE 
 
The research found that, South Africa‘s policy empowerment strategy has been, for some 
years (since 1994), perceived as one-sided, that is, mainly concentrating its resources by 
elevating technical capacity of the Executive. What instigates such an action, it is argued, 
is the attitude of the Executive (from the Presidency to Ministerial departments) towards 
policy management capacity, as they collectively perceived this exercise as crucial and 
fundamental for better governance and good service delivery. Moreover, the existence of 
professional in-house policy units within the Executive is considered as prerequisite for 
feasible policy design, analysis, coordination, monitoring and evaluation in support of 
Ministers and managers. Adding to that, the research findings reveal that, government has 
established sound relationship with independent policy units or think-tanks, specifically 
to augment, draw, and share information on evidence-based policy research, findings, and 
recommendations.  
 
The formation of two new ministries: the Department of Performance Monitoring and 
Evaluation, and National Planning Commission in the Presidency, with the South African 
Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) as a technical support structure. Is 
clearly a sign of commitment by the Executive on public policy-making and strategic 
national planning. Such initiatives are evidently proving to be beneficial in advancing the 
technical capacity, expertise, policy knowledge and skills for President Zuma‘s 
administration. By placing and asserting the Executive as better equipped in policy 
matters, compared to their counter-parts, the Legislature, is a practical reality. The 
strength of the Executive‘s technically capacity in policy matters was once again 
revealed, when three Bills were passed by Parliament without thoroughly examining 
them. In January and February of 2009, former President Kgalema Motlanthe (head of 
the national Executive) referred, in terms of section 79(1) of the Constitution, three Bills 
back to Parliament: the Broadcasting Amendment Bill, 2008 (The Bill); The Film and 
Publications Amendment Bill, 2008 (The Bill); The Competition Amendment Bill, 
2008 (The Bill) (see Appendix c), for further consideration. This unfortunate exercise 
exposed Parliament as inefficient, incapable and technically incapacitated as law-makers. 
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The above, represent a typical example of inequalities that exist between the Legislature 
and Executive. Therefore, authentically confirms views that seem to suggest that, 
Parliament rubber-stamps policies initiated by the Executive without properly engaging 
the government. This is widely attributed to poor or no policy support and advice 
available to Parliament.   
  
6.4 FINDINGS ON CAPACITY BUILDING 
 
As outlined in the Procedural Development In The National Assembly, Second Session – 
Third Parliament (2005), Members of Parliament do attend training sessions. Training 
sessions are intended to empower legislators, so they can effectively perform their 
functions and responsibilities, enhance their abilities to better understand the meaning of 
good and poor governance, and to appreciate strategic and business plans of departments 
for effective oversight role. It is recorded that, in an attempt to address the issue of 
capacity development, in 2006/2007, legislators were provided with university certificate 
courses. The main purpose for such initiative was to enhance intellectual capabilities that 
would eventual compliment practical intellectual development in Parliament (see 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2008: 75). This research reveals that, there is 
a general degree of willingness amongst Members, to acquire policy and technical skills 
for institution building. Senior officials and politicians, who were interviewed, view 
capacity building as a necessity, suggesting that, it should be linked to policy-making 
process and be compulsory to all, experienced and not so experienced.  
 
Although, the majority of respondents indicated that there was a need for a more 
technically capacitated policy analysis machinery, that should operate in support of the 
current Parliamentary Research Unit, political party study groups and party policy units 
for better policy output, exposure and authenticity. Data analysis interesting revealed that, 
most MPs are not informed about the existence, the role and functions of the PMU in 
Parliament.  
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An interview with Jonathan Carter, a senior research manager (HSRC) revealed that, 
although on a small scale, interventions by think-tanks and academic units do exist. They 
are specifically meant to provide policy management capacity and policy-making 
guidelines to parliamentarians, managers, and other institutional support structures within 
Parliament. Such interventions are instrumental for policy information, enhancing 
monitoring and evaluation abilities and for policy advise on internal and external policies. 
Carter states that, think-tanks provide, organise and facilitate workshops, seminars, 
training sessions, and accredited courses for official policy-makers for institutional 
development.  
 
Appearances by think-tanks and academic research units before committees, to submit 
and share research findings, prove to be beneficial to Parliament. As they provide 
empirical research and knowledge on subject of national importance, at the same breath, 
augmenting their abilities for future profound policy debates and implementation.       
 
Operating in a politically compelling environment, with different conflicting political 
ideologies, and faced by substantially demanding expectations and tasks. It is said that, 
Parliament has not shown any drastic improvement in terms of being an assertive, pro-
active and influential key player, particularly in initiating national policies. 
Questionnaires and interview results illustrate the need for a capacitated Legislature, not 
just in the oversight role, but also when deliberating on macro-governmental policies. 
Capacity development for Members of Parliament has always been a crucial issue within 
and outside government. One factor identified as an inevitable set-back in acquiring and 
maintaining capacity, is the term of office that parliamentarians are subjected to serve. 
The five year term of office, though legally and politically justifiable, is perceived as 
having a direct impact on comprehensive, systematic, sustainable capacity development.  
 
Theory and fieldwork results reveal that, the majority of current parliamentarians were 
previously political activists with little or no experience in the workings of Parliament. 
Some with minimal academic credentials; thereof, leaving them in an unfortunate 
situation where they are unprepared and overwhelmed by the type and the work load 
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assigned to them. Which, include among others; constant reading, deliberating and 
analysing procedural, internal and external policy documents. My observation is that, 
Parliament still suffers the humiliation of being an ill-capacitated, poorly resourced 
sphere, with no strategic purpose of instilling intellectual ability to fully execute its role 
as policy or law-maker.  
 
6.5 FINDINGS ON THE ROLE OF THE PMU 
  
As previously discussed (in Chapter Three), the US Legislature has for many years, 
successfully enjoyed multi-disciplinary in-house support in public policy-making. 
Members of the Congress are receiving independent policy advice from policy 
professionals and analysts, from within the Congress‘s institutional framework, and from 
those outside the formal political framework, namely, the academic policy and research 
units, independent policy units and think-tanks.  
 
In relation to the role of the PMU in the South African National Parliament, the research 
found that, the PMU itself contains necessary skills, ability and knowledge to execute and 
deliver accordingly. To mention the Unit‘s role again:  
 
―The PMU is responsible for providing research support and policy advice and analysis to the 
Secretary to Parliament on all aspects of policy development, coordination, implementation and 
monitoring in line with the vision and strategic objective of Parliament. As such, the PMU has 
specific responsibilities regarding the monitoring, assessment and evaluation that ideally would 
influence policy-making in the external environment. The PMU is also responsible for providing 
an analytical support service to the Secretary to Parliament (as a reference unit). In particular, the 
PMU is responsible for the development and formulation of internal policies‖ (see Policy Manual 
for the Development of Internal Policies, March 2008).  
 
As indicated before, responses from MPs indicated that, Members have either never 
heard or have little information about the existence of the PMU and its role and functions. 
Understandably so, this is because the Unit does not offer any services to legislators, who 
are supposedly their immediate customers. 
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Another challenge facing the Unit is the quantity of its personnel, five staff members are 
employed in the Unit, which is arguable not sufficient for this sector to realise its role as 
an influential multi-disciplinary in-house support mechanism. That intends to build 
institutional capacity, and serve Parliament by providing technical support on internal and 
external policies.  
 
6.5.1 PMU as policy developers and advisors 
 
Established in 2005, the study reveals that, the involvement of the Unit in policy-making 
and assessment is limited to internal policies only. As policy developers and advisors, 
personnel in the Unit, design procedural policies and thereof providing policy advice to 
managers and Parliament‘s Business Unit. In collaboration with the Policy Analysis 
Team (see Draft Policy Manual, 2008), the PMU is able to assess, examine, and draft 
existing policies. After following appropriate steps and procedures in identifying the need 
for new policy or re-examining existing policies, the Unit then involves relevant 
stakeholders in Parliament (office-bearers) for further advice. It is therefore, the 
prerogative of the PMU to advise (during and after drafting of a particular policy) key 
actors accordingly, these being the Policy Advisory Forum (PAF), Human Resources, 
and Division Managers, making the Unit accessible for more clarification and guidance. 
In a nutshell, the role of the PMU as policy developer and advisor is to provide technical 
support only in relation to administrative and human resources matters for the functioning 
of Parliament.  
 
Acknowledging the fact that this is a relatively new Unit, interviews with senior members 
of the National Assembly Division, and with analysts in the Unit, reveal that proper 
conceptualisation of the Unit as a support mechanism in providing policy advice was 
never done appropriately. Complementing each other, participants‘ views in this regard 
are that, the formation of the PMU was clouded with poor or lack of sufficient planning, 
improper conceptualisation and no academic study to support its existence. As a result the 
Unit‘s mandate was minimal and poorly referenced. 
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6.5.2 PMU as policy analysts 
 
The findings reveal that, to provide socioeconomic comparative analysis on legislative 
activities or proposals is not a function of the current Unit. An interesting finding from 
MPs, who participated in this study representing different parties in Parliament, is that 
Members have no idea of what the PMU is, whether it exists or not in Parliament.  
 
During the course of this research, it became evident that, although working under 
challenging circumstances with limited resources. The Unit do possess the necessary 
skills and intellectual abilities to, if appropriately utilised and mandated, analyse and 
scrutinise both internal and external policies. A researcher in the Research Unit and an 
analyst in the PMU share the same sentiments in this regard. Further elaborating that, the 
capacity and knowledge that exist in the Unit are not appropriately explored, sufficiently 
exploited and effectively channelled. The theory thus informs the study in defining the 
role and functions of the policy unit, which is among others, to provide technical and 
analytical support on internal or external policies. In this context, the researcher can 
conclude that, the Unit does not completely or fully represent and therefore reflect the 
core business of Parliament, and because there is no correlation between the macro-
governmental policies and the PMU, policy analysts in the Unit could be intellectually 
unchallenged resulting to frustration. 
 
6.5.3 PMU on monitoring and evaluation 
 
The PMU has a qualified and experienced monitoring and evaluation (M&E) expert. The 
role of the Unit‘s M&E analyst is to monitor the implementation of existing and new 
internal policies and their impact, and thereafter provide advice for further review. In 
giving a perspective to the fundamental role that the Unit plays in relation to monitoring 
and evaluation and policy review, an analyst specialising in monitoring and evaluation 
indicated that the Unit, appropriately so, does not implement policies (internal) but 
provides and develops instruments for respective departments to carry on the 
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implementation. As a result, the existence of the Unit has gained consent and momentum 
from stakeholders in Parliament, namely managers, staff members, and unions.  
 
Monitoring and evaluation promotes good conduct, performance, harmony, and 
professionalism by support staff members in Parliament. The analyst in the Unit monitors 
and reviews administrative policies, for example, policies on smoking, acceptance of 
gifts, benefits, and cellular phones, to name just a few. This research reveals that constant 
monitoring and evaluation of administrative policies, is to a large extent, demoralising 
and undermining the meaningful role that the M&E specialist and other analysts could 
play in the core business of Parliament. Moreover, it could also undermine their 
intellectual ability, knowledge, and academic credentials.  
 
6.5.4 PMU as policy researchers 
 
The role of a policy unit in general, is to empower parliament with relevant evidence-
based policy alternatives. It is to provide non-partisan policy research findings and 
recommendations for effective and confident policy decision-making.  
 
Fieldwork research in this study reveals that, analysts in the PMU provide internal policy 
research if and when requested, so as to facilitate procedural and operational matters in 
Parliament, particularly matters arising from administrative departments or institutional 
support structures. This depicts the terms of reference of the Unit as that of providing 
direct technical research assistance to the support staff and managers (as explained by 
Mintzberg, 1983). This particular finding explains the current immediate customers of the 
Unit, and consequently, where all resources (human and otherwise) and expertise of the 
Unit are being channelled to.  
 
Interviews with policy researchers‘ reveals absolute need for a professional relationship 
and consistent collaboration between researchers within and outside Parliament, where 
research knowledge and expertise would be shared amongst each other. However, this is 
foreseen by some as practically impossible for those policy researchers working in the 
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PMU, as they are perceived as administrative oriented. The PMU‘s mandate 
automatically isolates policy researchers in the Unit from the mainstream of public policy 
research, and from the political dynamics of the country.  
 
Views from participants in regard to the limited mandate of the PMU (which is 
unfortunately confined to human resource matters, codes of conduct, and administrative 
issues) refers to poor conceptualisation and institutional arrangements as the main 
reasons for the ineffective and inefficient PMU. The Unit is not a politically designed 
policy advisory support structure as it was initially established to be, this is evidently 
indicated in the current organisational framework of Parliament. The researcher 
concludes that, the PMU is corporate in design, with little or no research input and output 
on the actual socio-economic and political matters affecting the country.  
 
6.5.5 The role of the PMU in internal policies 
 
As mentioned before, internal policies refer to a combination of procedural rules and 
administrative aspects of an organisation. Internal policies include, among others, 
utilisation and maintenance of personnel, employee conduct, and institutional 
management, hence they (internal policies) are being equated to human resource policies.  
The findings revealed that, the main role of the current PMU is to manage (research, 
write develop, analyse, advise, monitor and evaluate) internal policies, to design and 
review the above. However, in conducing itself an internal policy designer, researcher 
and in monitoring and evaluation, the Unit has received greater recognition and applause, 
specifically from the support staff, who are the immediate clients of the Unit (with of 
course minimum grievances). The achievements of the Unit are attributed to its 
participatory mechanisms and its ability to analyse, monitor and assess, and investigate 
opportunities, challenges, and legalities regarding administrative or internal policies. 
 
Theory does associate policy units with internal or administrative policies (see Bernstein 
et. al., 1979; Fox et. al., 1991; Cloete et. al., 2006). In that, one can not completely 
marginalise the PMU‘s current mandate of designing, interpreting, monitoring and 
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evaluating internal policies. An analyst from the PMU mentioned that, one need to 
consider the fact that this is a new Unit. It is a Unit with a minimal or rather insufficient 
amount of personnel to actually become the life-blood of the National Assembly in terms 
of public policy-making, and therefore, the conditions only permits the Unit to focus, in 
the short-term, that is on internal policies.  
 
6.6 FINDINGS ON THE ROLE OF THINK-TANKS 
 
Understandably and justifiably so, the USA has a large number of effective and 
influential think-tanks that continues to advance and advocate what is believed to be  
intellectual support, adequate policy management capacity, and policy knowledge, based 
on non-partisan and independent thinking. In the case of South Africa as a new 
democratic state, ordinary citizens are not familiar with the existence, the role and 
functions of think-tanks, therefore limiting the accessibility to these independent policy 
units mainly to academics, policy scholars, MPs, management in Parliament and the 
Executive.   
 
With regard to capacity building, the findings reveal that think-tanks do embark on 
programmes (though on a minimal scale) that aim to capacitate MPs in SA for better 
policy decision-making. For example, the Human Resources Research Council (HSRC) – 
Policy Analysis Unit, represented by Jonathan Carter as the senior research manager, has 
provided training, workshops, seminars and of course consultations (sharing knowledge 
with committees) with Parliament and management, with the objective of offering policy 
knowledge and intellectual support, to advance the cause of a constitutional and 
institutional governance mandated by official policy-makers.  
 
Highlighted in The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995);  
 
―Responsibility for developing the creative energies and talents of South Africa's diverse 
communities does not lie exclusively with the state. For this reason the government foresees that 
a variety of social forces and institutions will become its active partners in building capacity for 
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good governance. These will include community organisations, private sector agencies and 
institutions of tertiary education‖.  
 
In realising the above, the involvement of The University of the Western Cape, School of 
Government-Executive and Consultancy Unit, and the Law Faculty in training, and 
empowering managers, political elites (MPs and MPLs), and researchers from Parliament   
in various courses prove to be beneficial in many ways. As a result, such initiatives are 
positively positioning the institution as an active partner in building capacity for good 
governance, providing financial technical skills and on public policy-making. 
   
Feedbacks from Jonathan Carter (HSRC), Thomas Wheeler (SAIIA), Christina 
Teichmann (DDP/KAS), and other parliamentary officers from civil societies (unions) 
explains the existence, and the functions of think-tanks as policy centres that offer 
analytical, intellectual, and capacity support to Parliament and the Executive on both 
national and international policies. The participants alluded to the fact that, think-tanks 
are a vital support tool to Parliament in many ways, providing, among others: scientific 
evidence-based policy research, analysis, guidelines, interpretation of policy submissions 
and alternatives, and policy advice. As well as sharing the merits of their research 
findings and recommendations, with committees for adequate policy decision-making. 
This active approach by think-tanks is based on the premise that Parliament, in particular, 
does not have sufficient time and adequate capacity to do such. 
 
Despite the necessary efforts to improve content in public policy-making, the perception 
is that, think-tanks in South Africa are somehow ignored or undermined by official 
policy-makers. It is said that think-tanks are facing unnecessary hostility from official 
policy-decision maker. Ranging from; the existing poor relationship between policy-
makers and think-tanks; irrelevant policy research topics by policy units; unwillingness to 
accept constructive criticism by elite politicians; fear of change; ignorance or lack of 
knowledge; and the typical overarching power-play by official policy-makers. These are 
some of the challenges faced by policy units, which they are trying very hard to 
overcome. Another frustrating challenge mentioned by one participant, is that of 
 
 
 
 
 110 
systematic shelving of policy research findings, submissions and proposals by 
departments and politicians, as a result demoralising these institutions of policy intellect. 
 
Public policy as a discipline is by its nature a complex political exercise, such that it 
presents challenges to many think-tanks as they (because of the environment they work 
under and the eventual intended recipients of their policy activities), have to be cautious 
and vigilant in their interface. Whilst maintaining a professional and independent 
approach to national and political policy ideologies. The understanding is that, it is every 
think-tank‘s goal to influence official policy decision-makers, and to strategically create 
relevant channels by positioning themselves to gain access to top-level decision-making 
(as it is suggested by Dror, 1988), ultimately with direct or indirect contributions to 
official public policy-making.  
 
The dilemma faced by think-tanks particularly in South Africa, lies with the relationship 
they have or seek to create with government and Parliament as official policy-makers. 
The findings of this research reveal that, in most instances, the relationship between 
Parliament and think-tanks is through committees. This is presented in different forms, 
including consultation, where think-tanks present policy submissions based on the agenda 
set by Parliament or based on their organisational interest. The unfortunate situation is, 
because they want to influence and maintain a good relationship with policy decision-
makers. Think-tanks somehow lose their objectivity when conducting policy research, 
thus pointing astray their independent thinking for the sake of remaining in good terms 
with official policy-makers. The researcher found that, in South Africa for an example, 
there are policy units born out of resistance and liberation movements, as a result 
attracting unwarranted dilemma in wanting to maintain their independence as non-
partisan policy advisors, and their allegiance to the Mass Democratic Movement. For 
example, the Centre for Education and Policy Development (CEPD) established in 1993 
as a result of the Mass Democratic Movement, spearheaded by the ANC. While forging 
itself as an autonomous policy unit, the CEPD holds ‗strategic relationship‘ with 
government and perhaps the ruling party (CEPD, 2009).   
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Financial dependency is a major challenge to policy centres. Their viability depends on 
funding, since they are not profit driven. This can create a sense of desperation, where 
they may be inclined to sacrifice objective conduct and independence in order to access 
funding. This finding suggests that, whilst there is a need to preserve the existence of 
autonomous policy centres, financial dependency on the state may undermine their 
intellectual ability to produce objective findings, with unbiased recommendations.  
 
With foreign funding, there are always terms and conditions attached to the money 
offered by international donors, which in turn affects the credibility and focus of think-
tanks. It is argued that, ―Those who pay the cost of research often control the research 
agenda‖ (International Social Science Council, 2010: 6). 
 
The issue of brain-drain, is viewed as detrimental to the cause of policy advocacy and 
independent policy analysis, and is somehow described as pandemic to the future of 
think-tanks. The findings are that, policy centres continuously witness the exodus of 
credible expertise and competent individuals to the state and government departments, 
where analysts accept positions as ministerial advisors in endeavours to strengthen the 
Executive and its policy units.   
 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
 
Findings in this study overwhelming reveal that, though the PMU is performing well in 
their narrow mandate as internal policy advisors. The Unit‘s role as external policy 
providers is nonexistence, with no input at all in macro-governmental policies. Hence, the 
PMU is unknown to legislators and to independent policy units or think-tanks. The direct 
and indirect effects of the above is that, Parliament still lacks sufficient policy support, 
thus overshadowed by the Executive in this regard. In a nutshell, research findings depict 
a picture about the eminent and crucial role policy management units could play. as 
providers of policy research, guidelines, policy alternative, policy designers and analysis.  
Policy units are capable of providing policy management capacity for parliamentarians, 
in both internal and external policies while maintaining their non-partisan principle.  
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
 
The creation of an adequate socio-political environment, followed by the redesigning and 
adoption of new and relevant policies representing every citizen, has been a critical 
exercise for the new democratically elected administration. The making of appropriate 
policies and laws that will serve and favour those who were previously disadvantaged, 
(without excluding those who benefited from the exclusive apartheid system) proved to 
be a challenge to the new government, especially for Parliament. The transfer of political 
power to those who were previously seen as terrorists by some posed serious questions. 
Questions as to whether the new regime has the ability and quality to better govern the 
country, to provide and formulate working and feasible policies that meet the required 
standards, not only of South Africa, but of the world, taking into consideration the ever 
changing dynamics of global politics. 
  
In a parliamentary democracy, the constitution, as the supreme law of the country, should 
explicitly stipulate, with authority and decree that, parliament is the legislative authority, 
with constitutional legitimacy and mandate to design and decide on the laws of the 
country. Constitutions of countries like Malaysia, Brazil and the USA unambiguously 
mandate parliament to make, pass, and amend existing federal laws, and such is 
practised. This allows parliament to practically propose policies, whilst examining 
(oversee) government‘s policies, whilst preserving and upholding the constitution.  
  
From that, this study concludes that, in practical terms, the current situation suggests that 
parliaments, especially from the developing world (the South African National 
Parliament included) lack the motive, capacity, knowledge, and technical qualities to 
independently initiate and profoundly make and decide on the laws of the country in 
question. Thus, coinciding with arguments advocating that, parliaments are a debating 
forums, rubber-stamping policies that are initiated by the well resourced, technically 
equipped and intellectually capacitated Executive.  
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The existence of the South African Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS), 
the formation of the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, and of 
National Planning Commission, with their ability to provide quality support. Allows the 
Executive to supersede the capacity and the technical support that the Legislature have 
and is receiving. Thus, exposing Parliament as an ineffective political institution, that 
lacks technical capacity to analyse and deliberate on public policies. If policy 
management capacity development is neglected, Parliament as an institution will slowly 
decline and its effectiveness and relevancy will fade with time. The Executive‘s growing 
power in public policy-making and implementation might as well make them (the 
Executive) untouchable and thus able to dictate macro-governmental policy inputs and 
outputs.  
 
For the South African National Parliament to be more effective in terms of policy inputs, 
outputs, and outcomes. It should first accept that the world is changing and it should 
change with it; and secondly, it should empower itself with all the necessary and 
available resources to make its presence efficient and sound. The study advocates for 
policy advisory machinery that will support and enable the Legislature to asset itself in 
policy analysis, formulation, research, monitoring and evaluation, and providing policy 
advice and alternatives. Policy support structures that are properly designed and 
conceptualised will keep MPs informed about policy challenges and opportunities that 
exist locally and globally. 
 
This study concludes by highlighting the urgent need and demand to address, review and 
perhaps seal the gaps that exist as a result of insufficient policy management capacity, 
between Parliament and the Executive.  
 
Informed by theory and research findings, this study affirms that, the PMU is not at all 
playing a meaningful role in macro-governmental and legislative debates happening in 
the country, leaving Parliament vulnerable in this regard. Parliament with no doubt, 
requires access to intellectual capacity, technical support from able policy advisors, 
analysts, and policy researchers who will be mandated, not only to develop human 
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resource policies, but to respond appropriately and empirical to socio-political, economic, 
and cultural challenges affecting the country, Parliament and citizens.  
 
It must be understood that, the basis for the formation of the PMU was in the main, to 
strengthen, harmonise, balance or coordinate, and to promote public policy-making in the 
Legislature. The emphasis and highlights of the findings reveal and suggest that, without 
a clearly conceptualised Policy Unit designed to support Parliament on both internal and 
external policies, Parliament will definitely and slowly lose its eminent mandate. That is 
to make, pass and reject laws, due to no or lack of sufficient in-house technical support 
and personal abilities positioned next the parliamentarian for policy decision-making.  
 
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The role and function of the South African National Parliament as a law maker can 
improve if the following recommendations are considered. 
 
Recommendation 1: The role of the Policy Management Unit   
 
With a theoretical perspective in mind, the role of the Policy Management Unit in the 
South African Parliament should be to provide a cross-cutting, multi-disciplinary support 
service to Parliament. The PMU‘s role should be to provide the Legislature (National 
Assembly) with technical support, including policy advice, policy research, providing 
policy alternatives, assisting with monitoring and evaluation Whereby, legislators as 
clients are able to debate with confidence, and contribute adequately to policies proposed 
by the Executive. The main objectives of the Unit should be to transform Parliament into 
a respectable political institution that functions with efficiency. To assist Parliament 
technically to assert itself whilst upholding its role and responsibilities; and to ensure that 
the law-making processes are adequately informed and realised accordingly. Considering 
the fact that policy units in general constitute in-depth policy knowledge, skills, and 
intellect. The above statement should be sufficient to motivate politicians to adequately 
reconfigure the Unit‘s role with a clear political mandate as its main point of reference.  
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In that, making the PMU‘s role as to provide policy management capacity, provide 
technical support, advice, analysis and policy directives, and to assist with monitoring 
and evaluation, and provide evidence-based policy research. This will, presumably, put 
Parliament in a better position when deliberating on issues of public policies, therefore 
closing the existing technical gap between Parliament and the Executive. This is the type 
of Policy Management Unit recommended and envisaged by this study, a Unit that will 
mainly serve Parliament as its immediate customer.  
 
Recommendation 2: Internal policies versus external policies 
 
This study acknowledges that internal or administrative policies are part and parcel of 
institutional policy development, where at some point they (internal policies) will be 
assigned or mandated to the Policy Unit for advanced modification or analysis. However, 
this study advocates that, the above cannot be the primary and sole role of the PMU. It is 
unprecedented and unfortunate to see qualified analysts, on a day-to-day basis, spend 
their valuable time assessing and developing administrative and procedural policies and 
nothing else. Policy analysts are a multi-disciplinary human resource, technically 
qualified and trained to offer meaningful support, primarily on national and international 
policy agenda. The current PMU should be providing authoritative policy research on 
legislative related issues, offering policy analysis and advice to all political parties in 
Parliament on education, health, housing, rural development, safety and security, 
international matters, climate change and others. 
 
Recommendation 3: PMU as a policy support mechanism 
 
As outlined in Section 55 (1)(b) of the Constitution, the role of Parliament is to consider, 
pass, or reject any legislation before it, and to initiate or prepare legislation except the 
Money Bill. Based on the above decree, it is therefore recommended that Parliament‘s 
institutional support mechanisms be expanded and enhanced so as to allow for an in-
house, non-partisan Policy Unit which serves this political institution in law-making 
activities. This Unit should empower legislators on a one-to-one basis through a 
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consultative model, and as a group through seminars, workshops, and through formal and 
informal training. Fieldwork results reveal that, it is detrimental for Parliament to 
continue functioning without the technical expertise of an in-house policy unit. 
Supporting arguments suggesting that, policy and law-making as an exercise, is a 
complex process requiring more than just a political will. This recommendation 
advocates for an ultimate injection of qualified policy knowledge within the parameters 
of Parliament is necessary. 
 
Recommendation 4:  Debating the existence of the PMU  
 
The study recommends a debate, so to understand the need for a relevant and effective 
Policy Unit to exist within the political framework. A debate of this nature would be a 
positive step towards proper conceptualisation, realignment, and reconfiguration of the 
current PMU. Such a debate will also enlighten policy decision-makers about the actual 
role and functions of the PMU, as a supporting tool in national policy debates. The 
anticipation is that, debating the existence of a properly conceptualised Unit will certainly 
bring back the respect that Parliament deserves, where debates will emphasise a need for 
legislative expertise, policy analysts, professionals and researchers to exist. This 
underlies therefore, specific and direct strategic interventions in the coordination and 
management of policy input-output and outcome, to support the policy analysis and 
research needs of legislators.  
 
Recommendation 5: Institutionalisation of the PMU   
 
The study recommends that the PMU should be structured so it can fully address both 
international and domestic legislative agendas. A reconfigured PMU that is politically 
framed and driven, and compelled to non-partisan operation, is what the study 
recommends. Such a PMU will then have to account and report to the Speaker of the 
National Assembly as the political head of Parliament. It will be a Unit that is accessible 
to all Members of Parliament, irrespective of party political affiliations. The study 
recommends and advocates for a Unit that is and should be a cross-cutting division, set to 
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provide objective policy analysis beyond party political lines. A Unit that will present 
itself as professional or adequate source of information, that will not legitimise what is 
already known and desired by politicians. This study recommends therefore that, 
Parliament should institutionalise the PMU to benefit politicians so to realise and perform 
efficiently in their national and political mandate. The study also recommends that, 
Parliament should consider re-establishing the PMU under an Act of Parliament. By such 
it (Parliament) will ensure that any services provided to MPs by the PMU will be 
subjected to confidentiality, and that the Unit does not operate in a vacuum.  
 
Recommendation 6: Realigning the PMU to the core business of Parliament 
 
A working synergy between the existing institutional support structures, including the 
PMU, will definitely promote knowledge, so to advance adequate input when responding 
to the ongoing needs of legislators on issues pertaining to public policy-making, analysis 
of legal matters and evidence-based policy research. This study recommends for the re-
conceptualisation of the current Unit, so to exist along or rather have close working 
relationship with the already established institutional support structures in Parliament, 
such as the Parliamentary Research Unit, Legislation Office, and the Bills Office, to 
name just a few. Moreover Parliament should take steps in restructuring and realigning 
the PMU to support such units.  
 
Recommendation 7: Building relationships with think-tanks 
 
The study recommends and envisages that the PMU is able to share policy knowledge 
and information with other key actors, whilst preserving professionalism in executing its 
duties. This recommendation proposes a working relationship between the PMU (as the 
in-house policy unit) with independent (or outside of the official political framework) 
policy units, where they will develop a common understanding in domestic and 
international policy issues. As indicated before, think-tanks around the world are 
perceived as fundamental role players in critical policy issues. This is based on the 
understanding think-tanks understand ‗better‘ and engage more with ordinary citizens. 
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Such a strategic relationship will therefore directly and indirectly assist both the Unit and 
Parliament in levelling and communicating national policies effectively and efficiently.  
 
Think-tanks contain and produce sufficient and credible policy intellectuals who 
advocate, lobby, shape, and influence policy agendas. For that, it is worth recommending 
the existence of a coordinated and properly managed relationship between the PMU and 
think-tanks. The motive for such a relationship is to improve trust, cooperation, and cross 
boundary communication, to scientifically explore various facets of public policies, and 
to advance the facilitation of mutually consensual training and strategic planning in 
public policy-making. A systematic cooperation should, if and when necessary, include 
joint facilitation of periodic workshops and seminars, as a way of complimenting the role 
that each player contributes for better informed public policy alternatives and guidelines.  
 
Recommendation 8: Policy management capacity         
 
Literature review and findings reveal that, Parliament‘s role and functions come with 
complications and challenges, particularly when it comes to matters relating to law and 
public policy-making. There is a compelling demand to create a synergy between 
capacity building, evidence-based policy research, and public policy-making, so to 
promote or uplift the confidence of the elite in policy decision-making. This study reveals 
that, lack of capacity building leads to poor policy debates, resulting in irrelevant and 
inappropriate policies. For that, the study recommends that, the South African National 
Parliament should come up with innovations and interventions that will assist to integrate 
quality policy researchers and analysts into the main stream of national politics, as 
transmitters and sources of intellectual and technical abilities. Parliament should embark 
on a search for policy professionals who meet the standards of good quality policy 
researchers; advisors, analysts, monitors, and evaluators. Who will understand the effects 
of the external environment and the importance of evidence-based policy research. These 
individuals should be included in the PMU considering the size of the current Unit. A 
properly conceptualised PMU should have the capacity and the mandate to work close 
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with independent policy units, and academic institutions in developing capacity building 
programmes (workshops o seminars) for the benefit of legislators. 
 
Recommendation 9: Developing a new generation of policy analysts 
 
This study recommends that, for an effective and vibrant Parliament to exist, you need a 
policy and research unit that is sufficiently incapacitated in terms of quality and quantity 
of its human resource. Hence, Parliament should develop a system where necessary skills 
are recruited and retained for, and within, the institution. A developmental strategy, 
where new upcoming analysts, researchers, monitoring and evaluation students, are 
encouraged to take part in internship programmes within Parliament, should be designed.   
 
 
 
7.3 AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
 
It is recommended that further research be conducted on: 
 
 Case studies of policy management units in other parliaments. 
 
 The development of a feasible model of an in-house policy unit that will provide 
external technical policy analysis in support of parliament. 
 
 Possible ways in designing working relations between the policy units in parliament, 
political parties and the state in general with think-tanks.        
 
 Political and intellectual interconnectivity or approach needed to create, implement 
and monitor appropriate political policies. 
 
 Challenges and dynamics in monitoring and evaluating public policies. 
 
 Public participation in public policy making processes. 
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Emerging from the discussions with Professor John Bardill, School of Government, 
UWC. Recommendations for future research were made, which includes: 
 
 The commitment or political will by legislators in enabling the PMU to play a broader 
role in terms of policy advice and support.     
 
 The effects of a dominant party system with the overwhelming majority for the ruling 
party, as the main reason for ineffective and inefficient parliamentarians in policy 
deliberations, profound decision making and oversight.   
 
 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate the role of policy management units, 
including the PMU in the South African National Parliament in particular. The secondary 
objectives seek, among others, to provide a theoretical perspective on the role of policy 
management units and to record and develop a case study of the PMU in Parliament. 
  
The researcher has been able to effectively collate relevant and appropriate literature in 
support of the view that, policy units are generally and specifically the providers of 
evidence-based policy research. They are multi-disciplinary service providers, thus 
constitute professional policy experts. As revealed by literature review, the prerequisite 
of a policy unit is to provide policy analysis, policy advice, policy alternatives, evidence-
based policy research, policy advocacy, monitoring and evaluation, and policy 
management capacity on macro-governmental policies. Also of note, policy units do 
provide administrative or internal policy support to parliaments.  
 
According to the Constitution, Parliament is required and expected to be an important 
law-making organ, to be directly involved in legislative matters by initiating, considering, 
passing, amending, and of course rejecting legislation. Parliament‘s role also include 
 
 
 
 
 121 
monitoring, with much emphasise on accountability through its oversight duty over the 
Executive. As this study shows, Parliament is regrettably faced with lack of technical 
ability, policy management capacity, and confidence to initiate, deliberate, interpret and 
analyse public policy issues. For this reason, the research recommends and concludes 
that, the South African National Parliament Policy Management Unit has to be realigned, 
encouraged, and augmented to perform its actual duties as a political structured Unit. The 
PMU should provide timely technical support and advice, and to assist with monitoring 
and evaluation, for good governance and better service delivery for all South Africans.  
 
The study has systematically agued that, policy management is, and has been a complex 
discipline with substantial implications particularly to key and core policy actors. 
Parliaments, in the Africa continent, including the African Union, and the Pan African 
Parliament, as shown by the study, need to develop a conceptual framework and 
understanding on the role and functions of policy management units in relation to 
governance and policy development in Africa. A proper diagnosis of adequate public 
policy making in Africa depends on institutional capacity. 
  
If appropriately utilised, policy units, could assist in consolidating the development of 
public policies, democratic governance, monitoring and evaluation, socio-economic and 
the political growth for Africa, and South Africa in particular. Growth, stability and 
democracy shall only be maintained if and when Africa reconciles political power and 
activities with expert knowledge. 
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Republic informing her that he had reservations about the constitutionality of the 
following Bill: Broadcasting Amendment Bill [B 72B—2008] (National 
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letter reads as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 147 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 148 
 
 
1. Please indicate your role in the South African National Parliament. 
 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2. Which issues are the biggest impediments to Parliament being able to play its role as a law-
making body?  
 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3. In your opinion what are the key missing skills that the Parliament needs to continue 
making adequate input on socioeconomic issues? 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4. In your opinion what is the role of the Policy Management Unit (PMU) in the South  
African National Parliament? 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
5. Would you recommend for a more capacitated PMU that will technically assist Parliament 
by providing policy advice, policy analysis and research for better deliberations, 
amendments, passing and rejecting the proposed and existing Bills? 
 
 
Agree Do not 
agree 
I don’t 
know 
APPENDIX D:  Questionnaire 
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6. Section 55 (1)(b) of the Constitution stipulates that, ―The National Assembly may initiate 
or prepare legislation, except the money Bill‖. To realize such an in-house Policy Unit with 
full technical expertise is necessary. 
 
   
Agree Do not 
agree 
I don’t 
know 
 
 
7. How do you think Parliament can be better equipped to make evidence based policy 
decisions?   
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
8. Do you think MPs require extensive skills, training on legislative issues? Please explain. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
9. Public policy making is a complex exercise. What mechanisms should be in place to 
prepare parliamentarians to deal with the highly intensive, challenging and complex policy 
matters? 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
10. Do you think that good working relationship and sharing of policy research information 
between Parliament as a decision maker, with non-official policy makers (independent policy 
institutions) is necessary and essential?  If yes, how do you go about building this 
relationship? Please provide example[s] of existing relationships. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION 
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Friday, 9 October, 2009 15:16 
 
 
 
From: "Gail Dyers" <gdyers@parliament.gov.za> 
To: pqwakalol@yahoo.co.uk 
Cc: "Sindisiwe Mthembu" <smthembu@parliament.gov.za> 
 
 
Dear Mr Qwaka, 
 
 
As discussed. Please be informed that the Secretary to 
Parliament has granted permission for you to conduct research 
as part of your studies in our Policy Management Unit. 
 
 
For further enquiries, you may contact the Secretary to the 
Policy Management Unit, Ms Sindisiwe Mthembu on 021.403.2781. 
 
 
Thank you and regards 
 
 
Gail Dyers 
Administrative Officer 
Office of the Secretary  
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 
P.O. Box 15, CAPE TOWN, 8000 
direct tel:  (021) 403.2509 / fax:  (021) 403.2604 
e-mail:  gdyers@parliament.gov.za 
website:  www.parliament.gov.za 
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